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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Evolution of EU SSR Concept; Congo as its Test Case 
Since the turn of the millennium, in the aftermath of the devastating Congo Wars that 
had claimed the lives of millions of people, the European Union (EU) has allocated 
substantial resources for the post-conflict statebuilding in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC). A significant share of this statebuilding support provided by the EU has 
been allocated to a recently emerged policy concept branded as Security Sector Reform 
or Security System Reform (SSR).  
Supported through its development and security policy instruments, the EU has rapidly 
emerged as the lead donor in the support of the Congolese SSR. Since 2005, the 
European Council has established two Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP, 
former ESDP) civilian crisis management missions, the European Union police mission in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUPOL RD Congo) and the European Union 
Mission to Provide Advice and Assistance for Security Sector Reform in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (EUSEC RD Congo), to support a comprehensive reform of the 
Congolese police and military respectively (Council Joint Actions 2004/847/CFSP, 9 
December 2004; and 2005/355/CFSP, 2 May 2005). The European Commission, in turn, 
has supported the Congolese SSR by complementing the CSDP missions’ actions in 
military and police sectors, as well as by strengthening the justice system through its 
development assistance instruments (Hoebeke et al. 2007, 5). The other EU actors, such 
as the EU Special Representative for the African Great Lakes Region (EUSR) and the 
European External Action Service (EEAS), have been mandated to support the 
coordination of the EU SSR activities, while some EU Member States have 
complemented the EU action with their own assistance. (More & Price 2011, 17–19).  
Interestingly, the EU engagement in the Congolese security sector reform is in fact the 
first time that the EU has engaged in a military reform in a third country through a CSDP 
mission (Clément 2009, 243), and the first time that the EU has supported a police 
reform through a CSDP mission in Africa (More & Price 2010, 11). Furthermore, this has 
been the first time that the EU actors responsible for the implementation of 
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development and security policies have formally tried to develop a coordinated joint-
approach for any third country’s comprehensive SSR (Keane 2008, 224). 
However, the EU’s significant support to the Congolese SSR can not be interpreted as 
having emerged in a vacuum or being a mere coincidence. In fact, the post-conflict 
statebuilding in the Congo has coincided with the evolution of the EU’s SSR approach, 
and has therefore provided an ideal test case or “laboratory”, as Knutsen (2009, 456) 
argues, for the EU to try out its emerging SSR policies and instruments in practice.  
When approaching the emergence of the security sector reform as an EU policy concept 
through a historical perspective, it becomes clear that the concept has since the 1990s 
gradually become an increasingly important tool for the EU’s engagement in fragile 
states through its development and security policies. This development stems from 
three overlapping structural processes that have taken place in the post-Cold War world. 
Firstly, it can be seen as a practical effort for the EU to respond to the challenges posed 
by emerging fragile states that are cursed with civil wars, and to prevent the escalation 
of such internal conflicts through statebuilding. Secondly, it links to the EU’s inter-
institutional development and the deepening merger of its development and security 
policies, as well as to the attempt to increase collaboration between the institutions 
responsible for these policies and competencies. Thirdly, it can be interpreted as an 
ideological shift in the post-Cold War development thinking, which emphasises conflict 
prevention through a building of a robust liberal democratic state, and sees this 
statebuilding as a panacea to various development and security challenges.  
Whether the emerging EU SSR approach is interpreted as the EU’s effort to respond to 
state fragility in the post-Cold War context, as the EU’s inter-institutional development, 
or as a merger of development and security policies following a larger ideological 
paradigm shift, on a policy level this shift is not limited to the European Union's action. 
On the contrary, the EU approach to Security Sector Reform follows closely the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) Guidelines on Security System Reform and 
Governance in a number of ways. For example, the EU approach to SSR is based on the 
concept of broad security, which particularly focuses on how security is produced in a 
given context, and how the security system operates. Understanding which actors, 
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formal and informal, take part in the production of security and approaching the reform 
through a system-focused approach have therefore key importance (OECD 2004a, 11).  
Furthermore, the notion of security in the EU approach to SSR is also based on the 
concept of human security, following once again the OECD DAC Guidelines1. For human 
security, security is not only regarded as the survival and security of the state and a 
particular regime but above all as security of the citizens and as protection of their 
fundamental rights (Buxton 2008, 27–29). Furthermore, for this concept, security is not 
only regarded as an absence of ‘fear’ and violence but also as an absence of ‘want’: As 
an absence of extreme poverty and vulnerability. Security and development, or lack of 
those, are therefore regarded as mutually reinforcing and mutually dependent 
processes (OECD 2005, 12).  
Furthermore, the EU policy documents2 call for adoption of a comprehensive approach 
for the EU engagement in any third country SSR. In the DRC context this means that the 
Commission and the Council have – for the first time in the EU’s history – adopted 
a ’Comprehensive EU Approach to SSR in the DRC’ joint-document that guides the EU 
action in the Congolese SSR (Keane 2008, 224). In particular, it seeks to ensure that all 
the EU actors support the reform in a comprehensive and coordinated manner (ibid. 
2008, 224).  
The EU’s comprehensive approach to SSR is very normative regarding its language. For 
example, it sees security in a broad manner and builds on the concept of human security, 
stating that a key principle for the EU action is to ensure ‘that Congolese security actors 
become a source of security rather than insecurity for [the Congolese] citizens’. National 
ownership, good governance, democratic norms, the rule of law, respect for human 
rights, and strengthening the governance of security institutions are among other key 
priorities identified in the document. (Keane 2008, 224–225)  
                                                     
1 The EU SSR approach is based particularly on Council and Commission SSR Concept documents as well 
as a joint-EU concept document, which all explicitly use the DAC guidelines as a key reference point. 
2 As will be presented later in more detail, in 2005 and 2006 the Council and the Commission each adopted 
their SSR policy documents, which claim the legal basis for the EU SSR action, and which call for a 
development of country-specific comprehensive approach concepts. In November 2008, the Council and 
the Commission adopted a ‘Comprehensive EU Approach to SSR in the DRC’, a joint-document to guide 
the EU’s SSR support specifically in the Congo.   
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1.2 Research Questions; Relevance of Research for Development Studies 
The focus of this study is in the EU officials' understanding and implementation of the 
normative aspects of the EU SSR policy in the DRC. First, the study aims to assess how 
the EU officials understand the normative aspects of the EU SSR policy. The second 
objective of the study is to find out how the EU actors impelementing this normative 
policy actually succeed in their task. In other words, the study explores the EU 
engagement in the Congolese SSR and scrutinises to what extent the practice, the EU’s 
practical engagement, corresponds with the theory, i.e. the normative policy objectives. 
In particular, the thesis asks the following question:  
To what extent the EU security sector reform support action in the DRC has 
succeeded in understanding and adopting an approach that focuses on 
security system thinking and the concept of broad security, and that seeks to 
promote human security? 
The topic and the research questions for this thesis have been selected on normative 
grounds. The study is being undertaken as part of the Master’s degree studies in 
Development Studies at the University of Helsinki, Finland. The author wants to carry 
out a study that would both be of a great interest to himself, as well as possibly be of 
use for the practitioners. In particular, the aspiration of the author is that the study 
would help identifying possible shortfalls and gaps in the implementation of the EU’s 
normative security sector approach. Moreover, the author also tries to explain some of 
the factors contributing to the potential gaps, which would allow the practitioners to 
design and implement their work. 
In addition, the research focusing on the EU statebuilding policy implementation in the 
Congolese SSR is highly relevant to the discipline of development studies. Firstly, the EU 
together with its Member States is currently by far the largest provider of development 
assistance in the world (Commission 2014, 3). Moreover, the EU’s development policies 
reflect and influence the policies of its Member States, including Finland. Therefore it is 
particularly interesting to see in what ways the EU is possibly refocusing its resources 
allocated to development and to civilian crisis management support, and how the Union 
is redetermining its policies and approaches. Furthermore, as the Congolese SSR is the 
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first time the EU support is actually based on a jointly-stated comprehensive approach 
(Keane 2008, 224), it is relevant to find out how this policy, based on the principle of 
human security and the concept of broad security, is implemented in the DRC context.  
This research is also timely for the discipline of development studies because it directly 
links to the larger debate regarding the increasing merger of security and development 
policies. The linkage is particularly relevant to the ongoing discussion on the security-
development nexus, which considers development and security as mutually reinforcing 
and dependent processes (OECD 2005, 11–12). While this thesis does not specifically 
focus on the larger discussion around the security-development nexus, and the 
sometimes feared securitisation of development funding, it has to be noted here that 
this perception of the inter-connectedness between development and security is 
inherent in the concept of human security. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
engage extensively in this debate it should be remembered that the concept of security-
development nexus is not necessarily an entirely unproblematic perception3.  
Another important debate for development studies that is also relevant for this 
particular study, includes the discussion regarding statebuilding and the role of the state 
in providing prosperity and protection to its citizens. First of all, it should be noted that 
the concept of a Western liberal democratic state is based on what Weber (1964) has 
conceptualised regarding the capabilities of a modern nation state. This state possesses 
a monopoly of a legitimate use of force within its boundaries. This type of a nation state 
has historically emerged in a very different setting than that of the contemporary Congo. 
On the contrary, in the context of the Congo, and particularly in some of its more remote 
regions, state has never really enjoyed a particularly high legitimacy as a provider of 
protection and welfare to its people, as will be discussed later. Therefore important 
questions are whether, to what extent, and in what cost, can statebuilding even be 
transferred and reproduced in the context of a multi-ethnic Congo, where the concept 
of state has practically been imported by the colonial master.  
                                                     
3 For example, according to Koponen (2010, 23–26), and Bueger & Venneson (2009,4), the notions and 
the characteristics of the concepts of security and development, as well as the linkage connecting the two 
are rather broad, elusive and ill-defined, and therefore the argued interconnection should not be taken 
for granted.  
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1.3 Data and Methodology 
The study has adopted a qualitative research approach that aims to look at the 
implementation of the EU SSR policies from a case-specific point of view. Case study as 
a method seeks to provide a deep understanding of a particular phenomenon or event. 
As Devine (in March & Stoker 2002, 207) writes, the advantage of this type of method 
is “to explore people’s experiences, practices, values and attitudes in depth and to 
establish their meaning for those concerned”.  
The starting point for carrying out this study are the various EU policy documents 
defining the EU action in the DRC, as well as other relevant sources that shed light into 
the EU action in the Congo. After a careful desk review and a construction of 
understanding of the actual EU support activities, interviews have been carried out with 
the key officials implementing the EU action. The data gathered through these 
stakeholder interviews has been codified and categorised, and interpreted and analysed. 
The author’s aspiration has been that the findings would reveal something about the 
implementation of the EU comprehensive approach in the DRC. 
As noted by Devine (2002, 207) the findings and results achieved through qualitative 
methods cannot be easily generalised as such to other phenomena and events. The aim 
of this study is therefore not to try to understand or explain how the EU comprehensive 
action is operating everywhere in the world, nor to argue that the findings of this thesis 
would apply to the EU action in other countries as such. However, even though the 
thesis focuses on the EU SSR action and its possible successes and challenges in the 
context of the Congo, it could nevertheless open some avenues and discussion points 
for future studies that focus on the implementation of the EU security and development 
policies in other countries. Furthermore, as many of the principles and policies discussed 
in this thesis do apply to the EU SSR action in other countries as well, and as the EU 
action in the DRC has often been quoted as a model for the EU comprehensive approach, 
the findings of this study can possibly reveal something about the direction the EU 
external action is currently moving towards. In this way, the findings of this thesis might 
be of a value to anyone interested in the future of the EU security and development 
policies in a more general level. 
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The work on the methodological part of the study was initiated by carrying out an 
extensive literature review that focused on the following topics: the history of the 
conflict and insecurity in the Congo; the merger of the EU security and development 
policies; the key EU SSR, statebuilding, conflict prevention and development policy 
concept documents; and the various articles and academic papers focusing on the EU 
SSR support in the DRC. This was complemented by studying various internet and other 
sources to achieve a proper understanding of the actual EU activities in the Congo: the 
websites of the Commission and the Council; the various EU policy and strategy papers; 
as well as statements and press releases. Some of the key documents reviewed for the 
purposes of this analysis include the European Security Strategy, the Council and the 
Commission concept documents on Security Sector Reform, the EU joint-document on 
Security Sector Reform, and the ‘Comprehensive EU Approach to SSR in the DRC’ joint-
strategic document that presents the EU’s approach in the Congolese SSR.  
However, some key documents relevant to the analysis of this thesis, including the 
above-mentioned ‘Comprehensive EU approach to SSR in the DRC’, were not easy to 
access. After several requests both to the Commission and the EEAS, and after months 
of waiting, the EEAS responded that the document in question is “classified as 
‘RESTREINT UE’, which means that the unauthorised disclosure of the information they 
contain could be disadvantageous to the interests of the European Union or of one or 
more of its Member States”. Furthermore, the letter, sent by the General Secretariat of 
the Council of the European Union, signed by the Jakob Thomsen, stated the following: 
Full release of these documents, which contain internal information and 
assessments, would still weaken the position of the European Union at the 
international level and in particular affect relations with the DR Congo. 
Accordingly, pursuant to Article 4(1)(a), third indent of the Regulation 
(protection of the public interest with regard to international relations), the 
General Secretariat is unable to accede to your request. However, pursuant to 
Article 4(6) of the Regulation, you may have access to those parts of the 
documents which are not covered by this exception. Enclosed you will find the 
partially accessible version of the documents in question.  
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(Council 2012c) 
In practice, this meant that a full access to the document in question was effectively 
denied, as the interests of the EU could be compromised. This obviously made it more 
difficult to study the implementation of the EU’s comprehensive approach. Fortunately 
the “partially accessible document” did contain enough information to reveal the main 
objectives and the key principles. Furthermore, secondary sources, such as David 
Spence & Philipp Fluri’s brilliant “The EU and Security Sector Reform” (2008), and 
particularly its chapter 11, on the “SSR in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: the role 
played by the European Union”, by Rory Keane, turned out as extremely valuable 
sources, presenting an excellent overview of the EU comprehensive approach document. 
With the help of such sources, and combined with other general EU SSR policy 
documents and analyses, it was possible to achieve an adequate understanding of the 
EU approach. 
After completing the desk review, a method used to obtain the primary data for the 
purposes of this study was semi-structured interviews with the key EU officials 
implementing the EU SSR in the DRC. The objective was to interview enough senior-level 
EU officials to gain a good understanding of the EU’s SSR policy implementation in the 
country. The Head of the EU Delegation (HoD), as well as the heads of the two EU CSDP 
civilian crisis management missions (HoMs) operating in the Congo (the EUPOL RD 
Congo and the EUSEC RD CONGO) were approached by letters, in which the objectives 
of the study were presented. The HoD and the HoMs were requested to be kindly 
interviewed, or alternatively to identify some senior level officials who could speak on 
behalf of each organisation. The letter introduced the main topics to be covered in the 
interview and explained the purposes of the study.  
Initially the author was planning to conduct a much larger number of stakeholder 
interviews than what eventually was possible. Moreover, the initial thought was to carry 
out the stakeholder interviews in Kinshasa, in the capital of the DRC. This, however, 
proved unexpectedly difficult: Obtaining a visa to the DRC beforehand was particularly 
challenging, as the Congolese Embassy in Stockholm that was supposed to handle the 
visa application had apparently literally vanished, and despite numerous phone calls to 
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various Congolese embassies and even a visit to Sweden to the supposed-address of the 
Congolese Embassy in Stockholm, the persons responsible for visas were never reached. 
At the same time, getting the interview permits from the different EU entities took 
longer than expected, and agreeing the interview times with the extremely busy EU 
officials during a period of a few days, proved nearly impossible. As it began to seem 
impossible to fill all the planned interviews in a few days of time (that the author could 
have afforded to spend in Kinshasa due to the limited research budget), and as time was 
of the essence, it was decided to carry out the interviews via phone.  
Eventually four senior-level officials were identified from the various EU organisations: 
A senior official working at the EU delegation, one from each of the two CSDP missions, 
and one working as an advisor for both missions. The four interviewed officials included 
three men and one woman, and three of them were currently working with the EU in 
the DRC, while the fourth one had already returned to Europe. All the identified 
interviewees were sent an informed consent-form before hand, ensuring their 
understanding of the voluntariness of participation, the nature of the study, as well as 
their role within it. The interviewees were also informed that they will remain 
anonymous and that they have a right to decline to answer any particular question(s) or 
withdraw from the project at any stage without any disadvantage to themselves. In 
addition, the main topics to be covered during the interview were presented in the 
information document (Annex I). In addition, the participants were asked to fill in a 
background information form that provided sufficient information about the tasks and 
responsibilities of the official himself/herself. Finally, the interviewees were informed 
that the interviews will be recorded and that portions of them will be transcribed. All 
this information was also repeated in the beginning of each interview. 
The collection of the primary data followed a method of semi-structured interviews: The 
main interview topics were divided in three groupings of questions, which focused on 
the interviewees’ views and opinions regarding the root causes and factors behind 
Congo’s insecurity; the extent the EU action has succeeded improving the Congolese 
human security; and the possible challenges to the implementation of the EU 
comprehensive approach in the DRC. No strict pattern or order for posing the questions 
was applied during the interviews but the only aim was to cover all three groups of 
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questions. Follow-up questions were asked based on the interlocutors’ answers. The 
purpose here was also to ask as much open-ended questions as possible, to keep the 
conversation free-flowing, to avoid leading the interviewees towards certain “expected” 
answers, as well as to leave space for arising of possibly unexpected themes (Hirsjärvi & 
Hurme 2008, 47).  
The specific times for the phone interviews with the three officials working in the Congo 
were agreed separately with each of the interviewees, and carried out over a course of 
four weeks between March and April, 2012. The fourth interview was done face to face 
in a coffee shop in a European capital around the same time. None of the participants 
were offered any monetary rewards for participation. The interviews lasted between 45 
minutes and 2.5 hours, depending on the schedules of the officials, and their willingness 
to continue discussion. During the interviews, the officials spoke surprisingly openly. The 
expectation, perhaps even a fear, had been that the officials would follow the usual EU 
Lines-to-Take (LTTs) and not reveal any particular problems regarding the EU action, or 
say anything critical in general. On the contrary, many of them discussed the challenges 
of the EU action in length, and some of them occasionally even mentioned that they 
were talking about “sensitive” or “secretive” matters, and that their identities should 
not be revealed. The author has been careful in protecting the anonymity of 
respondents. For example, all the names, nationalities, sexes, and exact titles are hidden, 
and later in the analysis the interviewees are only identified as officials from CSDP 
mission/EU delegation.  
Regarding the possible limits of the used methods, the fact that most of the interviews 
were eventually carried out over the phone has consequently limited the interaction 
between the interviewer and the interviewee, as well as hidden possible non-verbal 
communication, such as impressions and looks. Furthermore, the phone connection to 
the DRC was at times weak, and during some interviews the connection was actually 
interrupted several times, the call having to be reconnected again. The language used 
in the interviews was normally English. It should also be noted that as this was not the 
mother tongue of any of the interlocutors, it might have affected their capability to 
express themselves, or to use certain exact words and idioms in their responses. The 
same also applies to the interviewer. Moreover, the positionality of the author might 
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have affected the data collection and the received responses. Before carrying out the 
interviews, the author was an outsider to the EU action: a Master’s student from Finland 
without any formal connection to the EU. For example, during the interviews, the 
personal qualities of the interviewer, including his gender, age, nationality and social 
status, might have influenced the interviewees’ attitudes and answers.  
The recorded interviews were normally transcribed in the same or the following days, 
which also practically started the analysis of the raw data. However, carrying out the 
analytical part of this study was completed only in late-2014 and early-2015. This was 
due to the fact that in May 2012 the author was offered a position in Nairobi to support 
the management of the Finnish government’s development assistance to Somalia. By 
early-2013, this position had changed to another position with the European 
Commission, as the author was offered a position with the EU delegation’s Statebuilding 
and Security Sector Reform section. In other words, writing a thesis on the EU 
engagement in the DRC’s SSR had strangely turned into implementation of the EU SSR 
support to Somalia. The particular task of the author was to manage the delegation’s 
human rights and maritime security portfolios, and to contribute to the management of 
the statebuilding and SSR portfolios. Among else, this meant supporting the 
mainstreaming of human rights into EU action accross sections, and representing the 
EU in the donors' main human rights coordination mechanism, the Somalia Human 
Rights Working Group (HRWG), established by the EU to conduct policy dialogue with 
the authorities and the civil society of Somalia on the country’s human rights situation. 
The possibility to actually work with the EU Somalia delegation on statebuilding and 
security sector reform was at the same time a very strange coincidence and a huge 
opportunity. Strange, as it is always easier to point out the problems and to criticise the 
chosen actions as an outsider. An opportunity, as it could also provide valuable insights 
regarding the EU comprehensive approach in action. In particular, this experience could 
possibly help the author to understand some of actions and decisions that the EU actors 
are taking in the DRC’s security sector reform. This is also the reason why the analysis 
of this study focuses on the EU action before mid-2012: All the data for this thesis was 
collected by May-2012, and since the author was working on Somalia until the fall of 
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2014, the thesis has been completed only by early-2015. In practice, the time-span that 
the study covers focuses particularly on the period between 2007 and mid-2012.  
Moreover, the time spent in the Horn of Africa before completing the study might have 
affected the relevance of the findings in 2015. For example, the officials implementing 
the EU action have already changed, particularly in the CSDP side. This might also have 
affected the EU’s subsequent approach and the activities. Furthermore, over the two 
and a half years, the political and the security situation in the Congo have been evolving. 
The disappearance of the rebel group National Council for the Defence of the People 
(CNDP), as well as the emergence of a group M23, and the subsequent fighting, are 
certainly new developments (Wilen 2015). Moreover, the 2015 elections might again 
provide a new window of opportunity for important reforms to be carried out. 
Nevertheless, surprisingly little has actually changed regarding the larger security-
political context: in particular, the formal security providers remain fragile and 
malfunctioning, and incapable of protecting the citizens. As Wilen (2015) notes, the SSR 
in the DRC is “a never-ending story”. Therefore the author believes that the findings of 
this study continue to have relevance at the time it is published in early-2015.  
The approach of this thesis can be described as inductive in that the data and the 
findings have guided its final argument (Hirsjärvi et al. 1996, 248). However, the 
selection of the research questions and the formulation of the theoretical framework 
for the study have nevertheless influenced the analysis of the content. In practical terms, 
the research questions and the central themes of the theoretical part for this study have 
for the most part been written in 2012, and those sections have guided the selection of 
topics and issues emphasised when carrying out the actual data analysis. In other words, 
data has been reflected against the theoretical framework of the study (Hirsjärvi & 
Hurme 2008, 150). Upon returning to Finland in late-2014, the raw analysis was 
continued, as all the formerly transcribed interviews were read again. The central 
themes were then codified and finally categorised based on the interviewees’ answers. 
The writing process of the analysis took two to three months, during which the 
categorisation was adjusted when necessary. Finally, based on the analysis, the research 
questions were answered, and the thesis was finalised. 
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1.4 Outline of the Thesis 
The study is structured as follows: After presenting the research questions and the 
methological considerations in the Introduction chapter, the author presents the 
theoretical foundations and the contextual environment of this study. In particular, 
chapter 2 focuses on the evolution of the EU’s normative SSR policy, and its key concepts 
of human security and security system thinking.  
In chapter 3, focus is turned into a system approach for security analysis, based on the 
work of Kalyvas and Autesserre. Through this type of system-focused approach, and 
based on extensive literature regarding the Congo’s history, a context of the Congo is 
presented that aims to offer a balanced view of the production and reproduction of 
insecurity in the country. 
Chapter 4 introduces the EU’s involvement in the DRC’s security sector reform. In 
particular, the first part of this chapter explains the background of the EU’s support to 
the Congolese security sector reform, while the second part presents the key EU actors 
implementing the reform action, as well as the main activities they have been carrying 
out.  
In chapter 5, the EU action is analysed and the research questions are answered. In 
particular, in this chapter the nature and the main characteristics of the EU SSR action 
in the DRC are assessed against the normative policy objectives. Furthermore, based on 
key stakeholder interviews, the EU officials’ understanding of the normative EU policy 
is analysed. Moreover, based on the interviewees’ responses, different factors are 
identified that may explain the presented outcomes. 
Finally, the study is concluded with a short discussion focusing on some of the themes 
and questions that have risen during the writing process, including the possibilities 
regarding the implementation of the normative EU policies in the Congo, and the 
prospects for statebuilding in this same context.   
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2 EVOLUTION OF EU SECURITY SECTOR REFORM POLICY 
2.1 Introduction: Merger of Security and Development in EU policy 
The European Union’s growing involvement in the third countries security sector 
reforms since the 1990s provides a prime example of how the EU’s development and 
security policies have become increasingly merged as a response to  the greater 
structural transformations that have influenced the patterns in which today’s conflicts 
take place. This chapter provides first a brief overview of the increasing merger of the 
European Union’s security and development policies since the early-1990s, through the 
incorporation of such concepts as conflict prevention and human security, which then 
culminated in the formulation of the EU’s SSR policy concepts, and in the development 
of various EU SSR instruments during the first decade of the new millennium.  
As will be discussed later in chapter 3, by the early-1990s the state authority was in crisis 
in much of the developing countries, and new non-state and inter-state forms of 
authority were rising. Massive internal crises, such as the early-1990s civil wars in 
Yugoslavia and Somalia, and the civil war and genocide in Rwanda, in which the 
international community and particularly the EU could not respond effectively, were 
clear indications that the existing conflict management instruments were out to date. 
Within the EU, such internal crises were increasingly interpreted as being triggered by 
state failures, and particularly the Yugoslavian conflict gave an impetus to rethink the 
Union’s security policies (Merlingen & Ostrauskaite 2006, 36): the EU had been 
incapable in reacting rapidly to such state failure in its own backyard, having eventually 
had to resort to the NATO’s support, and give green light to a US intervention.  
As a response, addressing the root causes of conflicts, the state failures, was 
incorporated into the EU’s security analyses: In order to prevent violent internal 
conflicts from erupting, which often took place in the context of failing states, links 
between security and development needed to be understood, and addressed. The 
assumption was that development and security actors could both gain from cooperation. 
Building democratic governance and improving life conditions in general depended on 
a peaceful environment. Similarly, conflicts could not be eradicated without addressing 
the root causes that were often linked to development failures (Hänggi 2004, W).  
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As will be discussed in the following chapter, in the field of development the emergence4 
of this ‘security-development nexus’ took place in the context of failing structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs), which had emphasised market-oriented economic 
growth as the prime vehicle for development. Instead of having brought prosperity for 
the majority of the people in the developing world, the drastic privatisation and 
liberalisation policies of the 1980s had often only worsened their standards of living, as 
public services and subsidies had been scaled down (Hewitt 200, 300–304). Furthermore, 
together with the intensifying globalisation and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
such policies had contributed to the eradication of the state authority, which in turn had 
allowed the emergence of new internal security threats, as new sub-state authorities 
began to challenge the state’s monopoly over violence (Duffield 2001, 146–151). As the 
understanding was growing regarding the inter-linkages between development failures 
and the production of insecurity, the one-eyed focus on market-oriented economic 
growth as a development paradigm started gradually to give room to governance-
focused poverty-reduction approaches, as well as to an inclusion of development 
aspects into the security programming, and vice versa (Gourlay 2008, 80–82). 
Reflecting the increasing merger of the development and security agendas, the United 
Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Report (HDR) of 1994 
stated that insuring ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from fear’ for all persons is the 
most effective way to tackle the problem of global insecurity. This new approach was 
essentially based on a broader conception of security, as it included development 
objectives – ‘freedom from want’ – and argued that there could be no security without 
development. Furthermore, this so-called human security approach essentially held 
that a proper referent for security should be an individual rather than the state, and 
argued that a people-centred security approach, which recognised the links between 
security and development, and focused on improving the lives of the most vulnerable, 
was necessary for national, regional and global stability (Buxton 2008, 27–29). 
                                                     
4 However, as Koponen (2010, 23–26) notes, the considerations in the current discourse around security-
development nexus cannot necessarily be taken to be new as such. Rather, what is new is that they now 
appear in a new configuration. 
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As a consequence of the growing understanding of the interlinkages between the 
development failures and the emergence of conflicts, or development and security, the 
EU’s development and security policies started to increasingly merge. A good example 
of this is the emergence of conflict prevention as a new policy objective. This is well 
reflected in the High Representative Javier Solana’s contribution to the EU Strategy for 
Africa (2005), as he stated that for sustainable European Security and Defence Policy 
missions, civil and military initiatives need to be better linked to the EU’s longer term 
conflict prevention and development programmes; while development and conflict-
prevention initiatives have to similarly support the crisis management missions’ 
objectives (Solana 2005, 2–4). 
In fact, with regards to the evolution of the EU’s security policy, as early as in 1992 (at 
the time when the conflict in Yugoslavia was intensifying), the Western European Union 
(WEU) Council meeting at the Hotel Petersberg in Bonn had agreed on certain 
humanitarian, peacekeeping, and crisis management tasks that could be supported 
militarily, among them conflict prevention. In 1997, during the European summit in 
Amsterdam, these ‘Petersberg tasks’ were incorporated in the Treaty of Amsterdam 
(amending the Treaty of European Union or the Maastricht Treaty), which came in force 
in 1998. The new Treaty defined the European Security and Defence Policy, (ESDP), now 
the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The ESDP/CSDP was incorporated in 
the European/Common Foreign and Security policy (EFSP/CFSP), the EU’s ‘second pillar’. 
This was followed by creation of civilian crisis management mechanism and 
establishment of concrete ‘Civilian Headline Goal’ in the 1999–2000 European Council 
meetings. Since then, the ESDP/CSDP has provided an operational framework for the 
EU’s military and civilian crisis management efforts. (Law and Myshlovska 2008, 14)  
A good example of the adoption of conflict prevention as an EU security policy objective, 
and of the inclusion of development agendas such as prevention of state failure into the 
EU security policies, is provided in the 2003 ‘European Security Strategy’ (ESS). Firstly, 
state failure, is listed as a key security threat for Europe in the document. Furthermore, 
all the other security threats for Europe identified in the document (Council 2003a, 3–
4), such as the emergence of terrorist groups and their acquiring of weapons of mass 
destruction, growth of organised crime, and regionalisation of conflicts, are at least 
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indirectly linked to state failures. Moreover, instead of tackling these threats purely 
militarily, the Strategy proposes a use of mixture of instruments, including political 
solutions, humanitarian assistance, and economic/development instruments, as well as 
military and civilian crisis management (Council 2003a, 7). 
Conflict prevention, and the inclusion of security objectives, has similarly become 
mainstreamed in the EU’s development policy: For example, the ‘Commission 
Communication from 1996 on peacebuilding and prevention of African conflicts’ states 
that development has a key role in conflict prevention and regulation in Africa 
(Commission 1996, 2–3). A major shift in the Commission’s development policies took 
place in 2000, as the development policy objectives were formally redefined to include 
security and conflict prevention (Santiso 2002, 6). As a result, already in 2000, the DG 
Development, the Commission’s unit responsible for development cooperation with 
African, the Caribbean, and the Pacific States (now part of the Development and 
Cooperation Directorate General – EuropeAid) took conflict prevention on its agenda. 
Soon after, in 2001, the DG Relex, the Commission's External Relations Directorate 
General, created a Conflict and Peacebuilding Unit (Weiler 2009, 11). 
The subsequent Commission communications have similarly emphasised the linkages 
between security and development, and the importance of conflict prevention for 
development. For example, The Commission’s ‘Communication on Conflict Prevention’ 
(2001), ‘the Communication on Governance and Development’ (2003), ‘the 
Communication for Policy Coherence for Development’ (2005a), ‘the Communication on 
a Strategy of the External Dimension of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (2005b), ‘the 
Communication on Governance in the European Consensus on Development’ (2006b), as 
well as the EU joint-statement (the Commission, the Council, and the Parliament) on the 
European development policy, the ‘European Consensus on Development’ (2005), all 
endorse the importance of understanding of the linkages between development and 
security, and emphasize the importance of addressing development failures to prevent 
conflicts.  
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2.2 EU and Emergence of Security Sector Reform Concept 
2.2.1 Emergence of Human Security-focused SSR Concept 
In the context of increasingly merging development and security policies since the 1990s, 
security sector reform has emerged as a central concept for the EU to address conflict 
prevention, human security, and governance issues simultaneously. In practice, the 
Union’s involvement in the third countries’ security sector reform (although not yet 
conceptualised as such) begun with its projected enlargement to the former communist 
states of the Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Bailes 
2008, xiv–xv). In order to qualify for the EU membership, the candidate countries had 
to achieve certain accession criteria, defined in the Copenhagen summit in 1993. First 
of these so-called Copenhagen Criteria concerned the ‘stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection 
of minorities’. In particular, the document required that the candidate countries had to 
reform their institutions, including their defence, police, and justice sectors in order to 
to fulfil the membership criteria (Buxton 2008, 30).  
The first time the concept of security sector reform was approached through a explicit 
human security perspective was in 1998, as the British Development Cooperation 
Minister Clare Short described how such a reform should particularly improve the 
security of the citizens (Doelle & Gouzée de Harven 2008, 39). Since then, and reflecting 
the increasing merger of the EU’s development and security policies, the EU SSR policy, 
as well as its SSR instruments have been developing rapidly, and today the EU has a wide 
range of security and development instruments and policies available to support third 
countries’ security sector reforms in a broad manner. 
2.2.2 SSR in EU’s Organisational Structure; SSR Funding & Instruments 
With regards to the EU institutions’ involvement in third countries’ SSR-support 
activities, the European Commission (the Commission) and the Council of the European 
Union (the Council), are the key actors. Within the European Union’s organisational 
structure the EU’s development policy has traditionally been defined belonging under 
the European Communities’ (the former first pillar) competence, meaning that the 
responsibility to manage the EU’s development programmes has traditionally belonged 
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to the Commission. In addition, the Member States have their own development policy 
instruments. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (the former second pillar), 
under which budget line the CSDP civilian missions fall, has in turn been conducted inter-
governmentally through the Council (Derks & More 2009, 1). In the EU, the division 
between development and security policies has traditionally been rather strict, meaning 
that the Council has not been entitled to implement any projects that can be understood 
as falling under the development policy line (although management of the EDF, 
discussed later, is an exception to this), whereas the Commission-controlled 
development assistance has traditionally been restricted to cover only Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) eligible activities, leaving out any security-focused 
action (Gourlay 2008, 81).  
However, the increasing merging of security and development agendas since the 1990s 
has made it increasingly difficult to draw a clear line between development and security 
policies. The ensuing ambiguity has in fact resulted in an inter-institutional ‘turf-war’, 
which even led to the Commission taking the Council to the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) in the so-called ECOWAS/SALW case in 2006. This particular case concerned the 
dividing line between security and development policies and the division of 
responsibilities, after a CSDP mission had supported ECOWAS in the framework of its 
Moratorium on small arms and light weapons (Doelle & Gouzée de Harven 2008, 52). 
With the Lisbon Treaty having come into force in December 2009, the pillar system has 
formally been abandoned, and certain units from both the Council and the Commission 
have been partly integrated to the European External Action Service (EEAS/EAS), the 
new EU ‘foreign ministry’, which formally started operations in December 2010. 
However, following the Maastricht Treaty’s provisions, development policy still 
generally belongs to the EC competence, whereas primarily security-related actions are 
conducted by the Council. This division between security and development policies, as 
the ECOWAS case shows (and as will be discussed further when the EU’s SSR action in 
the DRC is discussed), certainly brings additional challenges to the adoption of a 
coordinated and comprehensive EU security sector reform approach.  
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The Council-led CSDP missions, which draw their personnel from the Member States’ 
experts, are divided into military and civilian missions. While the military action can take 
various peace enforcement forms, the civilian missions are the Council’s key tool to 
support SSR projects in third countries. The first CSDP civilian missions, including the 
very first mission ‘the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (EUPM) 
in 2003, were predominantly aimed at enhancing policing capacities in target countries 
(Gourlay 2008, 92–93). Later on, the scope of the civilian missions has gradually 
broadened, and the Council has established missions that have included support for rule 
of law (RoL), border monitoring, and demobilisation. As will be discussed later, the 
EUSEC RD Congo, established in 2005 and a focus of the analysis of this thesis, was the 
first CSDP mission in which the EU seeks to support a comprehensive military reform 
(Clément 2009, 243). By April 2012, the Council had established 24 CSDP missions, of 
which 16 have been civilian missions, seven military missions, and one combined both 
civilian and military aspects. 
The CSDP missions are established by CFSP joint-Actions, approved by the government 
representatives of each Member State in the Minister Council meetings. Missions have 
generally a short-term focus (whereas the EC assistance is more long-term-oriented) as 
they are planned to last for one to three years (although in practice many of the CSDP 
missions’ mandates, including the SSR missions in the DRC, are often extended). The 
Council’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) has been tasked to monitor the 
international situation of the CFSP/CSDP action and to advice the Council to define CFSP 
policies (Gourlay 2008, 92).  
In May 2006, the EU institutions (the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission 2006, 1–17) constructed an inter-institutional agreement on the EU’s 
financial framework for the period of 2007-2013, which introduced the agreed EU action 
priorities for the period in question. Among the identified four priorities were two 
segments that are particularly relevant for security and development: the completion 
of the EU’s common area of ‘freedom, security and justice’ and the establishment of the 
‘EU as a global player’ (Doelle & Gouzée de Harven 2008, 59–60). While the former 
accounts for the EU budgeting on the Union’s internal security and justice aspects, the 
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latter one represents the EU’s external action spending through the EU budget5. This 
includes the EU’s SSR-related support activities in third countries, either through 
external assistance instruments, or through the CFSP budget line.  
As the CSDP civilian missions belong to the budget line of the CFSP, or the former second 
pillar, their common costs are funded from the EU budget, while the running costs are 
generally carried by the participating Member States (Bloching 2011, 6). However, while 
having grown steadily since the early-2000, the whole CFSP budget for 2012 was 
standing only at EUR 363 million, accounting for a mere four percent of the ‘EU as a 
global player’ segment6 (Commission 2011, 36–37).  
The planning process of the CFSP joint-actions has also been rather complex: While the 
decision-making is inter-governmental (taking place at the Council/the PSC), the 
administrative responsibility for the execution of the CFSP budget has rested with the 
Commission’s DG Relex (integrated into the new External Action Service in December 
2010). Before implementation, the decision is still subject to various procedures by the 
Court of Auditors, European Court of Justice, and the Parliament, meaning that the 
process to establish a new mission has often been a rather time-consuming endeavour. 
According to Gourlay (2008, 92–93), this inflexibility, together with the CFSP’s modest 
budget, has limited the use of CSDP missions for SSR support activities. Furthermore, 
mainly due to the complicated decision-making procedure, some of the instruments 
that formerly belonged to the CFSP budget line, such as the European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), were transferred from the CFSP budget to the 
Community budget for the budget period of 2007–2013. (Gourlay 2008, 92–93) 
Together with the transfer of the EIDHR into the Community budget, other reforms 
were also completed to make the EC involvement in the third countries’ SSR more 
                                                     
5 It is important to note that the EU’s external action comprises also activities that do not originate from 
the EU budget, such as the European Development Fund (EDF)-allocations, which come from financial 
contributions from the Member States (European Commission 2008, 373), and the CSDP military missions, 
which are funded through a separate Athena Mechanism and are thus not accounted for the CFSP budget 
(Wouters 2008, 18). 
6 For comparison,  as is discussed below, the Commission’s external assistance instruments (including 
humanitarian aid) account for the rest EUR 8.64 billion of the EUR 9 billion ‘EU as a global player’ budget, 
for 2012 (European Commission 2011, 36–37), and the budget of Member States-funded 10th European 
Development Fund (EDF), stands in EUR 22.7 billion for the five-year period of 2008–2013, averaging 
around EUR 4.5 billion annually (European Commission 2008, 373–375). 
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effective for the 2007–2013 budget period. For example, several of the Commission’s 
previous instruments got merged into new ones and civilian aspects of SSR support were 
included in the strategy papers of many of the geographic and thematic instruments. 
This reflects the increasing merger of development and security agendas in the EU, and 
particularly the 2005 extension of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) eligibility 
criteria to cover several aspects of the area of security (Doelle & Gouzée de Harven 2008, 
40–47). This extension meant that a substantially wider spectrum of security-related 
activities could be financed through development cooperation funds than before. For 
example, the Commission concept for EC SSR support (Commission 2006a, 6–7), 
discussed below in detail, states that the EU’s development support can be directed into 
security sector reforms, “encompassing all civilian aspects of SSR, as well as activities in 
relation to democratic and civilian control of the military parts of SSR, including financial 
and administrative management of defence issues”. Only direct support to the armed 
forces is basically excluded. 
For the budget period of 2007–2013, the Commission-controlled or administrated 
geographic instruments that can be used for SSR support include the Instrument for Pre-
Accession Assistance (IPA), the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 
(ENPI), the Development Co-operation Instrument (DCI), and the European 
Development Fund (EDF)7, while the thematic instruments suitable for SSR-support 
activities are the Instrument for Stability (IfS) and the European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). While the geographic instruments are used 
mainly for long-term ODA eligible development financing, particularly the IfS has 
enough flexibility to be used for short-term support, especially in post-conflict settings 
(Buxton 2008, 27–30), and it can sometimes even bypass the ODA eligibility criteria 
(Doelle & Gouzée de Harven 2008, 40–47). 
As the EC’s external aid programming is generally based on the agreed principles of aid 
effectiveness (the Paris Declaration), all the ODA eligible programming has to be 
                                                     
7 The EDF is funded separately from the EC budget by Member States, and managed inter-governmentally 
by the Council as well as by a specific EDF committee. However, as presented later, it is administrated by 
the Commission’s DG for Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, which is responsible for 
programming and implementation of the projects (European Commission 2008, 376).  
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established in close cooperation with the beneficiaries – in order to ensure local 
ownership (OECD 2008, 3–4). The procedure typically starts with drafting of a Country 
Strategy Paper (CSP) together with the partner country’s government (and sometimes 
a Regional Strategy Paper [RSP]). The CSP/RSP covers the whole budget period of the 
relevant instrument, and identifies specific objectives, as well as focal and non-focal 
sectors for the EU support (Doelle & Gouzée de Harven 2008, 42) 
Following the increasing inclusion of conflict prevention and security provisions into the 
EU’s development policies, the Commission has since the late-1990s provided support 
for numerous third countries in SSR activities. The majority of the supported countries 
have been ‘stable countries in transition to liberal democracies’ (reflecting particularly 
the support given to the former Soviet states), and most of the SSR assistance continues 
to be given through the regional instruments (Buxton 2008, 27–30). Nevertheless, the 
support for post-conflict countries’ SSR has also been steadily increasing, particularly 
due to the establishment of the IfS, and its predecessor, the Rapid-Reaction Mechanism 
(RRM) (Gourlay 2008, 81).  
In practice, however, the mainstreaming of security-related aspects (such as SSR 
provisions) in development programmes varies widely between the different partner 
countries. Gourlay (2008, 99–101) argues that there are several factors that might 
contribute to this: First of all, the political context, including the need to reform the 
security system, and the willingness (or reluctance) of partner governments to include 
SSR aspects to the CSP or RSP largely determines the scope of such reforms. 
Furthermore, the EU’s other interests and objectives, such as economic and trade 
interests, may influence how sensitive issues such as defence reform are addressed in 
the country strategy paper negotiations. Finally, the partner countries’ leverage to 
determine the CSP provisions varies greatly, and it is no coincidence that the CSPs for 
China, Brazil or India do not include any aspects of the SSR, whereas the CSPs for many 
sub-Saharan African countries do so. (Gourlay 2008, 99–101) 
Of the EC administrated instruments particularly the regional instrument EDF, and the 
thematic instruments IfS and EIDHR, are relevant for the purposes of this study, as the 
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EC assistance for the DRC is basically directed through them. Therefore a closer 
examination of these instruments is provided below. 
The European Development Fund is the main instrument for providing EU development 
assistance for 78 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and 20 overseas 
countries and territories (OCTs). Created in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome, its support is 
directed to the areas of economic development, social and human development, as well 
as regional cooperation and integration. 
The 10th EDF is based on the Cotonou agreement, signed in 2000 and revised in 2005. It 
covered the budget period of 2008–2013. The budget of the 10th EDF was EUR 22.7 
billion, and unlike other EC regional instruments, it was separate from the Community 
budget (and also differs from the EC budget cycle of 2007–2013). This means that the 
EDF continues to be funded by the Member States according to their agreed proportions 
(Commission 2008, 374–376). However, over the past decades the Commission has in 
several occasions tried to integrate the EDF into the general budget, without succeeding 
to do so (ibid. 2008, 374). Therefore the EDF remains subject to its own financial rules, 
and is managed formally by the Council, by the Committee of Ambassadors, as well as 
by a specific EDF Committee, which is headed by an EEAS official and consists mainly of 
Member State representatives (as well as a few representatives from the European 
Court of Auditors and the European Investment Bank).  
However, the Commission’s DG for Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, has a 
key-role in the everyday management of the fund, setting programming priorities, and 
formulating the CSPs/RSPs, as well as the annual action plans (in cooperation with 
partner countries). After Commission’s formulation, the EDF Committee has the right to 
approve (or disapprove) the proposal. The decision-making in the Committee follows a 
weighted voting procedure, in which the respective voting power depends on each 
Member State’s contribution to the EDF. The CSPs/RSPs are considered approved when 
a Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) of two-thirds does not reject the EC proposal. 
(Commission 2008, 376) 
Although the Cotonou agreement’s provisions are not explicit on SSR activities, the 
Article 11, which aims at strengthening the linkage between development issues and 
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conflict prevention, management and resolution, provides a strong legal underpinning 
for EDF SSR support (Gourlay 2008, 100). Furthermore, following the 2005 extension of 
ODA eligibility criteria, a variety of SSR activities can be funded through the EDF, and 
already during the 9th EDF (2002–2007), some 35 ACP countries received SSR assistance 
through the Fund. In most cases the SSR-related funding has been rule of law support 
through justice and police reform, or capacity building. However in a few countries, such 
as in Kenya and Chad, civilian oversight mechanisms have also been funded. In post-
conflict countries SSR support is allocated increasingly through Multi-Donor Trust Funds. 
In practice, however, support for governance reforms has until recently received only a 
relatively minor allocation from the EDF budget even in post-conflict countries, as most 
funding has been directed on ‘traditional’ (non-security-related) development support, 
such as infrastructure building projects. (Gourlay 2008, 99–100) 
The vast majority of the EDF funding is consistent with the (extended) ODA eligibility 
rules (Doelle & Gouzée de Harven 2008, 62). However, since 2004, a portion of funding 
has been used to support non-ODA eligible security-related initiatives, such as peace-
support military operations, and military aspects of SSR. This sort of non-ODA eligible 
EDF-funding is often diverted through ‘the African Peace Facility’ (APF), a special 
instrument within the EDF, established in 2004 by the Council “to ensure rapid and 
efficient response to situations of violent conflict”, as stated in the Council Decision 
3/2003 (Council 2003b, 108). In practice, the facility was created to fund peace support 
operations carried out under the authority of the African Union. Its initial budget under 
the 9th EDF was EUR 250 million (Council 2003b, 109), which was later increased by 
another EUR 190 million to a total of EUR 440 million (Commission’s website on the APF, 
accessed 4 April, 2012). 
In 2007, when the 9th EDF was drawing to its end, and reflecting once again the 
increasing inclusion of security provisions into the EU’s development policies, the APF 
was strengthened further. Partly as a response to criticism from the development 
community, which saw the African Peace Facility on merely focusing on short-term 
peacekeeping than on preventive action or long-term capacity building (van Eekelen 
2012, 276), the scope of the Facility was broadened to cover conflict prevention and 
post-conflict stabilisation. This included capacity-building activities in the area of peace 
31 
 
and security and support to coordination processes. The extended scope was in line with 
the newly-issued ‘Africa-EU Joint Strategy’ (The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership 2007), 
which first priority concerned the ‘Promotion of Peace, Security and Stability’. Here, the 
strategy stated that the ‘two continents have laid the foundation for successful 
cooperation based on the need to promote holistic approaches to security, 
encompassing conflict prevention and long-term peace-building, conflict resolution and 
post-conflict reconstruction, linked to governance and sustainable development, with a 
view to addressing the root causes of conflicts” (The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership 
2007, 5). 
Under the current 10th EDF, EUR 300 million was allocated to the APF, adding up the 
total EDF support through the APF to EUR 740 million. Of these, around EUR 600 million 
have been allocated to peace support operations, which continues to be considered as 
the ‘core activity’ of the APF. A total amount of EUR 100 million has been budgeted for 
capacity building. (Commission’s website on the APF, accessed 4 April, 2012) 
Another concrete example of the increasing inclusion of security considerations into the 
EU’s development policy is the establishment of the above-mentioned Instrument for 
Stability, designed to address various security-related challenges in a flexible manner. 
The objectives of the IfS are two-fold, meaning that it has both a short and a long-term 
component. The short-term component is meant to address crisis or emerging crisis 
situations, and to provide rapid and flexible response to such situations. It is not 
constrained by the ODA eligibility criteria, and that it can avoid the cumbersome 
decision-making procedures entailing ‘comitology’8 (Gourlay 2008, 96). This flexibility 
enables the Commission to take a relatively rapid action. In practice, security-related 
activities can be supported through the short-term component in a comprehensive 
manner for up to 18 months (Buxton 2008, 30).  
The long-term component, in turn, is focused on conflict-prevention. It covers ‘stable 
countries’ and trans-regional cooperation, including SSR-support activities to strengthen 
the law enforcement, judicial and civil authorities’ capacities to address organised crime, 
                                                     
8 The cumbersome inter-institutional committee procedure through which the EC development projects 
are typically implemented. 
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terrorism, human trafficking, drugs, firearms, explosives and illegal trade and transit 
(Buxton 2008, 30). The long-term measures of the IfS need to follow the normal 
comitology process (Doelle & Gouzée de Harven 2008, 63), meaning that their 
implementation is not as flexible. 
However, there are certain limitations with the use of the IfS in general, and of the short-
term component in particular. First, the instrument is meant only to complement the 
EC’s regional instruments, and should not be used when it is possible to use any of the 
geographic tools (Commission 2011, 11). Furthermore, due to the traditional division of 
security and development policies within the EU system and the ongoing inter-
institutional ‘turf war’ between the Council and the Commission, the scope of the short-
term component’s army-support has practically been limited to “complement” CSDP 
civilian missions (Gourlay 2008, 96). In other words, the IfS short-term component can 
only engage in military support activities through so-called ‘flanking measures’, meaning 
that it has to complement the objectives of an existing CSDP mission. In practice, this 
has ususally meant that the IfS short-term component can be only used to start the 
preparations for a more comprehensive SSR in a post-conflict situation. The work 
initiated with IfS support is then taken over by a CSDP mission, and possibly later 
followed up with the Commission’s long-term funding (Gourlay 2008, 97). 
Another thematic EC-instrument that can be used for SSR support in some cases is the 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Its objective is ‘to 
provide support for the promotion of democracy and human rights in non-EU countries’ 
(Commission website on the EIDHR, accessed 6 April, 2012). As the EIDHR is a thematic 
instrument, similarly to the IfS, it is not geographically restricted to a certain region, but 
complements the EU’s other external instruments. It was established in 1994 by an 
initiative of the European Parliament. Since its adoption, the EIDHR has been 
strengthened and revised on several occasions. Of these, the latest was in 2007, as the 
Instrument was transferred into the EC budget line. The budget of the EIDHR for the 
period of 2007–2013 is EUR 1.1 billion. (Commission’s website on EIDHR, accessed 6 
April, 2012) 
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Differently from the most regional instruments’ programming, the programming of the 
EIDHR is not conditioned upon the approval of the partner country’s government On 
the contrary, the instrument can support CSOs throughout the world even when the 
partner countries’ governments do not wish to welcome such support. Furthermore, 
the EIDHR can even support non-legal entities and individual ‘human right defenders’ in 
third countries (Commission’s website on the EIDHR, accessed 6 April, 2012). However, 
despite its transfer under the EC common budget for the 2007–2013 budget period, the 
EIDHR support implementation is not particularly flexible, but has to go through the 
normal comitology process. 
As the EIDHR focuses on supporting civil-society organisations it cannot be used to 
support comprehensive SSR programmes. Morevoer, due to the slow implementation 
process, the EIDHR support cannot be deployed rapidly. Nevertheless, the Instrument 
can contribute to some crucial aspects of SSR programming, such as the civilian 
accountability and oversight aspects, by providing support to organisations that seek to 
strengthen democracy, human rights and the rule of law (Buxton 2008, 30).  
To conclude on the EU SSR tools and measures, it is clear that the EU institutions today 
possess a wide range of instruments and other measures to support human security-
oriented security reforms in third countries. As has been presented here, the inclusion 
of conflict prevention and state failure prevention provide prime examples of the 
inclusion of development considerations into the EU’s security policy since the 1990s.  
Similarly, reflecting the increasing inclusion of security considerations into the EU 
development policy since the 1990s, the EC has recently introduced completely new 
instruments to promote conflict prevention and to ‘complement’ the CSDP-driven post-
conflict crisis management. While none of the Commission’s instruments focuses 
exclusively on SSR, a number of SSR-related activities can now be supported through 
the EC-administrated regional instruments, particularly since the extension of the ODA 
eligibility criteria in 2005. For example, many of the ACP countries’ CSPs include EDF-
funded SSR-activities, and funding has been allocated particularly to justice and police 
reforms. In post-conflict situations, the EC assistance has also been directed to the 
relevant executive branches of government as well as to democratic oversight 
34 
 
mechanisms. Furthermore, with the establishment of the new ‘peace-support’ tools 
within the regional instruments, such as the APF, as well as due to the creation of the 
new security-oriented thematic instruments, including the IfS, the EC-assistance can in 
some cases even bypass the ODA-eligibility criteria. As a result, the EC is becoming 
increasingly capable in supporting conflict prevention and SSR-activities, and to some 
extent even military reforms and military crisis management. 
2.3 EU SSR Policy Framework 
2.3.1 OECD SSR Guidelines 
As was discussed above, the EU’s conflict prevention and practical post-conflict 
reconstruction involvement has became increasignly focused around SSR activities since 
the late-1990s. At the same time, the EU institutions’ instruments that can be used to 
support SSR activities have been evolving. As a result of these developments, the need 
to introduce legal concepts that define the precise EU SSR support principles, norms and 
objectives increased.  
During the first years of the new millennium, the then fifteen EU Member States that 
were part of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), were leading the 
work to adopt Committee’s Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance (Law 
& Myshlovska 2008, 11). Already since the mid-1990s the DAC had started to include 
conflict prevention and security aspects increasingly into its development policy 
formulation9, and security sector/system reform had emerged as a practical concept for 
this new focus area. In April 2004, the DAC High Level Meeting adopted the OECD DAC 
Policy Statement on Security System Reform and Governance, which was then published 
as ‘DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance’ in early-2005 (the same 
year when the Committee extended the ODA eligibility criteria to cover broad range of 
SSR activities). This document became the basis for the EU’s own SSR concept, and a 
“key point of reference for all SSR practitioners” (Law & Myshlovska 2008, 11). 
                                                     
9 Reflecting the increasing development-security merger, the OECD DAC had already in 1997 created a 
Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC), which focused on conflict prevention. 
SSR had soon emerged as the Network’s core focus area (OECD DAC Policy Statement 2004, 3), and it was 
the CPDC’s Task Team on SSR, who formulated the DAC SSR Guidelines (OECD DAC SSR Guidelines 2005, 
5). 
35 
 
The 2004 High Level Meeting policy statement expressed the need to understand the 
linkages between security and development. To address various security challenges, the 
DAC donors expressed in the document their commitment to “structure thinking”, 
which was “founded on activities with multi-sectoral strategies’, and which “integrates 
development and security policies’. Furthermore, the structure thinking aims to 
“improves civilian involvement and oversight” over the security sector. Other explicitly 
stated principles that should guide any SSR support activities were listed as transparency, 
accountability, as well as “clear processes and policies that aim to enhance the 
institutional and human capacity needed for security policy to function effectively”. 
(OECD 2004, 4–6) 
Furthermore, in the document the donors stated their strong commitment to a “people-
centred and locally owned” security system reform, which is “based on democratic 
norms and human rights principles and the rule of law”. In fact, the document is based 
on an explicit human security approach, which understands security in a broad manner:  
Security is increasingly viewed as an all-encompassing condition in which people 
and communities live in freedom, peace and safety, participate fully in the 
governance of their countries, enjoy the protection of fundamental rights, have 
access to resources and the basic necessities of life, and inhabit an environment 
which is not detrimental to their health and well-being. The security of people 
and the security of states are mutually reinforcing. A wide range of state 
institutions and other entities may be responsible for ensuring some aspect of 
security. This understanding of security is consistent with the broad notion of 
human security promoted by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and used by development actors.  
(ibid. 2004, 11) 
Similarly, the definition of a security system, as the previous quotation already hints, is 
based on a broad conception, including all the state and non-state actors, who take part 
in the production of security in the given society. These include the ‘core security actors’; 
the security management and oversight bodies; the justice and the law enforcement 
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institutions; as well as the non-statutory security forces10. (ibid. 2004, 11) This broad 
understanding is in fact highlighted even in the way the DAC uses the term ‘security 
system’, instead of the ‘security sector’. For DAC, such reforms should focus on the 
whole system, through which security becomes produced.  
Security system reform is another term used to describe the transformation of 
the ‘security system’ – which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities 
and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner 
that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good 
governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework. 
(ibid. 2004, 11; 2005, 20) 
Due to this broad understanding of security system, which acknowledges the need to 
understand the “major security challenges confronting the country”, and the actual 
forms through which security and insecurity are produced, the document also stresses 
the importance to develop context-specific and comprehensive SSR approaches: “It is 
critical to look at how their [security] systems work, including the power relations among 
individuals and institutions. This kind of knowledge cannot be acquired through short 
missions or shorter-term technical assistance. Understanding how systems work 
requires close contact over an extended time.” Therefore the document invites donors 
to adopt comprehensive approaches that extend beyond all the security system’s 
sectors, and to develop multi-sectoral strategies, which link the various security ‘sectors’ 
that are reformed under one such ‘overall SSR strategy’. Finally, in order to realise such 
a comprehensive and context-specific SSR approach in partner countries, the document 
invites donors to improve their cooperation. (OECD 2004, 19; 29; 31)  
                                                     
10 The core actors include among else armed forces; police; intelligence and security services; border 
guards; and local security units. Security management and oversight bodies include the Executive; 
national security advisory bodies; ministries of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and 
traditional authorities; financial management bodies; and civil society organisations. Justice and law 
enforcement institutions include judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and 
prosecution services; human rights commissions; customary and traditional justice systems. Non-
statutory security forces include liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private body-guard units; private 
security companies; political party militias. (OECD 2004, 11) 
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2.3.2 EU SSR Concepts 
Soon after the publication of the OECD DAC principles, the Council adopted its Concept 
on SSR. It was soon followed by the Commission’s Concept, as well as a Commission–
Council joint-SSR Concept, an overarching EU SSR policy document in mid-2006.  
The Council concept paper, ‘the EU Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform’, 
adopted in 13 October 2005, lists the general SSR principles and norms for the 
CFSP/CSDP-supported SSR activities. Referring to the 2003 European Security Strategy 
(ESS), the document states that a support to SSR in partner countries is one of the core 
areas for the EU action, and a major concept to promote human rights, democracy, 
peace and stability (Council 2005a, 4). 
As all the EU policy documents on SSR, the Council document is based on the above-
presented OECD DAC’s SSR Guidelines. For example, the document defines security 
broadly, adopting a human security approach by arguing that the CSDP action in security 
sector reform should concern “not only state stability and regime security of nations but 
also the safety and well-being of their people”, and that such reforms should always be 
“based on democratic norms and human rights principles and the rule of law” (ibid. 
2005a, 9). 
Furthermore, the document strictly follows DAC’s broad definition of the security 
system, by defining security sector as consisting of the core actors, justice and law 
enforcement institutions, security management and oversight bodies, and the non-
statutory actors. By referring to DAC Guidelines, the Concept explicitly stresses the 
importance of taking such broad and holistic multi-sectoral approach: 
Following the OECD guidelines there is a need to take a broad approach, 
engaging all these actors in reform efforts. Rather than focussing on a limited 
number of key sectors, a holistic, multi-sectoral approach is advocated. This 
approach includes the need to develop a clear institutional framework for 
providing security, strengthening of governance and political oversight of the 
security institutions, effective civilian control, as well as the need to build a 
capacity throughout the security system both accountable to civil authorities 
and capable of carrying out the required operational tasks. 
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(ibid. 2005a, 10) 
Furthermore, the Concept stresses the importance of any SSR reform to address the 
normative aspects of the SSR, the “issues of how security system is structured, regulated, 
managed, resourced and controlled” (ibid. 2005a, 9).  
The principles guiding the ESDP/CSDP SSR support, presented in the Concept, include 
respect of local ownership, measuring progress, holistic approach, tailored approach, 
and coordinated approach – all in fact aspects that can be found in the OECD DAC SSR 
Guidelines. With regards to local ownership, the Concept stresses the importance of 
integrating SSR to national development plans and broader multilateral frameworks, 
and states that ESDP action can only support the local actors if it is formally invited by 
the partner government, or authorised by the UN Security Council. According to the 
concept, the holistic and tailored approach refers to the comprehensive, multi-sectoral 
and context-specific SSR action that ultimately “addresses the security concerns of the 
people”, and in which SSR activities are “tailored to the specific needs of an individual 
state and its people as well as to its political environment both nationally and regionally”. 
(ibid. 2005a, 11–12, 17, 21) 
However, while defining security broadly as human security, and the security sector as 
consisting all the relevant state and non-state entities who contribute to the production 
of security, there are still certain exclusively state-centric elements present in the 
document. For example, on page 9, it is stated that the “security sector reform seeks to 
increase the ability of a state to meet the range of both internal and external security 
needs”, suddenly narrowing down the actual SSR-activities to concern only the state 
actors.  
Soon after the Council had adopted its Concept for SSR, the Commission followed. In 
May 2006, it released its communication for the EC support for SSR, setting out the 
guiding principles, roles and activities for the Commission’s SSR support. Similarly to the 
Council document, the Commission’s concept follows the OECD DAC’s human security 
approach, stating that the security of individuals should be at the centre of any national 
security agendas:  
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For the EC, security is not limited to the territorial security of the state or to the 
security of a particular regime; it includes both the external and internal security 
of a state and its people. Thus, it focuses on human security (freedom from want, 
freedom from fear and freedom to take action on one’s own behalf), putting the 
security of citizens at the centre and thus complementing state security.  
(Commission 2006a, 4) 
Following again the DAC’s broad definition of the security sector, the Commission 
concept defines the security sector, or the security system11 as including all the state 
and non-state actors contributing to the production of security (ibid. 2006a, 5). The 
concept also provides an exact definition for the SSR, describing it as “transforming the 
security system, which includes all these actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, 
working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is consistent with 
democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributing to a 
well functioning security framework” (ibid. 2006a, 5). 
According to the Commission Concept, and still reflecting the DAC Guidelines, SSR 
activities should always aim to contribute to strengthening of good governance, 
democracy, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights (ibid. 2006a, 5). 
Furthermore, for the Commission, civilian control and oversight of the security sector 
are regarded as key aspects of SSR. Other guiding principles for the EC SSR support 
include the local ownership (based on a political dialogue with each partner county), as 
well as taking into account the local context, gender sensitivity, efficient use of public 
resources, and accountability and transparency across the public sector (ibid. 2006a, 7– 
8). 
While certain state-centrism can be found also in the Commission’s policy document12, 
it is perhaps more careful in narrowing down the actual EC SSR action to concern only 
the state actors, which occasionally happens in the Council Concept. On the contrary, 
                                                     
11 The concept document notes that these two terms, ‘security sector’ and ‘security system’, can be used 
inter-exchangeably (Commission 2006a, 3). 
12 For example, following the OECD DAC Paris principles the principle of ownership is interpreted as the 
ownership of the national leaders, and the EC-supported SSR-activities and priorities are, as discussed 
earlier, defined in CSPs together with the partner countries’ governments.  
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according to the document, the role of the civil-society and “other non-state structures 
of governance” have to be taken into account in the development and implementation 
of national SSR programmes. Furthermore, the document calls for a context-specific 
SSR-support, which addresses the “diverse security challenges facing states and their 
populations, [and is] based on a gender-sensitive multi-sector approach”. The document 
also recommends the EC to strengthen its short to medium-term engagement through 
development of relevant tools and instruments. Finally, the Concept calls the relevant 
EU actors to expand their expertise in SSR, and to mainstream it into programming (ibid. 
2006a, 7; 9; 11) 
Compared to the Council Concept, the Commission Communication provides perhaps a 
more specific overview of its available SSR-support tools, which include SSR-related 
activities through the various instruments. This is however understandable, as during 
the drafting of the Concepts, the first ESDP civilian missions were only taking shape, 
while the Commission’s expertise on SSR-related support activities through its various 
instruments was already extensive13. 
Furthermore, both the Council and the Commission SSR policy concepts underline the 
need to enhance EU’s inter-institutional cooperation, in order to make the EU action 
more coherent and effective. As the II pillar was now becoming more active in SSR-
related activities, and as the scope of the EU SSR support was increasingly broadening 
to cover human security, as well as to address the whole security system, the both 
concepts seemed to understand the increasing importance of a coordinated effort. This 
was particularly important due to the still existing division of competencies between 
security and development-related actions in the EU external action but also because the 
Council’s CSDP missions were meant to operate in a short to mid-term range, while 
development support was more long-term-oriented. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, 
due to the ongoing inter-institutional turf-war, there had rarely been effective inter-
pillar coordination in the past (Doelle & Gouzée de Harven 2008, 52). 
                                                     
13 According to the document, EC SSR support had in early-2006 been already allocated to over 70 
countries through EC’s thematic and regional instruments. 
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Therefore, a major objective for the joint-EU SSR policy framework, adopted in June 
2006, was to ensure greater coherency and coordination between the pillars (as well as 
with the Member States’ bilateral support). The EU SSR Framework became the 
overarching policy document for the EU SSR activities. It acknowledged the importance 
of the both pillars, and the both Concepts, and saw them complementing each other 
(Council 2006a, 2).  
The three-page Framework document repeats the EU’s commitment to the OECD DAC’s 
broad conception of security sector, and similarly draws from the DAC’s SSR Guidelines 
by restating the EU SSR-support ‘principles’, including national ownership, good 
governance, democracy, the rule of law, respect of human rights, nationally owned 
concept of security, the need to target the reforms in key sectors, parliamentary and 
civilian oversight of the security sector with accountability and transparency, and 
political dialogue (ibid. 2006a, 2–3). Furthermore, while the term human security is not 
explicitly spelled out, the document does refer to the importance for the EU SSR-support 
to address “development and security concerns”, and the “security challenges facing 
states and their populations”, which practically refers to human security (ibid. 2006a, 3). 
In addition, the SSR Framework calls the EU institutions to adopt a “gender-sensitive 
multi-sector approach to the provision of security and access to justice”, and to take a 
“case-by-case analysis based on a situation specific approach”. Furthermore, the 
document calls for an approach that addresses security in a broad manner, and takes 
into account the “role of civil society and other non-state structures of governance” (ibid. 
2006a, 3). Finally, it stresses the importance of a coordinated and coherent EU external 
action, which is based on case-specific analysis “on a situation specific approach” to 
determine whether action should be taken through the “ESDP or the Community action 
or a combination of both” (ibid. 2006a, 3). 
In policy terms, the EU Policy Framework for SSR is definitely a major breakthrough for 
the integration of the Commission’s and Council’s SSR approaches. The document 
provides the EU actors common conceptual guidance by defining the principles for EU 
engagement in SSR and underlying the importance of a comprehensive and cross-pillar 
approach. However, the Framework’s practical guidance for effective coordination 
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between the Council and the Commission remains low, as it does not specify in detail 
which pillar should be used in which case. The document only states that the Council 
and the Commission should “ensure consistency between their activities in accordance 
with Article 3 of the TEU [The Treaty of European Union or the Maastricht Treaty]” (ibid. 
2006a, 3). The Article in question, in turn, only presents the various Community 
activities, including development policy, and states rather ambiguously the following: 
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall 
take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far 
as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the 
proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. Any action by the 
Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of 
this Treaty. 
(Treaty on the European Union 1992, 3–4) 
Therefore the Framework does not solve the practical problem of how to implement 
coherent and comprehensive SSR programmes between the different EU institutions. 
As Doelle & Gouzée de Harven (2008, 52) argue, the Framework “clearly does not deliver 
all the expected results and is merely a declaratory document, in practice risking the 
status of wishful thinking”.  
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3 SYSTEM APPROACH TO SECURITY ANALYSIS AND THE CONGOLESE 
SECURITY SYSTEM 
3.1 Importance of a Systems-Focused Approach to Security Analysis 
As the previous chapter showed, the EU has developed a widening set of instruments 
and policies to address development and security challenges in third countries in a 
holistic, comprehensive and context-specific manner. In particular, the EU approach 
seeks to address how insecurity is actually being produced and reproduced in a given 
security system, and to focus on addressing the root causes behind this insecurity. The 
second part of this chapter will therefore provide a system-oriented historical overview 
of the production and rootcauses of insecurity in the contemporary Congo, focusing 
particularly on the ongoing large-scale violence in the Eastern Congo, as this is the area 
where most of the today’s violence occurs.  
Before going to the actual overview, the first part of this chapter presents a framework, 
based particularly on Kalyvas’ (2003) and Autesserre’s (2010) thinking, to approach the 
production of insecurity in a given context through a system-perspective. Such an 
approach acknowledges that the rootcauses of the Congolese human insecurity have to 
be identified and addressed in order to create sustainable development and security. 
Therefore focus should be on the whole system, and on all the actors and factors that 
have the potential to contribute to the production of security and insecurity. 
By focusing on the security system, this framework emphasises the dynamic causality, 
holism, and interconnectedness of the different social phenomena. It therefore 
provides a good starting point to analyse the continuing insecurity in a given context.  In 
particular, it provides a basis for understanding how the different levels from global to 
local interact; and how those maintain or transform the social, political and economic 
realities in which the people in a given context live.  
In order to study a particular social phenomenon, such as an eruption of a conflict or 
consolidation of peace in a given society, it is necessary to first recognise and 
understand the plurality of other social phenomena, and the various actors and 
structures, which influence in transforming or maintaining the existing social reality. 
This interconnectedness between the social phenomena, and between the various 
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actors capable in influencing each other, is the starting point of such an analysis: Social 
phenomena do not exist in a vacuum but are essentially connected to other social 
phenomena. 
At the same time, it is important to address the dynamics of the different levels in which 
the various actors operate, and the linkages that these actors form, within and across 
the different levels. These levels include the individual, local, national, regional, as well 
as global, and the importance of actors operating at different levels varies over time, 
depending on how the social structures become transformed, and how the linkages, the 
alliances and the cleavages, between the various actors evolve.  
For example, while the changing global structures or evolving regional relationships may 
contribute in the emergence of a conflict in a national level at one point of time, local 
cleavages or evolving relationships between the local and the national actors may 
influence on the continuation and transformation of the same conflict in another time. 
Similarly, while local disputes may trigger a conflict, the global structural 
transformations might help to sustain it. The point is that there hardly ever is just one 
contributing factor in the emergence of a particular social event, but various events and 
actors at different levels, whose combined influence generates the phenomenon in 
question. 
Before moving on to the history of the Congolese (non-)state, and to the analysis of the 
various explanatory factors contributing to the creation and continuation of insecurity 
and poverty, one important consideration has to be made: Between the experts, and 
reflecting the wider divisions among the social scientists in general, there are 
considerably differing interpretations on the underlying factors explaining the 
emergence and continuation of insecurity and underdevelopment in any given context, 
including in the DRC. 
First, there are commentators emphasising internal factors in explaining the problems 
related to insecurity and lack of development of the fragile states such as the Congo, as 
well as ones focusing on external or structural causes. A second distinction can be made 
between the commentators emphasising the significance of macro-level events behind 
the Congo’s misery; and the others arguing for the importance of micro-level dynamics.  
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These explanatory factors – the emphasis on internal or structural factors, and the 
importance of the macro or micro level dynamics – are then combined and emphasised 
in different ways by academics and practitioners to form coherent narratives of the 
Congo’s continuing violence, depending on the ontological assumptions and the 
ideological standpoint of each analyst. While lack of space forbids a comprehensive 
introduction of even the more important of such narratives, a few general marks have 
to be made here.  
The importance of internal and structural factors in the production of insecurity and 
underdevelopment in African states such as the Congo is a widely debated topic. This 
debate has many variations, but broadly speaking the camp focusing on internal factors 
conceives the everlasting violence and poverty as resulting from issues indigenous to 
the country concerned. These include among else inefficient economic policies, high 
levels of corruption and lack of good governance 14 ; the absence of the liberal 
democratic structures/institutions 15 ; greedy, rent-seeking and criminal leaders 
benefitting from the corrupted system and from the insecurity itself16; and inefficient or 
‘primitive’ practices, institutions or beliefs that are rooted in tradition and culture17.  
The approach focusing on external (or structural) issues, owing to the structuralist 
approaches of the 1970s, in turn emphasises the significance of structural 
transformations, particularly those in the global level, in explaining the development 
and security provision failures in fragile states such as the Congo. Such structural factors 
often include the legacy of colonialism (in destroying the African traditional social order 
and institutions, and replacing them with states and European-modelled institutions ill-
suited for African realities); the unequal character of the global trade regime; the 
imposition of the ‘new public management/policy’ (NPM) to the South 18 ; the 
‘grievances’, or the growing sentiments of inequality felt by certain social or ethnic 
groups due to such global or national level structural transformations19; as well as the 
                                                     
14 Emphasised particularly in the neoliberal economic approach, see Hewitt (1998, 300–307).   
15 See for example, the Liberal Peace thesis presented by Michael Doyle (2012). 
16 The ‘greed’ side of the greed versus grievance debate. 
17 Particularly emphasised by the new barbarist school. 
18 See for example, Duffield (2001, 48).  
19 The ‘grievance’ side of the greed versus grievance debate. 
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eroding effects of the economic globalisation20 (and the ending of the Cold War) for the 
authority and functioning of developing countries.  
While the actual international development and peacebuilding practitioners’ 
conceptions of the causes of insecurity and underdevelopment are of course a mixture 
of different internal and structural factors, it must be noted here that particularly in the 
1980s and since then, the views that stress the importance of the former have gained 
influence at the expense of the approaches that focus on the latter. For example, the 
main international development actors have since the 1980s been emphasising internal 
policy reforms, and particularly privatisation and downsizing of the public sector, as 
engines for economic growth, while structural factors have remained less addressed. 
While in the field of development the focus has since the 1990s, due to the apparently 
failing structural adjustment programmes, turned from maximisation of the economic 
growth towards poverty reduction and statebuilding, the major emphasis is 
nevertheless still on internal factors. These factors include eradication of corruption, 
sound macro-economic management, liberal democratic institutions and promotion of 
good governance (Hewitt 1998, 304–308). 
Furthermore, with the increasing merging of the development and security actors’ 
agendas over the past decades, the security provision-failures have similarly become 
interpreted as resulting largely from similar internal causes, such as the absence of good 
governance and democratic institutions, and the prevalence of widespread corruption 
and greedy elites.  
However, instead of arguing for the insignificance of such internal factors for the actual 
production of insecurity and development failures, it is important to also understand 
how the underlying structural factors are either indirectly contributing to the their 
production by enabling the above-mentioned internal factors to emerge, or how they 
might at times even directly contribute to their emergence. On the contrary, in order to 
really understand the rootcauses of human insecurity, and following the OECD DAC SSR 
approach reasoning, it is then necessary to understand how the whole security system 
                                                     
20 See for example, Kaldor (1999, 2–4). 
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works, and how the various structural and internal factors are interconnected and often 
mutually reinforcing. 
Such external or structural factors that possibly influence the production of the human 
insecurity in national or local levels are of course numerous, and cannot be even listed. 
However, a few influential ones, frequently appearing in the literature on African 
contemporary internal conflicts and development failures, include the legacy of 
colonialism, the challenges created by intensifying globalisation, the imposition of NPM 
to the South, and the Cold War geopolitics. 
For example, the legacy of colonialism, of which the King Leopold’s extremely brutal 
colonial rule in the Congo serves as a prime example, as will be discussed in the following 
chapter, has to be taken into account in order to really understand and address the 
actual rootcauses of insecurity in certain African weak states. The colonial legacy might 
include among else (as it does in the Congo) strengthening of the erosion of traditional 
social, political and economic order; the intensification of tensions over land ownership 
between different groups due to colonial land reforms; and the very creation of a state 
structure and an administrative culture that is primarily interested in profit 
maximisation of certain external entity/elite faction, with little interest in the promotion 
of general human security.  
Similarly, certain more recent global level structural transformations have played a 
major role in the erosion of state authority and the redistribution of political power in 
various African countries. In fact, Mobutu’s Zaire of the 1980s–1990s, as will be 
discussed in the following chapter, makes again a prime example of how many states in 
the global ‘South’ have weakened, and become non-integrated in the post-Cold War 
global economy in the process of globalisation21, and through the imposition of the new 
public policy22, or how globalisation has generally allowed new forms of sub- or trans-
national authority to emerge and challenge the state’s monopoly over violence. 
                                                     
21The term ‘globalisation’ refers here to the ‘world-wide economic and political convergence around 
liberal market principles and the increasing real-time integration of business, technological and financial 
systems’, following Duffield’s (2001, 46) definition. 
22 The ‘new public management’ (NPM) or ‘new public policy’ refers to the neoliberal economic policies 
that became dominant in the 1980s among the Western states and the International Financial Institutions 
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For example, according to Mark Duffield (2001, 47–48), globalisation forces states both 
in the North and the South to rework their public policy and to cut their domestic 
welfare expenditure. Since the 1980s, privatisation – and when not feasible, 
marketisation, the introduction of private sector management and accounting 
techniques – of public services has become seen as a panacea to maintain economic 
growth and to increase the economic competitiveness in a globalising world:  
[P]ublic institutions have been corporatised and run as if they were capitalist 
enterprises. ...Increasingly, national economic strategy has shifted towards 
domestic budgetary restraint coupled with global trade liberalisation. By the 
beginning of the 1980s, this model had assumed a dominant position among 
the OECD countries and, through the efforts of the World Bank and IMF, has 
become the template in the South as well.  
(Duffield 2001, 48).  
As a result of this downsizing of the public sector, the competence of the states both in 
the North and the South has eroded. However, due to the imposition of a much more 
extreme form of neoliberal structural adjustment in the South, coupled with an absence 
of “mediating and compensatory mechanisms” that exist in the North, the process has 
had much more devastating consequences in the South, often including a breakdown of 
the social cohesion and deepening poverty (Duffield 2001, 149).  
In the process, part of the authority that previously belonged to states is turned over to 
various actors of multiple levels, such as the international organisations, the IFIs, 
multinational corporations (MNCs), private military companies (PMCs), international 
non-governmental organisations (INGOs), as well as a plethora of various sub-national 
actors: from wealthy businessmen and merchant networks to sub-national security and 
justice providers, and from religious leaders to local non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs). While in the North the transnational networks – the “global liberal governance” 
– that these actors have formed, have become increasingly interconnected through the 
process of globalisation, much of the South has been integrated to the global economy 
                                                     
(IFIs), characterised by privatisation, marketisation and internationalisation (Duffield 2001, 49), and which 
emphasise ‘domestic budgetary restraint and promotion of trade liberalisation’ (ibid. 149). 
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only through the informal economy. This phenomenon, in which the state- and non-
state actors from both the North and the South become interconnected through the 
emerging transnational networks of formal and informal economy through the process 
of globalisation and due to the imposition of new public management, Duffield calls the 
“expansion of transborder shadow economies”. (ibid. 2001, 146–151)  
Furthermore, in an inter-connected system, such massive structural transformations 
influence the processes through which national and even local security and insecurity 
are produced. For Mary Kaldor (1999, 2–4), processes related to globalisation, defined 
as “intensification of global political, economical, military and cultural 
interconnectedness, and the ensuing changing character of political authority”, are the 
key driving forces behind the contemporary conflicts, or the ‘new wars’. This refers to 
the post-Cold War low-intensity conflicts that involve myriad transnational connections, 
and therefore blur the lines between internal and external, and local and global.  
Typically based around the disintegration of states, such ‘post-modern conflicts’ 
generally take place between various state and non-state groups, each of which 
attempts to impose their own definition of the national identity of the state and its 
population. Furthermore, the increasing inter-connectedness and the fragmentation of 
states’ political authority, caused by the intensifying globalisation, also changes the 
ways how conflicts are funded: While in the ‘modern’ inter-state conflicts the war-
economy was centralised and authartic, the new war economies are rather 
decentralised, and the fighting units now “finance themselves through plunder, hostage-
taking and the black market or through external assistance”. (Kaldor 1999, 10) 
For Duffield, the emergence of transborder shadow economies caused by globalisation, 
and the imposition of the NPM provides the mechanism through which these post-
modern conflicts are funded: As the state authority erodes and the old forms of state 
patronage networks and formal survival strategies become non-viable, new non-state 
networks and informal strategies emerge to replace them. For example, as the new 
public policy reforms downsize the public sector, the government officials, including the 
police and the military, have to find alternative sources of income. As existing survival 
strategies are undermined and as unemployment increases, the shadow economy might 
50 
 
be the only available alternative for survival. As the state’s control over its territory and 
borders gets eroded, illicit resource extraction and transnational trade might offer an 
alternative survival strategy. Security actors may also, for instance, introduce informal 
taxes for local populations, or start selling arms to private actors, or even join the ranks 
of rebel movements who are now increasingly capable in challenging the state authority 
themselves. (Duffield 2001, 150)  
While globalisation coupled with the implementation of the new public management, 
are probably the largest contemporary transformational phenomena redistributing the 
political and economic authority away from certain states, other structural level 
transformations are further strengthening the trend.  
For instance, the Cold War geopolitics had tremendous influence on the existence of 
African socialist and developmental states, influencing the national-level dynamics 
throughout the continent, and therefore necessarily affected the ways conflicts took 
place. For example, as is also clear in the context of the Congo, the external superpower 
support affected greatly to the allocation of political power between different 
ideological, social or even ethnic factions within the society, as well as on their access 
to economic, including military, resources: During the Cold War, most African states 
were heavily backed by either the West or the Soviet Union. Such support was based 
purely on ideological fault lines, and basically given on the basis of membership in the 
correct ideological camp. However, as the Soviet Union collapsed in the early-1990s, the 
need for the West to support its former Cold War proxies decreased, which added 
greatly to the problems of many African states to maintain their extensive public sectors 
(de Waal 2000, 15). 
With regards to the various internal factors’ role in the production of insecurity in 
African ‘fragile states’, there has also been a tendency to focus particularly on national 
level processes, and see the civil wars as resulting from national (and possibly regional) 
level events, while micro-level dynamics get often rather ignored. In the case of the 
Congo, this trend is clear: The (often destructive) role of the national and regional actors 
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and particularly the one of national elites is strongly emphasised in the literature23, 
while local dynamics are often seen merely as reflecting the national and regional events. 
Congo Wars of the 1990s, for instance, tend often to be depicted as having simply been 
caused by the Rwandan genocide’s domino effect, as the Hutu refugees (together with 
the perpetrators of the genocide), fearing for the new Rwandan Tutsi regime’s reprisals, 
fled to the Zairean side, which was followed by a Rwandan-masterminded invasion of 
the weak Zairean state. Local conflicts of the Eastern Congo are, in turn, generally seen 
as merely mirroring the national (or regional) cleavages and only having erupted due to 
the effective manipulation of the local groups by the national elites. 
However, as Kalyvas (2003) and Autesserre (2010) have pointed out, while regularly 
neglected, local dynamics are often of a crucial importance both in the emergence and 
continuation of violence. Instead of merely mirroring the national ‘master cleavages’, 
they often have dynamics on their own that stem from micro-level issues, such as local 
land disputes or struggles over local political or economic authority (Autesserre 2010, 
176). Furthermore, in weak states such as the Congo, local actors can in fact often even 
manipulate the national actors’ behaviour in order to strengthen their own position, 
and thus influence themselves on the macro-level events (Kalyvas 2003, 484). The point 
is then that a simple top-down analysis is not sufficient in explaining the patterns that 
create and sustain violence in countries such as the Congo, but a more holistic and 
context-specific approach is needed, just as the OECD DAC SSR Guidelines calls for. 
When assessing the capability of the various actors at different levels to influence on 
the social, political and economic realities in a particular context, a useful starting point 
is then to look at how the relationships between macro- and micro-level actors have 
evolved over time. Here the approach constructed by Kalyvas (2003) provides a useful 
conceptual basis. Rather than positing dichotomies between micro- and macro-level 
dynamics (or between ‘greed and grievance’) in the creation of violence, Kalyvas focuses 
                                                     
23 Examples of the academics focusing on regional and national events while very much ignoring the local 
dynamics include Reyntjens 2009; Prunier 2008; and Berkeley 2001. In addition, according to Autesserre 
(2010, 42–47), the Security Council Resolutions, most news items on the Great Lakes, as well as nearly all 
diplomats and UN officials working in the Congo during the Transition period adhere to a top-down view 
of the causes of insecurity and violence, which then affects to their peacebuilding priorities. 
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on the interaction between the macro- and micro-level actors, and between political 
and private identities.  
According to Kalyvas (2003, 482; 486), the top-down accounts of emergence of African 
civil wars tend to focus mainly on a master cleavage – an overarching ‘issue dimension’, 
such as ideology, religion, or ethnicity – in explaining the emergence and continuation 
of conflicts. Furthermore, in such analyses the agency tend to be located in the centre 
and the local dynamics are only interpreted as mirroring the macro-level events. 
However, adoption of a more holistic approach that focuses on the interaction between 
the macro- and the micro-levels, allows a more comprehensive account to the 
emergence of violence. Of a particular importance are then the changing alliances that 
the national (or regional) and the local actors form, in which the various actors in the 
centre are linked to the ones in the periphery through an interactive relationship. 
Focus on the interaction and the alliances between the different levels’ actors enables 
the analyst to locate the agency both in the centre and the periphery, and instead of 
focusing on one overarching issue, it allows to take into account a variety of factors that 
contribute to the emergence of violence:  
Alliance entails a transaction between supralocal and local actors, whereby the 
former supply the latter with external muscle, thus allowing them to win decisive 
local advantage; in exchange the former rely on local conflicts to recruit and 
motivate supporters and obtain local control, resources, and information – even 
when their ideological agenda is opposed to localism. 
(Kalyvas 2003, 486).  
Alliances between the national and the local actors evolve and change over time, 
depending on how the different levels’ actors can use them in furthering their interests 
(Kalyvas 2003, 484). Causality may, and does, therefore run into both directions, top–
down and bottom–up.  
Following Kalyvas’ analysis, this study treats the Congo’s recent conflicts, and 
particularly the ongoing violence in the Eastern Congo, not merely as a ‘binary conflict’ 
with a master cleavage, but as an remarkably complex and ambiguous set of processes, 
53 
 
in which the local, national and regional actors with diverse motives interact and form 
alliances, in the context of constantly transforming global-level structures. Rather than 
seeing the Congo’s insecurity as having simply been caused by national level events and 
a top-down master cleavage, the emphasis here is placed upon understanding the 
convergence of local motives and supralocal imperatives, and of private and political 
issues, which together construct the patterns through which violence becomes 
produced. 
The next chapter, following a system approach, provides a brief but contextual analysis 
of the Congolese insecurity and of the rootcauses of the ongoing violence in the Eastern 
Congo. This is the particular context in which the European Union is now operating, as 
it gets involved in the security sector reform in the DRC. The next chapter seeks to take 
into account both the internal and the structural explanatory factors, as well as the 
various events and actors at different levels, whose interactions and evolving 
relationships have generated the current social, political and economic realities that 
sustain and transform the everyday security and welfare – or insecurity and destitution 
– of the Congolese people. While the overall focus is on the system and its different 
levels, particular focus is given to the local level actors, as this level is often missing from 
analyses that seek to explain the ongoing violence in the Congo. 
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3.2 The Congolese Context: An Analysis of the Root Causes of the 
Congolese Human Insecurity through a Systems Approach  
 
« Enrichissez-vous et, si vous volez, ne volez pas trop en même temps. Vous 
pourriez être arrêté. Volez intelligemment, un peu à la fois »  
 -- Mobutu Sese Seko24 
« Structural adjustment did not help. Over half of the national budget was 
devoted to debt service. The economic situation worsened, severe poverty 
became rampant and unemployment escalated. The development of informal 
economy...is a direct repercussion of a failed Structural Adjustment 
Programme »  
-- Theodore Trefon 2011, 24 
3.2.1 The Colonial Legacy and the Local Conflicts in the East 
As discussed in the previous chapter, in order to understand the continuing insecurity 
and development failure in the Congo, one has to focus on the various levels of the 
holistic system, and on both the different internal and structural factors, capable in 
creating, maintaining or transforming the existing social, political and economic realities. 
The importance of the different levels, the impact of the various overarching structures, 
and the capability of different actors to transform those structures changes 
undoubtedly over the course of time, depending on how the system as a whole evolves. 
To understand the emergence and continuation of insecurity in the Congo, it is then of 
a particular importance to address both the macro and the micro level dynamics, and to 
incorporate both the internal and the structural factors into the analysis. Following a 
system approach, and using the Kalyvas’ analysis of the importance of changing alliances 
and cleavages between the different levels’ actors in the emergence and continuation 
of conflicts, this section will seek to provide a contextual account of the Congolese 
insecurity. 
                                                     
24 Mobutu allegedly encouraged his officials with these words to steal from the government. See for 
example Le Vine (1993, 273). 
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The history of the Congolese state’s inability to provide security and welfare to its 
citizens traces back to the creation of the colonial Congo Free State in the late-19th 
century. In this private colony of the Belgian monarch Leopold II, millions of Congolese 
were brutally taken to forced labour by the ‘Force Publique’, the newly established 
colonial army. The few decades of forced labour and pillage during the Leopold II’s 
regime eventually claimed the lives of millions of Congolese, perhaps even half of the 
contemporary population (Hochschild 2004, 285–286).  
During the Belgian colonial enterprise of 1908–1960, the pattern of exploitation 
continued: profits from the extracted resources kept on flowing to Europe (Turner 2007, 
44), or as Naniuzeyi (1999, 674) puts it: “Belgian financial interests became, ipso facto, 
an integral part of the colonial enterprise”.  
Furthermore, while forced labour was technically abandoned during the Belgian 
colonisation, the colonial authority continued to transform the traditional order in a 
number of ways. Particularly in the densely populated Eastern Congo, access to land 
was, and remains today, a primary means to gain social status and secure resources – 
and in the end, key to survival and ability to feed one’s family. While land conflicts 
between the different ethnic groups have to some extent existed in the Eastern Congo 
long before Europeans arrived 25 , the arrival of colonisers often exacerbated such 
conflicts, as well as created completely new pressures. By transforming and 
undermining the traditional mechanisms to access land, and by drastically increasing 
the pressure for available land, the colonial rule effectively sowed the seeds of the 
contemporary Eastern Congo land conflicts, which today play a major part in the 
continuation of the violence in the East.  
Firstly, Belgians declared all the uncultivated land a state property, distributing large 
parts of it to colonial families, taking it on the land market, or transforming it into 
national parks, therefore reducing the native communities’ access to land drastically 
(Vlassenroot 2000, 62–63). Communities were also often forced to abandon their 
traditional ways of living, and start growing cash crops for the European market (Turner 
                                                     
25 For example, according to Autesserre (2010, 173), conflicts between pastoralists and farmers, such as 
Hema and Lendu ethnic groups of the Ituri District, have existed for centuries. 
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2007, 111–112). For example, in Ituri district, the land conflicts between the various 
ethnic groups, and especially between the Hema and the Lendu intensified due to the 
colonial land reforms (Autesserre 2010, 170–173). In Katanga, in turn, land conflicts 
between the North and South exacerbated, and in all over the Eastern Congo, the 
conflicts between the other ethnic groups and the Pygmies, who often lived as hunterer-
gatherers in forests, were increasingly intensifying due to colonial land reforms (ibid. 
2010, 170–173).  
Secondly, the colonists divided Congolese into ethnic communities, each with its own 
customary law and authority, and ruled them indirectly through the selected local chiefs, 
granting the chiefs the monopoly on administrative, executive and judicial power over 
their own community, including a right to grant their subjects access to land. This 
resulted in certain groups becoming excluded from land access, and led to a formation 
of the first grassroots militias, whose initial goal was to preserve the traditional order 
(Autesserre 2010, 130–131; Turner 2007, 108–114).  
Thirdly, and particularly importantly with regards to the eruption of the Congo Wars and 
the ensuing contemporary violence in the Eastern Congo, the seeds of the so-called 
‘Banyamulenge question’ were sown, as the Belgians started transferring Rwandan 
migrant-workers to the Eastern Congo: While some Rwandophone26 people had lived in 
the Eastern Congo already before the colonists had arrived (Turner 2007, 108–109), 
during the 1930s the colonial authority started transferring tens of thousands of 
Rwandans to the Eastern Congo to work in the plantations of the Kivus and the mines 
of Katanga. The status of these workers soon became ambiguous: As they were not 
considered as ‘indigenous’, they were generally not granted the ethnic citizenship, 
                                                     
26 Rwandophone refers here to both the Tutsi and the Hutu population of the Eastern Congo, who 
originate from Rwanda or Burundi’s territory and who speak the Kinyarwandan language. First of these 
people had already settled in the Eastern Congo before the colonists arrived. They had often been 
expelled from Tutsi kingdoms by the contemporary ruling elites, mainly due to political reasons. The 
second group (mainly Hutu, but some Tutsi too) consisted of labour migrants that were transferred to the 
Eastern Congo during the colonial era to work in the mines and plantations, as well as in the colonial 
administration. The third group consists of various waves of Hutu and Tutsi refugees who have fled 
Rwanda and Burundi due to the post-colonial violence. For example, at the eve of the independence, the 
Rwandan Tutsi had to flee the massive violence caused by the revolting Hutu, and in the 1970s thousands 
of Hutu from Burundi fled the Tutsi-initiated mass-killings. However, in everyday use, the the term 
Banyamulenge has become ambiguos and is often used to refer generally to the Rwandophone 
population in the Eastern Congo. (Turner 2007, 107–108) 
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which among else, remained the key factor in access to land and wealth at a local level 
through the customary authority. However, these Rwandans were often hired to the 
colonial administration, which in fact sometimes granted them more political and 
economic power than even the indigenous chiefs had received, and allowed the 
Rwandophone to access the land labelled as non-customary. This created tensions 
between the ‘indigenous’ groups and the Rwandophone people of the Eastern Congo 
(Autesserre 2010, 130–134).  
Turner (2007, 111–112) accounts how such manipulations of traditional authority and 
of population increased the land pressure in Rutshuru territory in the North Kivu 
province: 
Rutshuru was apparently quite densely populated when the Belgians arrived, 
yet they proceeded to move people around in ways that greatly increased 
pressure on the land. They moved Rwandophone Hutu out, to clear space for 
European coffee planters (who received 60 to 70 hectares each) and to 
create...the Virunga Park. The new park occupied half of the Rutshuru territory 
and cut the Bwisha chefferie in half. The people displaced by these major 
projects were resettled in paysannats or state farms, where they lived 
alongside Nande, whose home territory is further north. The Hutu and Nande 
were forced to grow coffee.  
Similar population transfers of Rwandans to the Eastern Congo, but in an even larger 
scale were repeated in the 1950s by the colonial administration, which further increased 
the pressure on land tenure and led to the first open land conflicts between the ‘natives’  
(in this case the Hunde) and the Rwandophones in 1957 (Turner 2007, 113). 
This Belgian manipulation of population and administrative units effectively laid the 
foundations of the today’s land and resource conflicts in the Eastern Congo, many of 
which occur between the indigenous and the Rwandophone communities. Such 
conflicts exacerbated further in the post-colonial Zaire, eventually playing a major part 
in the escalation of the war in the mid-1990s, and continue to threaten the stability of 
the whole region today. 
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While the Belgian rule in the Central Africa was drawing to its end in the late-1950s, the 
local land conflicts of the Eastern Congo continued to evolve. In 1959, just before the 
Congo’s independence, the Hutu populations of Rwanda started revolting against the 
Belgian colonial rule and the indirectly ruling Tutsi minority, causing an influx of tens of 
thousands of Tutsi refugees to the Congolese side (Turner 2007, 114–115)27. These 
rather macro-events again increased the local tensions between the ‘natives’ and the 
Rwandophone groups of the Eastern Congo, which in Masisi territory culminated in 
1963 in the ‘Kanyarwanda’ war that lasted for two years and saw “tremendous violence 
on both sides” (Autesserre 2010, 134).  
3.2.2 Post-colonial Zaire, Mobutu’s Patrimonialism and the Changing Alliances  
The post-colonial Zairean state, organised around a presidential monarch Mobutu Sese 
Seko (who seized the power in 1965) with the ‘approval’ of the United States, continued 
to exploit the land and its population (Callaghy 1986, 221). Backed by the Western states 
in the context of Cold War geopolitics, Mobutu’s Zaire adopted the Belgian colonial state 
structure and patrimonialised it by creating an administrative monarchy, which was 
then used to recentralize the coercive, administrative and financial power (Callaghy 
1986, 221). Opposition was either eliminated, or used cleverly among factions of 
Mobutu’s patronage network to neutralise the network’s threat to the president (Reno 
1998, 149). This ‘divide and rule’ strategy, allowed the president and his associates to 
enrich themselves for decades, without having to fear the opposition of growing to 
threaten or challenge the president’s authority. 
Keeping the country together was however, a difficult task. Comprised of over 300 
ethnic groups, of which most did not have much of a connection or affiliation to each 
other before the colonial era, the state of the Congo, or Zaire as Mobutu renamed it in 
1971, was a rather artificial construction. Not surprisingly then, right after the Congo’s 
independence in 1960, the mineral-rich province of Katanga tried to secede. The 
                                                     
27 Interestingly, however, while in the newly independent Rwanda (and Burundi) the cleavage took clearly 
place between the Hutu and the Tutsi ethnic groups, in the Congolese side of the border cleavages have 
followed much more complex patterns. For example, until the 1980s, and despite the inter-ethnic 
violence in Rwanda, the various Hutu and Tutsi populations of the South Kivu have largely been 
cooperating, wanting to distance themselves from the Rwandan influence, and the cleavages have more 
often occurred between the indigenous populations and the Rwandophone populations, than between 
the Hutu and the Tutsi. (Mamdani 2001, 235; 246–249) 
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secession attempt ended only in 1963 after a UN mission with a peace-enforcement 
mandate, unprecedented in the Cold War geopolitical context, was sent to overpower 
the rebels. Further insurrections still took place in Katanga later in the 1960s and in the 
1970s, some of which even the neighbouring countries, as well as the United States, 
France and Belgium got involved. 
Independence did not bring an end to the land conflicts of the Kivus and the Province of 
Orientale. Quite the contrary, the Mobutu’s patrimonial network depended on allies, 
and the changing alliances between national and local actors influenced the local 
conflict dynamics. Mobutu regarded the support of small minorities useful for 
consolidating his authority, as strong minority groups could keep the larger groups in 
check, but were however unlikely to grow influential enough to threaten the president’s 
own position. In return the minority groups loyal to the president, such as the 
Rwandophone populations of the East, could use the state authority to improve their 
position at a local level. By the late-1960s, the Rwandophone had managed to win 
Mobutu’s support, and Tutsis were increasingly nominated to high national positions. 
The central regime also allowed Rwandese immigration from Rwanda, and in 1972, all 
the Rwandophone people who had arrived in the Congo prior to 1950 were granted the 
Zairean citizenship. (Autesserre 2010, 135) 
The alliance between Mobutu and the Rwandophone was strengthened by the 
Banyamulenge’s support to the government’s troops, after a clash between two local 
Fulero leaders had evolved into a rebellion against the government in the early-1970s. 
Thanks to the support of the Banymulenge, the government managed to end the 
rebellion by the mid-1970s. Needless to stay, this deepened the tensions between the 
Banyamulenge community and the ‘indigenous’ groups. Of these, particularly the 
Pembe, who had a long history of conflicts with the Rwandophone groups, were already 
antagonistic towards them. (Autesserre 2010, 138–140) 
The post-colonial Zaire had initially kept the colonial system of land control, in which 
the ‘native’ groups were able to control some parts of the highly valued land, but 
Mobutu’s land reform of 1973, the so-called ‘Bakajika Law’, which was planned by 
Barthélémy Bisangimana, himself a Tutsi, made all except the customary land a state 
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property (Autesserre 2010, 136). Particularly the Rwandophone groups benefited from 
the reform, as land was distributed to the political allies of the regime as a reward for 
their loyalty (Turner 2007, 117).  
Furthermore, the prospering Rwandophone businessmen managed even to buy large 
sections of customary land from local chiefs “through murky transactions”, which 
resulted in creating overlapping ownership claims based both on modern and traditional 
law (Autesserre 2010, 136). Conflicts between the Rwandophone groups and the 
minority indigenous communities deepened, and both sides felt as victims: 
Rwandophone groups still remained excluded from traditional authority at the local 
level and the ‘anti-Banyarwandan’ sentiments were growing among the other groups. 
Indigenous minority tribes, in turn, regarded the Rwandophone as immigrants who 
were not entitled to the customary land, and accused the Tutsis of having cheated when 
acquiring their land. Furthermore, they saw the Rwandophone as preventing the 
indigenous groups’ influence at the national level. (Autesserre 2010, 136–138)  
At the same time, new fault lines were emerging within both camps. The tensions 
between the Hutu and the Tutsi were resurrecting due to the violent clashes in Rwanda, 
as the arriving refugees from Rwanda increasingly imported such tensions to the Zairean 
soil as well. Furthermore, the immigrating, often rather wealthy Rwandans could afford 
to buy large pieces of land, while the Rwandophone groups who had lived in Zaire longer 
could necessarily not. This created new divisions among the Rwandophone people 
(Autesserre 2010, 136).  
Similarly, the growing pressures on land tenure had exacerbated the conflicts among 
the different ‘native’ groups since the colonial era all over the Eastern Congo. The 
colonial land reforms had often worsened the forest-dwelling Pygmies’ access to land, 
and they continued to be conflicting with other ethnic groups in various parts of the 
Eastern Congo. In Ituri district, the land conflicts between the various ethnic groups had 
intensified due to the colonial land reforms, and similarly to the Tutsi of the Kivus, the 
Hema continued benefitting from belonging to Mobutu’s patrimonial networks, which 
in turn generated deep resentments among other communities, and particularly among 
the Lendu. In Katanga, in turn, the rivalries between North and South Katangans 
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continued, as did the antagonism toward ‘Kasaian groups’ by other groups. While lack 
of space forbids the detailed overview of the various micro-level conflicts, it should be 
noted that similar local disputes between different clans, tribes, and ethnic 
communities existed everywhere in the Eastern Congo. (Autesserre 2010, 170–173) 
While Mobutu had managed to use the strategic alliances to consolidate his own 
position as a sovereign ruler at the national level, in the 1970s his authority started to 
erode slowly due to a number of factors. The unproductive character of its political 
autocracy, combined with its patrimonial nature, had made the regime extremely 
dependent on external allies, the Western powers. By late-1970s, Mobutu’s extensive 
nationalisation policies and the ambiguous industrial development projects were 
apparently failing, and Zaire’s external debt was soaring (Turner 2007, 35). 
Reinvestment in basic infrastructure nearly halted, and by mid-1980s, only 15 percent 
of the roads inherited from the colonial rule remained passable (Ayoade 1988, 106). 
Lack of reinvestment also led to a rapid erosion of the crucial mining infrastructure, 
which was compounded by the sharply falling copper world market prices during the 
1970s (Wrong 2000, 94). By the mid-1980s, the mineral exports had fallen drastically 
(Reno 1998, 151), and the economy was in the verge of collapse, further undermining 
the state’s ability to perform its functions, such as providing security to its people.  
3.2.3 State Collapse   
Against this background – and as the neoliberal macro-economic policy line was gaining 
strength in the Western world in the 1980s, the debtors started insisting on economic 
and political reforms, as well as military reorganisation (Callaghy 1986, 222). By the end 
of the decade, over half of the national budget was devoted to debt service, while 
economic stability was sought by containing budget deficits, downsizing public sector 
and providing incentives for private sector investment (Trefon 2011, 24).  
The end of the Cold War added to the dynamic of the waning state authority. As the 
Soviet Union was dismantling, the need for the West to support its former Cold War 
proxies as bulwarks against communism decreased (de Waal 2000, 15). In the case of 
Zaire, this meant that the Western external support was drastically cut, and any new 
loans was conditioned on political and economic reforms. According to Time Magazine 
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(24 June, 2001), Mobutu remarked the change in the U.S. attitude bitterly by stating 
that “I am the latest victim of the cold war, no longer needed by the U.S.”. Soon, the IMF 
stopped practically all the loan payments to the Zairean government in 1991 as it 
regarded that the reforms it insisted did not proceed satisfactorily.  
By the early-1990s, the growing international pressure, combined with an increasing 
discontent among the population, forced Mobutu to adopt a new policy that increased 
political freedoms: a new constitution was adopted, which allowed multi-party elections 
and limited the presidency terms (Collier 2009, 17). The president, however, while 
reluctantly acquiescing to such reforms to keep the economy from collapsing, did his 
best to preserve the patrimonial system. The shrinking state resources were centralised 
nearly completely under his personal command (Reno 1998, 153), security troops were 
used to harass the emerging opposition parties, and dissident politicians were sought 
to be bought off to keep the opposition fragmented (Naniuzeyi 1999, 681).  
In order to divert the accusations away from the failures of his own regime, the 
president decided to capitalise on the growing anti-Rwandophone sentiments. In 1991, 
the National Sovereign Conference, established by the president to consider potential 
political reforms, rejected the ‘non-indigenous’ groups’ representation (Autesserre 
2010, 140). Throughout the 1980s, there had been low-level violence with occasional 
sporadic clashes between the ‘natives’ and the Rwandophone all over the Kivus, and by 
the early-1990s, tensions had grown extremely high. Mobutu started now promoting 
the principle of ‘indigeneity’, discriminating the allegedly ‘non-indigenous’ groups, such 
as the Rwandophone people of the Eastern Zaire, and blocking their access to political 
power (Vlassenroot 2000, 79). As a result of the deepening tensions, the different ethnic 
groups in the Kivus started forming their own self-defence militias to protect themselves, 
and to defend their demands for land and authority, making the Eastern Zaire fertile 
ground for rebellion. 
At the national level, the socio-economic conditions kept plummeting: By mid-1990s, 
the inflation had risen to an absurd 23,000 percent (Economist Intelligence Unit 1996, 
19), and unemployment had escalated while poverty was increasing rapidly (Trefon 
2011, 24). In 1995, there was virtually no more public spending to social services as a 
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result of privatisation and due to the effective centralisation of the remaining state 
resources under the president (Reno 1998, 153–154). 
The under-resourced Forces Armées Zairoises (FAZ), the national army, of which salaries 
were often unpaid, had become highly dysfunctional and disorganised. Soldiers became 
increasingly dependent on alternative ways of generating income to “make their ends 
meet” (Reyntjens 2009, 108). They began to live off the population, and particularly off 
those segments not belonging to Mobutu’s clientelist networks. In other words, they 
increasingly became a security threat to the population that they were supposed to 
protect. Naniuzeyi (1999, 669) observes the following: 
On the socioeconomic level, the lives of the Zairian people under the Mobutu 
regime kept deteriorating day after day. Public employees were not receiving 
their salaries for months or even years, and the army and police that were 
supposed to protect citizens became, on the contrary, citizens’ nightmares. On 
many occasions, soldiers harassed and terrorized the masses while public 
services were performed on the basis of briberies or kickbacks. Under Mobutu, 
Zaire became a kind of jungle where the rule of law did not exist. In this context, 
some analysts did not hesitate to argue that the state was no longer existent in 
Zaire. 
As a result of the eroding state authority and the downsizing of the public sector, the 
informal economy started expanding rapidly (Trefon 2011, 24). Not only did Mobutu’s 
own patronage network begin to extract resources from the informal sector through 
activities such as clandestine trade, tax avoidance, money laundering, drug trafficking 
and passport sales (Reno 1998, 154), but new forms of trans- and sub-national authority 
had begun to emerge to replace the vacuum left by the waning state. For example, 
various self-defence militias and armed groups, organised around strong individuals 
such as wealthy local businessmen, started operating throughout the country, and 
particularly in the East. Such militias were increasingly connected to the globalising 
world market through illicit trade, and operated particularly through the trade of 
various minerals. For example, by late-1990s in Ituri district in the Eastern Congo, each 
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of the five major ethnic groups had its own militia, of which operations were also deeply 
linked to the economic interests of each group (van Puijenbroek 2008, 46–48). 
The neighboring Rwandan civil war of the early-1990s, which led to the horrendous 
genocide of some 800.000 Tutsis in 1994, exacerbated the conflict between the Hutu 
and the Tutsi in Zaire too. After the new Tutsi-regime had seized power in Rwanda, 
between one and two million Rwandan Hutu flooded to the Eastern Zaire, which only 
destabilised further the already extremely tense situation in the Kivus (Autesserre 2010, 
141). By then, the various militias on different sides already practically controlled large 
sections of the Eastern parts of the country, financing themselves often through 
clandestine activities, including cross-border trade of various minerals to Uganda and 
Rwanda. 
Due to this fragmentation of the Zairean state authority and due to the long-lasting 
violent land conflicts of the Eastern Zaire, the Kivus then offered an ideal base for a 
larger rebellion to take place. In late-1996, a rebel group Alliance of Democratic Forces 
for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL), consisting of various smaller Tutsi and other militias, 
and heavily backed by the new Rwandan Tutsi-government (as well as Uganda), started 
advancing towards Kinshasa. In only six months, under the leadership of Katanga-born 
Luba Laurent Kabila, a former rebel leader already in the 1960s and a gold smuggler, the 
AFDL reached Kinshasa and ousted the president. Kabila was crowned as the new 
president and the 30-year-term of Mobutu Sese Seko as a head of state had come to 
conclusion. 
However, rebuilding the Zairean state, which Kabila renamed the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (DRC), was not easy. Various political and ethnic groups were seeking to 
maximise their influence in the new government, and the accusations that Kabila was 
nothing but Rwanda’s puppet were loud. In July 1998, Kabila dismissed his Rwandan 
chief of staff, James Kabarebe, and made him a mere military advisor. Soon after, he 
asked the Rwandan troops to leave the country. Only a few weeks later, Rwanda, 
together with Uganda and Burundi, launched another war to overthrow Kabila by 
channelling support to the various rebel groups of the Eastern Congo, as well as sending 
their own troops to fight alongside the rebels. This war, the so-called Second Congo War, 
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however, in which eventually eight African countries and numerous Congolese rebel 
groups took part, ensued with a stalemate. The war dragged on for four years, and saw 
the deaths of some 3.9 million Congolese (IRC 2007, 1). In 2002, a formal peace 
agreement between the four main belligerents, the ‘Global and All Inclusive Agreement’ 
was signed, which led to the creation of transitional authorities. The four largest parties 
to the conflict were included to the new government, their leaders becoming the 
leaders of the different army units. This was followed by drafting a New Constitution in 
2005, and organising the first democratic elections in the history of the country in 2006. 
However, the ending of the Second Congo War meant all but an end to the violence and 
human suffering. The ending of the War had also left thousands of former combatants 
unemployed. Low-scale violence with sporadic eruptions continued particularly in the 
Eastern Congo, where numerous local militias and various armed groups have been 
disintegrating and reforming, periodically continuing fighting since the end of the war 
(Turner 2007, 1). By 2007, an estimated 5.4 million people, mostly in the Eastern part of 
the country, had died since the beginning of the war, due causes related to fighting and 
insecurity – from violence, disease and starvation (IRC 2007, 1).  
For civilians, the role of militias in the production of security and insecurity has become 
controversial. While the militias consisting of the other communities’ members 
obviously pose a serious threat to the security of civilians, so do the formal security 
providers, the army and the police (van Puijenbroek 2008, 45). In fact, in some districts, 
such as in Ituri, the Congolese formal security actors continue committing constant 
violations and are often regarded as the biggest threat to the population: 
The Congolese army, followed by the national police, is the main source of 
instability at the moment, with cases of harassment of the population and 
illegal arrests, torture and the looting of properties taking place on a large scale. 
Despite the partial re-establishment of the judiciary (there is a local court in 
every territory, except for Mambasa, and one higher court in the district’s 
capital) impunity still prevails. Perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity are walking around freely.  
(van Puijenbroek 2008, 47) 
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The ethnic militias are therefore often regarded as providing protection to certain 
community, while simultaneously threatening other communities’ security. In the 
absence of other survival strategies, militias often plunder other communities or get 
their funding through illicit economic activities, such as informal road tolls, or 
unregulated resource extraction and trade. The Ituri district, and the dynamics between 
the local communities and the various ethnic militias, are a good example of this (van 
Puijenbroek 2008, 45–48). In these circumstances, the line between community-
protection groups and dangerous militias becomes increasingly blurred, especially as 
the local communities become increasingly dependent on the very same non-formal 
economic activities, such as resource extraction and cross-border trade, to ensure their 
survival.  
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4 EU’S INVOLVEMENT IN CONGO’S SSR: ACTUAL ACTIVITIES 
4.1 Background of EU’s SSR Action in Congo 
As discussed earlier, since the turn of the millennium, the EU development and security 
policies had been rapidly merging, and becoming increasingly focused on conflict 
prevention and statebuilding. Following the extension of the ODA eligibility to cover a 
vast range of security-related activities; the drafting of the EU institutions’ SSR policy 
concepts; and the rapid evolution of the EU’s practical development and security policy 
tools, the concept of security sector reform was emerging as a key EU concept to 
address development and security challenges in fragiles states of the South.  
All of this was coinciding with the escalation of violence in the DRC since the early-1990s, 
as discussed in the previous chapter – caused by a complex myriad of external and 
internal factors as well as by the changing dynamics between actors at various levels. 
Due to this coincidence, and due to the Congo’s strategic importance for the regional 
stability, this fragile state became an ideal test case, or ‘laboratory’, as Knutsen argues 
(2009, 456), for the EU to try out its new security and development policies. In particular, 
the Congo provided a good opportunity to try out the evolving comprehensive and 
human security-oriented SSR policy.  
As mentioned in the Introduction, the establishment of EUPOL Kinshasa28  in 2005 was 
the first time the EU sent a civilian CSDP mission to support SSR activities (Police reform) 
in Africa (More & Price 2010, 11). Furthermore, the creation of the EUSEC RD Congo a 
few months later, was the first time a CSDP civilian mission was supporting a third 
country’s army reform anywhere (Clément 2009, 243). Moreover, the EU’s involvement 
in the Congolese SSR was the first time when the different EU actors, particularly the 
Commission and the Council, had actually explicitly stated their willingness to 
coordinate their SSR actions jointly, showing a commitment to a holistic EU approach 
that aims to reform the security sector in a comprehensive manner (Keane 2008, 224).  
As an explicit indication of a much-needed inter-institutional coordination, in April-2005 
(just after the extension of the OECD ODA eligibility criteria and at the time when the 
                                                     
28 EUPOL Kinshasa’s mandate was later extended and it was renamed EUPOL RD Congo. 
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CSDP missions were being deployed), the High Representative of the CFSP (the Council 
Secretary General), Javier Solana, and the Commissioner for Development and 
Humanitarian Aid, Louis Michel, released a joint press release on the EU’s support to 
the Congo’s transition. In the document they emphasised the urgency to strengthen the 
Congo’s ‘good governance’, to rebuild the “essential functions of the democratic state 
based on the rule of law”, and to improve the security situation, by reforming the 
security sector through a multi-sectoral support (Solana & Michel 2005, 1–2).  
Furthermore, in November 2006 (after the adoption of the joint-EU SSR Framework in 
June), for the first time in the history, the EU institutions adopted a joint-Council-
Commission SSR document for any country, which presented the ‘Comprehensive EU 
Approach to SSR in the DRC’. This happened soon after the EU Foreign Ministers had 
concluded in September that the EU (together with the UN) should play a coordinating 
role for SSR in the DRC, subject to an agreement by the DRC authorities. According to 
Keane29 (2008, 224–225), the classified joint-paper emphasised three key principles for 
the EU SSR joint-action in the DRC: 
1. Development of DRC nationally-owned concept designed to strengthen good 
governance, democratic norms, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. 
2. Strengthening governance of security institutions. 
3. Enhancing service delivery in the security sector, ensuring that Congolese security 
actors become a source of security rather than insecurity for citizens. 
(Keane 2008, 224–225) 
The joint-document, which together with the EU SSR concepts forms the basis for the 
EU SSR action in the DRC, supports a comprehensive multi-sectoral approach, which 
focuses particularly on security governance and oversight aspects (“designed to 
strengthen good governance, democratic norms, the rule of law, and respect for human 
                                                     
29 The joint-document itself is classified and despite several requests could not be fully accessed, so the 
stated objectives here are based on the partially accessible document, as well as on Rory Keane’s (2005) 
article on the EU’s involvement in the DRC’s SSR. In 2006, at the time of the drafting of the EU’s 
Comprehensive SSR Approach to the DRC, Keane had worked as the Commission’s desk officer for the 
DRC in Brussels. 
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rights.’ and ‘strengthening governance of security institutions”). In addition, the paper 
particularly aims to improve the security of the Congolese people instead of just seeing 
strengthening the military as an objective per se (“ensuring that Congolese security 
actors become a source of security rather than insecurity for citizens”). In this sense, the 
paper once again repeated the normative EU policy objectives of the previously adopted 
EU SSR concepts. Furthermore, the document placed particular emphasis on the EU’s 
inter-institutional coordination, as it noted that the EU will continue to support SSR 
activities in the DRC comprehensively through political dialogue with the government, 
through the CSDP missions’ action, through the EC action, and through the Member 
States’ bilateral efforts (ibid. 2008, 224–225).  
4.2 EU Actors in the Congo’s Security Sector Reform 
4.2.1 Overview of EU Actors 
Due to its pioneering nature, the EU SSR support to the DRC provides an ideal case to 
analyse the EU’s increasing involvement in the third countries’ security sector reforms, 
and to evaluate the implementation of the EU’s normative policy-approach.  
By 2012, the EU SSR support to the DRC has evolved to include the two above-
mentioned CSDP civilian missions, which were complemented by the European 
Commission’s development assistance. While the Commission started supporting the 
SSR right after ending of the war, the two CSDP civilian missions30 were established by 
Council Joint Actions in December 2004 (EUPOL) and May 2005 (EUSEC), after the 
Transitional Government’s President Joseph Kabila had sent a letter to the CFSP High 
Representative Javier Solana, formally inviting the EU to assist with the Congolese SSR 
(Weiler 2009, 10).  
These two actors, the CSDP missions and the Commission, are responsible for the actual 
EU SSR support in the Congo’s SSR, and are therefore in the main focus of this study. 
Until the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the EEAS, the 
                                                     
30 In addition to the CSDP civilian missions, the Council has also established two CSDP military missions, 
the French-led military operation Artemis in 2004 to secure Bunia territory (in Ituri district) with 1.500 
soldiers at the request of the UN Secretary General, which supported a safe return of the refugees to the 
town before the UN MONUC troops returned to safeguard the area, and a short-term EUFOR military 
operation in April 2006 to Kinshasa to support the election process. 
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Commission was represented in the DRC through its EC Delegation. Since 2010, the 
Delegation is formally the EU Delegation, but the Commission’s development support 
continues to be allocated through the Delegation (More &Price 2011, 15). 
The EU support has been complemented by the activities taken bilaterally by the 
Member States (MS), as well as by the EU Special Representative for the African Great 
Lakes Region (EUSR), who had a supporting role for the CFSP/CSDP action in the DRC 
until August 2011. The EUSR belonged to the CFSP framework, and he/she was 
mandated, in addition to his/her other tasks31, to provide political insight to the EU 
actors from a regional perspective, to coordinate the CFSP/CSDP missions’ SSR actions 
in the DRC, to provide advice and assistance for SSR in the DRC, and to put political 
pressure on the implementing parties when required. Furthermore, the EUSR was 
responsible for promoting overall EU political coordination and ensuring a coherent EU 
action at the political level. However, as the EUSR’s mandate concerned only the CFSP 
framework, he/she did not have any formal leverage on the EC action, and therefore 
the hierarchy between the EUSR and the EC ‘remained unclear’. (More & Price 2011, 
18–19)  
Lastly, since the establishment of the EEAS in 2010, the Head of the EU Delegation has 
been an EEAS official. As the EEAS represents the whole EU external action (including 
formally both the Council and the Commission), this change is expected to boost the 
diplomatic role of the Delegations, as well as to improve coordination between the EU 
institutions. Among else, the mandate of the Head of the EU Delegation is wider than 
that of his/her predecessors, and in particular more political. While it has not been 
officially stated by the EEAS, the Head of the EU Delegation has practically also been 
seen as replacing the EUSR. Therefore the role of the EEAS, particularly in the lead of 
the CSFP/CSDP, has been growing since its establishment in December 2010. While not 
in the main focus of this thesis, the role of the EEAS is increasingly relevant for the 
                                                     
31  The EUSR for the Great Lakes Region was mandated to support the further stabilisation and 
consolidation of the post-conflict situation in the whole Great Lakes region, and to provide “regional 
dimension” to the EU stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction action, meaning that his duties 
comprised not only the DRC, but also Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. However, support to the DRC’s post-
transition phase, and a “particular emphasis on the reform of the security sector” were defined as “a key 
objective” for the EUSR (Council Joint-Action 2006). 
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success of a coordinated and comprehensive EU approach. (More & Price 2011, 17, 24, 
43)  
The following is a brief overview of the key EU actors’ roles and activities in the DRC’s 
security sector reform until mid-2012, namely in the fields of police reform, army reform 
and judicial reform, as of mid-2012.  
4.2.2 Police and Justice Reform: EUPOL and the Commission 
After the War, the Congolese Police was in a terrible condition: Officers were not only 
incapable of investigating crime but actually lacked training, were poorly resourced, 
received a minimal salary, worked under poor conditions, and were reported of 
committing human rights abuses and corruption on a continued basis (Davis 2009a, 19–
20). The United Nations’ MONUC mission had began to give basic training to the 
Congolese police in 1999, aiming to provide it to some 50.000 territorial police officers 
before the elections, to ensure a smooth election process. To support the objectives of 
MONUC, the European Commission decided to provide some funding to train officers 
for a new Kinshasa-based specialised unit called ‘Integrated Police Unit’ (IPU), charged 
with the protection of the institutions and the political leaders of the new transitional 
government in the run-up to the national elections. In particular, the Commission was 
providing technical assistance, basic equipment and training for the IPU, financing the 
activities through EDF and Rapid Reaction Mechanism (predecessor of the IfS). 
(Martinelli 2006, 390) 
The CSDP civilian mission EUPOL Kinshasa was deployed in the Congolese capital in 
February 2005, initially to take over the responsibilities from the Commission in training 
the IPU. The mission was mandated to support the establishment and the training of 
the IPU (Council 2004). The objective was to train 1008 officers for the IPU, and to 
provide them with equipment and mentoring. In other words, the main objective was 
to make the IPU fully operational by strengthening it as an operational unit (Martinelli 
2006, 391). The IPU officers were deployed in Kinshasa and the unit was supported by 
the EU, until its command was handed to the Congolese in 2006.  
For the EU external action, the training of IPU also represented a historical point, as it 
was the first time, when an EU SSR project had been divided into two parts to be 
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implemented by two EU institutional actors: the Council with a CSDP approach and the 
Commission with a Community approach (Martinelli 2006, 390). However, it was clear 
that a more comprehensive police reform was needed in the DRC, and with the 
termination of EUPOL Kinshasa, the Council established a new mission in June 2007. The 
new mission was named EUPOL RD Congo and its mandate was extended to cover the 
whole Congolese territory, and to contribute to the massive task of reforming the ill-
functioning and fragmented Congolese national police PNC. Furthermore, the mission’s 
mandate was also enlarged to include improving the interaction between the police and 
the criminal justice system, and ensuring the coherence between EU’s SSR support for 
military, police and justice sectors (Vircoulon 2009, 222–224). Later, the mission’s 
mandate has also been expanded to provide support for the restoration of law and 
order in the eastern Kivu provinces, as well as to strengthen the border police and the 
police inspectorate (ibid. 2009, 225). The Council presents the key tasks of the mission 
as follows: 
Its [the mission’s] purpose is to contribute to the restructuring of the Congolese 
police by supporting the establishment of a police force that is civilian, 
professional and respectful of human rights. The mission also aims to help 
improving the interaction between the police and the criminal justice system, 
thus contributing to the fight against the impunity of sexual violence and 
human rights abuses. The mission cooperates closely with the EUSEC RD Congo, 
the European Union delegation in DRC and the United Nations Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in its efforts to help ensure that 
all SSR efforts deployed are consistent. (Council 2012b) 
By 2012, EUPOL had grown to consist of 50 international experts, most of whom are 
police and criminal justice experts. Nearly all of them are deployed in Kinshasa. 
According to the Council, these experts advise their Congolese counterparts in technical 
aspects of the police reform. In particular, the mission has been supporting three 
Congolese authorities: the Police Reform Monitoring Committee (CSRP), the General 
Commissariat of the Congolese police (CG-PNC), and the General Inspection of the 
Congolese police (IG-PNC). (Council 2012b) 
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The purpose of the CSRP is to bring together the concerned authorities with an aim to 
draft a national police reform strategy for the Congolese police. A key objective of the 
planned reform strategy would be improving training and professionalism for all the 
Police units. Furthermore, the strategy would possibly aim at integrating the various 
independent police units into the national police (PNC). Another key task that that the 
body has already engaged with has been the promulgation of the organic law on the 
organisation and functioning of the Congolese police. (Council 2012b) 
The two other authorities, CG-PNC and IG-PNC, are bodies belonging to the Congolese 
National Police PNC. The General Commissariat of the Congolese Police is basically the 
structure responsible for implementing the police reform. The General Inspection of the 
Congolese Police, in turn, is the inspection and audit body of the PNC, covering the 
criminal, administrative and financial offences committed by the police. The role of the 
EUPOL in relation to these authorities is to provide strategic advice, particularly in the 
creation of the training and education facilities for the Congolese police. (Council 2012b) 
In addition to the support provided to the Congolese authorities, EUPOL has aimed at 
strengthening the operational capacities of the Congolese police by training of trainers 
and police officers of the PNC. In addition to providing further training to UPI, the new 
mission has also supported the training of other specialised police units, such as the 
Police d’Intervention Rapide (PIR) and the Groupe d’Intervention Mobile (GMI). EUPOL 
has also supported specific projects. For example, before the 2011 elections the mission 
was providing technical assistance to projects that were designed to support the 
security of the 2011 elections in the DRC. This was done through training crowd control 
units in Kinshasa and by supporting awareness raising campaigns carried out by the IG-
PNC. (Council 2012b) 
Regarding its justice-interface, EUPOL has been seeking to improve the coordination 
between the police and judicial fields in the reform process. It has provided training to 
the Judiciary Police and to the Technical and Scientific Police in conduction of criminal 
investigations and liaison with the judicial actors. Furthermore, the mission has aimed 
to put special focus in its training on cross-cutting issues of SSR, such as human rights, 
gender, victims of sexual violence, as well as protection of children in armed conflict 
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(Keane 2008, 221–223). In practice, in 2010 the mission deployed a small team to North 
Kivu in the Eastern Congo that has focused “in the areas of human rights, gender 
equality and protection of children in armed conflicts”. This team is collaborationg with 
the Congolese authorities in the region, aiming to “provide training and raise awareness 
among police officers, justice and civil society experts”. The mandate of the EUPOL was 
originally supposed to expire in June 2008, but it has been extended several times32. 
Between December 2008 and May 2010, EUPOL’s budget was EUR 81.4 million, 
increasing annually as the mission kept expanding. (Council 2012b) 
The Commission’s efforts to support the DRC’s SSR are, in turn, carried out mainly 
through its development assistance instruments (particularly through EDF, IfS and 
EIDHR), and make up therefore only a part of the larger EC development support for the 
DRC. The EC development assistance for the DRC was restarted33 in January 2002, as the 
first CSP and its National Indicative Programme (NIP) were signed, as a result of a 
“positive evolution” in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (Hoebeke et al. 2007, 5). While 
majority of the EDF support for 2002–2007 was directed to rebuildinging of the 
country’s neglected infrastructure, improving the health sector, and to the organisation 
of the national elections, support was also given to certain SSR activities.  
In the field of police reform, the Commission’s contributions have been allocated 
through the 9th and the 10th EDF, as well as through the IfS. The support to the training 
of IPU by mid-2005, before the EUPOL Kinshasa took over the activities, was funded 
through EDF with EUR 6 million. The RRM/IfS was also used to finance the rehabilitation 
of the UPI’s operational base in Kinshasa. This contribution was around EUR 1 million. 
Furthermore, the Member states contributed some EUR 2.3 million to this project, in 
cash and in kind (weapons and law enforcement equipment) (Hoebeke et al. 2007, 10).  
SSR-related EC support continued during the 10th EDF, covering the period of 2008–2013. 
Under the 10th EDF, SSR support activities fell under the ‘Governance’ support, one of 
                                                     
32 The latest mandate of the EUPOL Congo expired in September 2014 and the mission was terminated. 
33 Since 1992, all the EU’s development assistance for Zaire had been interrupted (excluding humanitarian 
aid) due to the increasing conditionalities, as discussed earlier, and particularly due to ”the lack of 
progress in the political democratization, the high degree of corruption, the economic mismanagement 
and the differences between the Member States in their policy towards Zaire” (Hoebeke et al. 2007, 5). 
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the three priority areas the current framework, which made up 25 percent (some EUR 
130 million) of the total EDF DRC budget of EUR 514 million. Of this, some EUR 22 million 
was allocated to police and justice reform support (Commission 2008, 38).  
Regarding activities funded through the EC action, the Commission has among else 
supported the establishment of the police reform committee CSRP. The Commission’s 
DRC CSP for 2008–2013 makes clear (similarly to the EUPOL’s mandate) that defining a 
clear role for the CSRP and ensuring that it is operational is a priority for the EU support 
to SSR in the DRC in future. However, by far the most funding is reserved for supporting 
the operational and technical aspects of the Congolese Police. In particular, the 
Commission’s instruments have been used to “develop systems within the police”, 
particularly in areas of human resources management and auditing the members of the 
police service, including in the collection of biometric data (Davis 2009a, 28). The 2008–
2013 CSP specifically identifies “human resource management” of the Congolese Police 
as a priority for the EC police reform support (More & Price 2011, 15). In other words, 
tackling corruption has been a key priority for the EC police reform support in the Congo.  
Finally, the Commission’s support to the DRC police reform has also included some 
funding for the civil society. Together with some EU Member States, such as the 
Netherlands, UK, Belgium and Sweden, the Commission has funded projects designed 
and implemented by international and Congolese NGOs. These NGOs include IDASA, 
Search for Common Ground, RCN Justice et Démocratie, and Pax Christi Netherlands, as 
well as their national partners. Their projects have aimed, among else, at facilitating 
community interaction and dialogue with the police, sometimes in conjunction with 
training. (Davis 2009a, 28)  
Finally, of the EU Member States, particularly the United Kingdom and France have had 
their own police reform programs, through which they have supported the various 
activities in the police reform, including provision of equipment and training for certain 
specialised police units (Vircoulon 2009, 225, 228; Justaert & Keukeleire 2010, 18).  
Regarding justice reform, the Commission has been the largest single donor in this 
sector since the Transition Period (More & Price 2011, 16). The findings of a 
comprehensive audit conducted for the justice sector with EC funding in 2004, revealed 
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that the sector was institutionally weak, procedurally incoherent and severely lacking in 
equipment, infrastructure and training (Keane 2008, 220). There were not enough 
judges to serve the needs of the country, and even the existing judges had received only 
a minimal judicial training. Furthermore, the judicial system lacked independence from 
the government almost completely, and due to economic failure and poor governance 
it had operated well below minimum standards for decades. For example, in the region 
of South Kivu in 2005, an estimated less than one percent of all the rape cases were 
reported to justice authorities, and 80 percent of those reported were granted bail and 
never faced a justice official again (Davis 2009a, 21). This was the situation in the early-
2000s, when the international community, including the EU, started to engage with the 
Congolese judicial reform.  
As a result of the findings of this audit, the government and the donors agreed on a 
structured reform programme. The reform was to follow the EU-funded Justice Reform 
Action Plan, which was drafted in 2004, and validated eventually in 2007. Later in 2009, 
the government turned the plan into a “ministerial roadmap”, which set out the 
priorities for the justice reform (More & Price 2011, 16). 
The EU support to the justice sector has been allocated mainly through the 
Commission’s development support instruments, particularly the EDF. The Commission 
has supported both a general justice reform in the DRC, as well as directed some short-
term “emergency support” to the most conflict-ridden regions of the East (More & Price 
2011, 16). Under the 9th EDF, the general justice support programme received some EUR 
28 million, while the short-term programme for ‘Restoration of the Judicial System in 
the Eastern Congo’ (REJUSCO) was funded with some EUR 8 million (European 
Commission, EU@UN website on the EC support to Rejusco, accessed 20 April, 2012).  
General judicial reform support has similarly continued during the 10th EDF. As 
mentioned above, ‘Governance’ was one of the three priority areas of the EC 
programme in the DRC during the 10th EDF, receiving some EUR 130 million. Of this some 
EUR 22 million was allocated to police and justice reform support (Commission 2008, 
38), ‘bringing the Commission financing to the justice sector up to EUR 60 million since 
2003’ (EEAS website on the EU Relations with the DRC, accessed 20 April, 2012). 
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The EC support to the general justice reform has included a number of institutional 
programmes. These programmes have supported, among else, “the construction and 
rehabilitiation of courts, the audit services provided by the Ministry of Justice, support 
to the administration of justice, and the promotion of universal access to justice and of 
women’s rights”. Apart from supporting the actual workings of the justice system, the 
EC support has also been allocated to the creation of ‘Comité Mixte de Justice’, the 
central coordinating structure for justice reform. (More & Price 2011, 16) 
The REJUSCO programme, in turn, started initially as a pilot project for the restoration 
of the judicial system in the town of Bunia, and was later expanded to cover most of the 
Eastern Congo. The programme has been supporting the judicial system, covering all 
aspects of criminal law. It has intended to reinforce the judicial institutions (police, 
courts, prisons), as well as those professionally involved, including the criminal police, 
judiciary, lawyers, court registrars and prison officers. The programme has also provided 
support to witnesses and defendants of victims. Some Member States, including 
Belgium, the United Kingdom, as well as the Netherlands, have also contributed to 
REJUSCO (Justaert & Keukeleire 2010, 21). France has also provided support to the DRC’s 
justice reform through its rule of law programme (More & Price 2011, 17). 
Two mechanisms to address the human suffering during the past conflict have also been 
created with the EC support as a basis of transitional justice: an Amnesty Law and Trust 
and the Reconciliation Commission. However, there has been criticism that these have 
been completely inadequate to address all the violations that have happened during the 
recent conflicts, including human rights abuses, political crime and victimisation. (Keane 
2008, 220–224) 
4.2.3 Defence Reform: EUSEC and the Commission 
After the Congo Wars, many of the army brigades were inadequately trained, lacked 
basic equipment, and often even basic services, such as health care or proper housing. 
Furthermore, the coordination between the different units was poor, and corruption 
was seen as a major obstacle, payments and even food often disappearing before 
reaching the ground level (More & Price 2011, 5–6). As has been discussed earlier, the 
signing of the peace treaty had united the largest fighting groups into a national army 
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(FARDC). However, a lot of effort would be needed to make the soldiers of the new 
national army to act in a professional and coordinated manner, protecting the people 
instead of threatening them. This is also recognised in the Council’s Concept of 
Operations for the DRC CSDP missions (See for example, Council 2011a, 7–8), which 
identifies the Congolese army as a major human rights violator and therefore calls for a 
comprehensive SSR. 
By the request of the DRC government, the ‘EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for 
Security Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (EUSEC) was mandated to provide 
advice and assistance in security sector reform. The mission was launched on 8 June 
200534, and according to the Council press statement concerning the mandate and the 
objectives of EUSEC, the general aim of the mission is to “support the Congolese 
authorities in rebuilding an army that will guarantee security throughout the country 
and create the conditions for making economic and social development possible again”. 
This should be done in a way that promotes policies compatible with human rights and 
international humanitarian law, democratic standards, and the principles of good 
governance, transparency and respect for the rule of law (Council 2012a). 
EUSEC has been operating mainly in Kinshasa, and by mid-2012 it composed of around 
50 European military and civilian personnel. Some experts have also been deployed in 
the Eastern Congo field detachments, and two project sites have been established in 
Lower Congo (School for non-commissioned officers, Infantry School and Artillery 
School of Kitona) and Kasai Occidental (Military Academy and School of Administration). 
Similarly to EUPOL, EUSEC has had a coordinating function for projects by the Member 
States. (Council 2012a) 
The main objective of EUSEC has been to support in the integration of the fragmented, 
weak and malfunctioning Congolese army: The mission has tried to assist the Congolese 
authorities in integrating, restructuring and rebuilding the army (Council 2005b). This 
has included advising and assisting the Congolese authorities in the planning and 
conduction of military reform. In particular, the mission has given advisory support to 
                                                     
34 The mandate of EUSEC has been repeatedly renewed and at the time of writing the latest mandate is 
going to expire on 30 June, 2015. 
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the Congolese authorities in drafting a revised strategic plan for the army. Furthermore, 
the mission has tried to support the creation of a Steering Committee that would guide 
and coordinate the military reform.  
Apart from supporting the integration of the army, EUSEC has aimed at strengthening 
its administration by supporting the human and financial resources management of the 
army (Martinelli 2006, 392–393). In particular, the mission has been advising the 
Ministry of Defence, the FARDC high command and the general inspectorate, to 
consolidate the administration of human and financial resources, to support the 
consolidation and alignment of the training system and to support the reconstruction 
of the logistics system. A “flagship project” for EUSEC, according to the Council press 
release concerning the mission, has been the biometric census of troops carried out by 
the Congolese military FARDC with the EU support (Council 2012a). This census has 
allowed a proper assessment of the number of the Congolese soldiers, and has 
therefore been a cornerstone of personnel administration and financial reform. The 
census was followed by a distribution of military identity cards and reduced the number 
of “ghost soldiers” by tens of thousands. (Clément 2009, 243; More & Price 2011, 14).  
Since completing the census, the mission has provided technical advice and guidance in 
the reform of the chain of payment of the army itself. In practice, the mission has 
supported the Congolese authorities to decouple the chain of payment from the army 
chain of command, by assigning the former to the administration of the Defence 
Ministry. After this, EUSEC experts have been supervising the monthly disbursements of 
wages to the Congolese soldiers. The aim of this initiative has been to reduce corruption 
and misuse of army resources, and to ensure that the payments actually reach the foot 
soldiers. (Council 2012a) 
Furthermore, the mission has supported the training of the Congolese soldiers, 
particularly in financial and human resources management. By mid-2012, these courses 
have been attended by around 1 800 officers. In addition, the FARDC has reopened the 
Administrative School with EUSEC support after a break of 24 years. The school building 
has been renovated with the EU support, and the school now has a capacity for 140 
students. The mission has also supported opening of other training facilities. Moreover, 
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EUSEC has supported the establishment of territorial computer networks to support 
human resources management, by connecting the capital Kinshasa to the main sites of 
the military regions. Finally, the mission has supported small projects that have been 
aiming at promoting gender equality. For example, the mission implemented a project 
that has supported families and dependants of the national army soldiers. (Council 
2012a) 
With regards to the Commission’s action, as discussed earlier, the ODA-eligibility 
requirement has continued to limit the Commission’s use of its instruments to directly 
engage in the field of defence reforms. In the DRC, the Commission has been 
complementing EUSEC’s activities by financing the construction of the ‘centres de 
brassage’, the facilities used in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) 
process during the army integration (Gourlay 2008, 86; 100). In addition, the 
Commission has allocated some EUR 20 million of financing to the World Bank-managed 
Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) through the 9th 
EDF (Hoebeke et al. 2007, 5). 
Some Member States have also been active in the defense reform. Of these, Belgium 
and France have been the most active EU states. They have, for instance, provided 
training to the Congolese army (Clément 2009, 246). In fact, Belgium was funding the 
Congolese army’s integration even before the launch of EUSEC (Justaert & Keukeleire 
2010, 15), and its activities have in particular aimed at reinforcing the Congolese 
military’s operational capacity (More & Price 2011, 17).  
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5 EU AND HUMAN SECURITY-FOCUSED SSR IN CONGO 
5.1 Analysing Implementation of EU Action 
The previous chapter presented an overview of the actors and activities of the EU 
support in the DRC’s security sector reform. By looking at the achievements of the EU 
SSR action by mid-2012, it can be argued that the overall results have so far been rather 
modest: The high level of violence and insecurity particularly in the Eastern Congo 
continues, the army and the police remain fragmented and the judicial system remains 
malfunctioning. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that there are some positive developments regarding the EU SSR 
engagement in the DRC. For example, the efforts by the different EU institutions to 
coordinate and collaborate in the field of SSR in the policy level represent a positive 
development for the EU external action. Furthermore, some of the training initiatives, 
such as training of the IPU of the Congolese police, have also apparently succeeded in 
improving the conduct of this specialised unit. Other activities both in police and army 
reform to address corruption have most likely improved the human resources 
management of the Congolese formal security providers. Conducting the census of the 
police and the army are other positive achievements that have most likely improved the 
management of these sectors. Provision of training facilities and equipment to the army 
and the police, as well as provision of training, might similarly have strengthened the 
operational capabilities of these actors. Moreover, the conduction of the audit to assess 
the current state of the judicial system, and the drafting of the action plan to address 
its needs, represents a positive and important achievement in the field of justice reform. 
The Commission’s financing to the general justice reform and the support to the 
restoration of the judicial system in the Eastern Congo are surely greatly needed as well. 
At the same time, not all the supported projects have succeeded particularly well. For 
example, according to the interviewed EU officials, the processes to establish 
coordination mechanisms for the Police and the Army have been particularly slow and 
challenging. In fact, the creation of a coordination structure for a comprehensive army 
reform had not succeeded by the time when the data was collected, despite continuous 
efforts. Furthermore, by mid-2012, the interviewed officials explained that the organic 
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law to determine the status of the military had been pending for approval by the 
Congolese authorities for a long time.  
More seriously, however, the various reports continue to assess that the state security 
forces commit human rights violations on a regular basis, including sexual violence, 
torture and arbitrary killings. For example, a report by the United Nations Joint Human 
Rights Office (UNJHRO) from May 2013 details victim and witness accounts of “mass 
rape, killings and arbitrary executions, and violations resulting from widespread looting”, 
as the fighting intensified between the government forces and the new rebel group M23. 
The report noted that “particularly systematic and violent abuse was committed by 
some FARDC elements as they retreated from the towns of Goma and Sake” (United 
Nations 2013). Unfortunately this is just one example of similar reports and articles, 
frequently published by various organisations.  
However, the main focus of this study is not to examine certain individual projects 
funded by the EU, or to assess their success or failure against the expected results. 
Rather than evaluating or assessing the EU activities against their project proposals, the 
aim here is to find out how well the EU action has succeeded in following the adopted 
normative policy objectives. To return to the main objective of this study, the aim here 
is to answer the research questions presented in the beginning of this study: To find out 
whether the rhetorics of the EU SSR policy documents has turned into practice by asking 
to what extent the EU action has succeeded in understanding and adopting an approach 
that focuses on security system thinking and that endorses the concepts of broad 
security and human security, in its engagement in the Congo’s SSR.  
One way to analyse how well the EU has succeeded in adopting its normative policy 
approach is to assess the extent the officials implementing the EU support actually 
understand the key policy objectives, and the extent they support these. Therefore, 
througout the current chapter, the focus is not only in analysing to what extent the 
implementing officials have adopted an approach that supports human security and 
endorses security system thinking and the concept of broad security – but also in finding 
out how the EU actors understand these policy level objectives.  
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At first the chapter examines the extent to which the EU actors have implemented an 
approach that focuses on system-thinking and endorses the concept of broad security, 
and how the implementing officials themselves regard and understand the importance 
of this approach. This is followed by an analysis regarding the extent to which the EU 
support actually strengthens the human security of the Congolese, and how the EU 
officials see the importance of promoting human security in the context of the Congo. 
Then, before explicitly answering the research questions, the chapter seeks to shed light 
on the factors that the EU officials identify as explaining the chosen approach, and the 
reasoning behind the prioritisation of certain activities over the others. 
5.2 EU Actors and System-Focused Reform 
5.2.1 “Statebuilding the Only Option”  
In order to answer the question that how well the EU has succeeded in supporting a 
system-focused security sector reform, it is important to analyse how the EU actors 
themselves see the importance of reforming the whole security system, and of 
addressing the various formal and non-formal security actors at different levels. 
When reflecting the actual supported activities in the Congolese SSR to a system 
approach, it becomes clear that the EU approach is actually rather rather traditional: 
The EU support in the Congo focuses solely on formal security providers and the building 
of their capacity. All the activities seek to strengthen the state security actors and there 
are hardly any activities that try to directly address the informal or non-state actors. In 
fact, the line of thought among the EU officials is rather hostile towards the non-state 
actors. In practice, the only way the non-state actors should be treated, according to 
the officials, is by minimising their role to the extent possible. For example, one of the 
interviewed EU officials who works for a CSDP mission in Kinshasa explains the following, 
when asked to elaborate on the greatest security challenges in the Congo: 
I would say that today there is no direct external threat, all the threats are 
internal, and they have to due with the weakness of the state. The weakness 
of the chain of command in the army, and in fact for us, and for the reform of 
the army – that is a big problem.  
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-- It is not easy of course, because as I said already, the army is very weak, and 
the solution when you think about it, looks easy: ‘get rid of the foreign and 
internal armed groups and have an integrated army’. But to put that in place is 
a little more difficult, when you consider the size of the country… 
(Official from CSDP mission) 
--And a problem is also that because the state is weak – although it is saying 
that it is strong and [that] it won't accept that and that – finally it accepts 
everything, and it accepted even these people [the various non-state armed 
groups that were integrated in the army after the war] in the army. And we 
have a problem when these people are accepted into the army. And all this is 
linked to the weakness of the army and this weakness is also linked to the low 
level of good governance, and the lack of financing the public affairs. So you 
cannot consider the reform of the army independently from the context. And 
the context is that.  
(Official from EU delegation) 
Similarly, an official from the EU Delegation states that “the greatest challenge for the 
Congo is the lack of financial resources, due to the weakness of state” (Official from EU 
delegation). Furthermore, the official continues by saying that he/she does not see any 
way the EU should engage with the informal sector. At the end of the day, for this official, 
there is only one way to proceed: 
I'm going to be very conservative in my own thought, sorry, but again, the main 
strategic act is the strengthening of the state. This is the only way. Today we 
see there is disintegrity in the army. It cannot even protect the citizens, it is not 
even united.  
(Official from CSDP mission) 
When talking to the EU officials, it becomes very clear that the only option for them to 
address the existing security problems that the Congo is facing, is through building a 
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strong state, and strengthening the state-controlled armed forces so that they gain a 
position of monopoly over violence in the entire territory of the Congo. 
This should not be very surprising, however. Statebuilding is of course a key concept for 
the EU development policy, together with SSR. Furthermore, even the EU policy 
concepts that are based on the OECD DAC Guidelines do acknowledge that state security, 
in addition to human security, is a goal in itself. In fact, the policy documents can be 
interpreted of taking a view that these two should go hand in hand. For example, as 
discussed earlier, the OECD approach does argue that “the security of people and the 
security of states are mutually reinforcing” (OECD 2004a, 11). This seems to be also the 
argument of many the EU officials: Building a strong state is the best, and the only way 
to ensure security of the people.  
However, as discussed in length earlier, all the EU policy concepts, following again the 
OECD approach, nevertheless emphasise that the EU approach should endorse a 
system-thinking to security – and to take all the actors that are part of the production 
of security into account in the reform action. This is exactly the major difference with 
the OECD SSR approach compared to a traditional approach to security that focuses on 
state security and national security. When conducting a comprehensive security sector 
reform in a given context one needs to understand how security is produced in that 
particular context and what different actors, formal or informal, are involved in that 
production, and then take this into account in the actual reform process.  
5.2.2 Neglectance of Informal Actors  
How then, the EU actors in Kinshasa regard the role of the informal actors, be them the 
non-state security providers or the NGOs working on security-related issues? In practice, 
and consistent with their view to see statebuilding as a panacea to all security problems 
in the Congo, most of the interviewed EU officials saw the non-state actors as either 
categorically insignificant actors, or somehow dubious or even criminal forces. In any 
case, it was a common view that the EU’s practical engagement in the Congolese 
security sector reform should not engage with the local level actors but to focus on 
strengthening the state and the formal security actors. 
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To begin with the various informal security forces and militias of the Eastern Congo, all 
the interviewed officials were holding a view that the EU should not collaborate with 
these forces in any level: Such actors were categorically seen as criminal and a part of 
the problem, and the only correct way to deal with them would be to get rid of these 
forces. For example, an official from a CSDP mission explained the following: 
There is no action with the armed groups by the EU, we are only working with 
the state actors like the Ministry of Defence and the official army. We have no 
implication and we don’t have any contacts with armed groups, who are real 
problems. And one of the the real challenges with these armed groups is that 
there is sometimes in the Congolese policy a promotion of these armed groups, 
you know. You are in the East, you are poor, you don't have work, you contact 
30 people and you create a Mai-Mai group, and you are training the people, 
during one week, two-weeks, maybe one month. And then they are going to 
rape women, they are going to steal from people, they are going to make 
trouble in the area, and then the solution is that ‘oh, we are going to integrate 
these people in the army, their leader is going to be a colonel or a commander’, 
and it's always like that! You make trouble for a few weeks, one month and 
then you become an officer in the Congolese army. That's the only solution 
what they have – the integration into the Congolese army. You make widows, 
you rape women, and then you become a commander in the military. What we 
try to do is to say that you cannot take these people to the army, it is not the 
way to manage the army, it is not the way to manage an institution, a security 
institution, so stop it. But their answer is that it is the only solution we have, it 
is the political solution, and the army is paying the price of the insecurity in this 
country.  
(Official from CSDP mission) 
Interestingly, this official acknowledges that the non-state armed groups are a “real 
problem”. Nevertheless, for the official it is clear that the EU should not take any action 
with them. On the contrary, the official actually strongly criticises the pragmatic decision 
taken after the war to integrate some of the armed groups into the Congolese military. 
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In other words, the only solution for this official seems to be strengthening the military 
to a level that no other force can challenge its power in the Congolese territory. Another 
CSDP official puts the same even more directly, completely rejecting the legitimacy of 
any informal security actors and seeing them as “enemies”: 
These are no community defense groups. They have been created simply to 
improve the conditions of certain groups, not to defend communities… These 
are gangs that have been founded to rob, not to defend. This is the logic of the 
armed groups in the Congo: never to defend, always to rob. These are gangs 
that live by their own logic. The only way to stop violence would be by getting 
these gangs in line… I completely agree that these militias are enemies.  
(Official from CSDP mission) 
However, the problem is that as the informal security organisations are de facto 
controlling large areas in the Eastern Congo, these groups simply cannot be ignored. 
Furthermore, as discussed earlier, some communities in the Eastern part of the country 
do see the state security providers as a threat to their security, not as a solution, and 
this has been the trend since the colonial times. The situation is even further 
complicated by the fact that for some communities, informal security and justice 
mechanisms have always been the most, and practically the only source of security. This 
cannot be changed easily, particularly if such informal mechanisms are not included in 
the reform activities in some way or another, and certainly not before the formal 
security providers begin to be seen as providers of protection and security by the local 
communitie, instead of looting and raping them. 
A somehow different approach among the EU officials applies to such local level actors 
that are not necessarily direct security providers but could nevertheless have an 
important role in a successful security system reform. Such actors include the local 
NGOs and CSOs that have a role to play in the reform activities, and particularly in 
security management and oversight functions of the reform.  
While not seen directly as “enemies”, the interviewed EU officials, and particularly the 
officials of the CSDP missions, regard the civil society organisations either as rather 
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insignificant actors, or as some sort of troublemakers. For example, one CSDP official 
who was specifically tasked to work on issues that required close collaboration with the 
Congolese civil-society, and was somehow positive regarding to the role of the civil 
society, explains that within the missions, “…NGOs are seen as problematic and 
troublemakers, or as insignificant actors without real power... Within the CSDP missions 
there is a very stereotypical view regarding the role of the NGOs: They are seen as some 
sort of zealots” (Official from CSDP mission). The Official goes on explaining on an effort 
to attend a funeral service of a well-known Congolese human rights defender to which 
the official had been invited to attend, which was eventually rejected by the Head of 
Mission as it was not seen as important for the mission’s mandate. 
Another interviewed official from the EU Delegation, in turn, explains the following, 
when asked about the EU’s practical cooperation and engagement with the Congolese 
civil society on the security sector reform action: 
The EU is an institutional power player. There are NGOs that work in the local 
level. The European Union cannot do that. ...And I know there are a lot of good 
things that are done in the local level with NGO actors who are doing some 
good work. And we [the EU Delegation] are doing some calls for proposals, we 
are working with those NGOs. But we also need to be an institutional power 
player. This is the general agreement and this who we are. This is also the 
reason why our programmes are always in tune with the policy of the 
government. We go through the government to implement them. It can 
provide challenges because we cannot say that we work outside the 
government spectrum but we have to respect the Government.  
(Official from EU delegation) 
The official further explains that sometimes the EU Delegation does engage politically 
or “even through funding” the civil-society organisations, “in the view that they will 
actually lobby their own government”. But practically, for the interviewed official, this 
seems to be the only way the EU can cooperate with non-state actors in the security 
sector reform support, and the main message is that the EU is an “institutional power 
player” that needs to focus on working with the more important state-level issues. 
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While the EU Delegation does work with the civil society particularly on certain 
development projects, the contribution of the civil society regarding the SSR does not 
seem to be appreciated even to the same extent by some of the interviewed CSDP 
officials. On the contrary, the responses provided during the interviews by the 
interviewed officials show that the work of the civil society does not enjoy a great 
respect. For example, one interviewed CSDP official argues that the EU should not 
engage with the civil society, and suggests that the EU Delegation might currently be 
working even too much on local-level development-related issues: 
I think that the EU Delegation, that they are already involved in lot of [local-
level] projects and maybe they should focus less on these issues and just to 
focus on some key points like education and good governance. And less 
perhaps on some bottom-up projects and bottom-up issues...  
(Official from CSDP mission) 
By looking at these answers, it becomes clear that the EU actors who are involved in the 
Congo’s SSR support, and particularly the representatives of the CSDP missions, do not 
think that the EU should be focusing significantly on local level dynamics: Practically all 
the given SSR support and activities are directed at the national level and to the formal 
security providers, whereas initiatives that would possibly seek to include the local and 
informal level actors are seen as either irrelevant or even potentially harmful. 
As discussed earlier, the EU SSR concepts call for adoption of a system approach that 
takes all actors into consideration. For example, the Council Concept states the 
following: “Following the OECD guidelines there is a need to take a broad approach, 
engaging all these actors in reform efforts. Rather than focussing on a limited number 
of key sectors, a holistic, multi-sectoral approach is advocated” (Council Concept 2005, 
8). The reference point for the EU concepts, the OECD DAC Guidelines, in turn, explains 
the following regarding the role of the civil society: 
A strong civil society capable of carrying out its policy analysis and ‘watchdog’ 
role is important in creating the needed checks and balances of democratic 
governance and ensuring that security system reform meets the needs of the 
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broader public. Civil society groups should not be simply seen as alternative 
service providers or channels for donor assistance. Support for civil society 
should place greater emphasis on encouraging the development of 
independent policy interlocutors, including women’s groups who can 
contribute to and raise awareness on security decision-making. Given the 
weaknesses of state capacity in many countries, it is particularly important that 
civil society groups develop the capacity to go beyond denouncing 
governments for their failings and make practical suggestions that will help to 
sustain the reform process.  
(OECD 2005, 39) 
Therefore, by disagreeing to acknowledge the significance of the local level actors, such 
as the informal security provision mechanisms and the civil society organisations, or to 
engage such actors for other reasons, the extent in which the EU and particularly the 
CSDP missions actually succeed in adopting a system-focused SSR approach becomes 
rather questionable. In fact, by refusing to collaborate with the local-level actors, the 
EU is practically denouncing its own approach of a holistic and context-specific system-
focused reform. By looking at the EU policy documents that call for a security system 
thinking, and by following Kalyvas and Autesserre’s system-focused model of analysis 
regarding the rootcauses of insecurity, the EU’s action in the Congo can hardly be seen 
as supporting a system-focused security sector reform. In fact, it becomes rather 
questionable whether the officials implementing the EU support even understand the 
concept of a system-focused SSR. 
One way to explain this is to say that the practice of ignoring the local level follows a 
more traditional approach of trying to support the building of a Weberian state that 
secures the rights of the people. Through a monopoly to violence, this state can uphold 
the Rule of Law, and ensure that all citizens are protected from violence. In this thinking, 
anything that challenges this monopoly to violence is seen as hostile and unwanted. 
Indeed, as mentioned above, even the EU policy concepts do give some support to an 
approach that sees state security and human security as mutually reinforcing. 
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By analysing the answers given by the EU officials implementing the EU support, this 
seems to be their way of thinking. The objective for the interviewed officials is to 
strengthen the state and the formal security actors so that they could provide security 
to the citizens. This is of course an incredibly massive task, as the Congolese state is 
fundamentally an artificial colonial creation and its formal security forces currently 
often the “citizens’ nightmares” rather than their protectors. Such a starting point 
makes it extremely difficult to carry out a successful reform and to turn the Congolese 
formal security forces into true security providers. 
Nevertheless, while the chosen approach is not really the system-focused approach 
advocated in the OECD Guidelines, perhaps the EU action could advance human security 
if the EU support to the Congolese formal security made sure than the formal security 
providers actually achieve a position of monopoly over violence, and use this monopoly 
for the protection of people. In other words, instead of just strengthening these actors, 
the EU should also support their transformation into providers of security to the citizens. 
For example, Davis (2009a; 2009b) has called for a justice-sensitive approach to the 
Congolese SSR that seeks to ensure that the formal security providers that gain from the 
EU support become a source of security instead of a threat to the ordinary people. Here 
the focus should be, among else on addressing the impunity and the human rights 
violations committed by the security forces, and strengthening the military justice 
system so that it prosecutes and punishes the perpetrators.  
5.3 EU Support and Human Security: Policy and Practice 
5.3.1 EU Actors and Rootcauses of Congolese Insecurity 
If the EU actors who are implementing the SSR support activities in the DRC regard all 
the non-state actors either as irrelevant or illegitimate and focus solely on supporting 
statebuilding and the formal security sector actors, how does the EU support to the 
state security providers then seek to promote human security? 
It is clear that advancing human security is a strong policy priority for the EU. As 
presented earlier, all the three EU SSR policy concept documents, based on the OECD 
DAC SSR Guidelines, follow an approach that aims to promote human security. Similarly, 
the EU joint-approach to the Congolese Security Sector Reform, also presented earlier, 
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which is supposed to guide the EU’s comprehensive action in the country, repeats the 
normative objectives of the EU policy concepts. As presented by Rory Keane, the EU 
joint-paper focuses on three key principles that include developing a DRC nationally-
owned concept designed to strengthen good governance, democratic norms, the rule 
of law, and respect for human rights; strengthening the governance of security 
institutions; as well as enhancing service delivery in the security sector and ensuring 
that the Congolese security actors become a source of security rather than insecurity for 
citizens (Keane 2008, 224–225). These three principles, as agreed by the Commission 
and the Council, are bound to guide the EU action in the DRC’s SSR support. 
How do the EU actors on the ground then implement the policy objective of advancing 
human security in the Congo? To begin with, it is important to understand what the EU 
actors regard as the rootcauses of insecurity and chaos in the Eastern DRC and how they 
understand the concept of human security, as well as one of its key underlying 
assumptions, the inter-connectedness between development and security. 
When asked about the rootcauses of insecurity in the Congo, many of the interviewed 
EU officials do show a level of understanding between the development failures and the 
prevalence of insecurity. For example, as discussed earlier, the EU officials from both 
the EU Delegation and from the CSDP missions generally see statebuilding as a panacea 
to the Congo’s development and security problems. Consequently, they regard the 
weakness of the state as the main challenge for the Congo. As was already presented, 
one of the CSDP officials stated that “all the threats are internal, and they have to due 
with the weakness of the state”, and that ”all this is linked to the weakness of the army 
and this weakness is also linked to low level of good governance, and the lack of 
financing the public affairs” (Official from CSDP mission). An official from the Delegation 
similarly explains in a lengthy manner how improving the security situation is inherently 
dependent on the progress in building of a state and organising the finances of the state: 
I would say the greatest security threat is the weakness of the state to bring 
weak and unaccountable security forces on the ground in certain parts of the 
country. This is the case, you have an absence of the state in some parts of the 
country and you can have different groups that terrorise people in certain parts 
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of the country. And also it is true that the security forces are not paid very well, 
sometimes they act wrongly on the population. And there might be a police 
officer on the roads in Kinshasa trying to take ten dollars from you because he 
is only paid forty dollars per month and nobody can live on that so he takes ten 
dollars from you so that he can let his family to be fed. So the reason for this 
situation are the war and the destruction of the infrastructure and the lack of 
resources, particularly the resources dedicated to the state. In my mind 
statebuilding is then the only viable option. Because you can do whatever you 
want in the provincial level and maybe it will work better and maybe even in 
Ituri things will go great, but you know today, we have a huge country that 
needs a state to get to be unified and that is what you need…  
(Official from EU delegation) 
Furthermore, in addition to seeing statebuilding as the only possible way to address the 
Congo’s security and development needs, some of the interviewed EU officials also 
presented certain specific issues related to the lack of development such as lack of 
education, as rootcauses to the Congolese insecurity. For example, one of the 
interviewed CSDP officials explains such rootcauses as follows: 
I think the rootcause of the insecurity is the lack of education, poverty, greed – 
actually I think that the lack of education is the main issue because when you 
go to school, when you are educated, you will have the sense of public interest 
– and there is a real lack of this in the Congo. The Congolese don't understand 
the public interest, so there are leaders who are greedy. Especially the leaders 
of the army in the east and the local commanders of the armed groups. So, this 
is the real challenge of the Congo.  
(Official from CSDP mission) 
Another CSDP official explains how the conflict economy and the trade of conflict 
minerals sustains insecurity and violence in the Eastern Congo: 
…It is a massive set of problems. If we were completely pragmatic, we should 
focus on the trade of minerals and get it under control. The basic problem is 
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that the trade [of minerals] is unmonitored and uncontrolled. If mineral trade 
was made legal and controlled the soldiers would lose their jobs and eventually 
their profession would cease to exist. It would become an extinct profession 
and the illegal business would stop.  
(Official from CSDP mission) 
By looking at these answers it can be argued that the EU actors do have some level of 
understanding regarding one of the core assumptions behind the concept of human 
security, that security is also linked to “freedom from want” – the more development-
oriented needs of the people.  
However, in practice, as has been presented earlier, the type of SSR support that has 
been given to the Congolese formal security actors has been mostly technical in nature, 
focusing very much either on enhancing the technical aspects of the security forces to 
conduct their core operations (e.g. through building of training facilities), or on 
administrative reforms (such as reducing the level of corruption in the armed forces by 
separating the chain of payment from the chain of command). According to the OECD 
DAC Guidebook, while this type of technical support is needed, it is not alone enough to 
achieve a comprehensive human security-promoting reform that the EU policy is aiming 
to achieve: 
The task of enhancing the professionalism of security forces – including the 
military, intelligence and police services – has both a normative and a technical 
component. It is important to differentiate between this normative component 
and the technical one. In the first case, this includes strengthening adherence 
to democratic principles – especially accountability to the elected civil 
authorities and, through legislatures, to the public. Other normative elements 
include building respect among the security forces for international 
humanitarian law, internationally-accepted human rights standards, gender 
issues (including sensitivity to issues of violence affecting women), and basic 
codes of conduct that relate to the security force in question. In the second 
case, building professionalism relates to improving the technical proficiency of 
security forces to carry out core operational functions. These kinds of activities 
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might include doctrinal development (in the military) or the development of 
skills for confronting, arresting and investigating criminals (in the police), 
including the use of force in the line of legitimate duty.  
(OECD 2005, 39–40) 
In other words, the EU support in the Congo has focused by and large on “improving the 
technical proficiency of security forces to carry out core operational functions”, while the 
more normative, and the more political component, and its elements of accountability, 
respect on human rights, and impunity of the security forces, has not received such a 
strong focus. 
This argument that the EU action has not substantially addressed some of the more 
political aspects of the security sector reform is also shared by Laura Davis, whose 
justice-sensitive approach was presented earlier. Her point is that by strengthening the 
state security actors and by making them more capable to manage their resources or to 
carry out their operations “without addressing the abusive nature of the state” will not 
alone or automatically mean that human security of the ordinary Congolese is 
strengthened (Davis 2009a, 18–19). On the contrary, by strengthening the perpetrators 
and making them more capable and efficient without focusing on security governance 
and impunity, one might only make them stronger and more efficient in committing 
such violations. 
In the context of the Congo, where the formal security actors are among the worst 
human rights perpetrators, as discussed earlier, this is particularly relevant. The 
brutality of the Congolese formal security actors is also admitted by both the EU 
Concept of Operations for the Congolese CSDP missions (see, for example Council 2011a, 
7–8), as well as many of the interviewed EU officials. Logically, as Davis (2009a, 32–34) 
suggests, as the police and the army officials often pose a threat to the citizens, a 
significant focus should then be placed on preventing the violations of the security 
forces through proper vetting and training processes, and addressing impunity by 
investigating such violations and punishing the culprits.  
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In practice, the EU support to the army and the police has hardly prioritised such 
aspects. As the answers of the interviewed EU officials reveal, the focus has been very 
much on providing the Congolese formal security forces technical assistance and 
supporting their training, with an ultimate objective of making the army more proficient 
in carrying out their operations. The eventual implicit objective here is that the formal 
security actors achieve a position of monopoly regarding the use of force in the 
Congolese territory. Here is one example of this reasoning: 
In the East we see that things are very unstable. It is very hard to tell what in 
the next 20 years will become, but we can hope for a greater strength of the 
army, we can hope for reduction of the armed groups.  
(Official from EU delegation) 
5.3.2 EU Actors and Surreality of Human Security 
Why then the EU support to the Congolese security sector reform has focused 
particularly on technical capacity building rather than addressing the normative and the 
more political aspects of the reform? This is a rather complicated matter and some of 
the reasons explaining the chosen approach will be discussed in the following sections. 
One obvious explanation can however be found through examining what the actors 
implementing the EU’s Comprehensive Approach in the DRC in fact think about the 
concept of human security. By simply posing this question, it might be possible to find 
out the underlying assumptions towards the concept of human security of the key actors 
who implement the EU support in the field. 
When actually asking this question, some of the answers of the interviewed EU officials 
are rather surprising. Despite the EU’s firm support to the concept on the policy level, 
the implementing actors themselves seem in fact to be rather sceptical towards the 
concept. For example, an EU Delegation official explains in a lengthy manner how the 
the reality is “very complicated in the Congo”, and this makes it very difficult to apply 
the concept of human security. Furthermore, as the interview moves on, the official 
undermines the concept by arguing that the main challenge in the Congolese security 
sector reform is not accountability of the army but creating a unified state with a 
functioning army. 
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…[B]ut you know today, we have a huge country that needs a state to get to be 
unified and that is what you need. And that is why the concept of human 
security is workable, of course, but it is not as easy to be used as in the Eastern 
European countries in the 90s, because the main challenge is not to make the 
security forces more accountable and more in tune with the well-being of the 
people. It [the main challenge] is of course, almost to create a state and to 
create the security forces so we are doing it with the best intentions in the 
framework of human security concept and in the framework of democratic and 
human rights ideals which are all there. But when you go talk to the Congolese 
about human security when you are supporting the SSR, you will see how it 
looks like. So this is how it is, it is a workable concept. I am not saying it is not 
to be used or to be misused but we have to also understand the limitations of 
the concept in this context. 
(Official from CSDP mission) 
While the statement does follow the logic of building a state with a strong army, it is 
nevertheless somehow surprising: A senior EU official, supposed to defend the chosen 
EU approach – the one building heavily on the concept of human security – actually 
undermines the very concept. To follow this official’s logic of reasoning, though stated 
behind the veil of anonymity, the army is currently so weak that the main focus should 
be placed on strengthening the army and making it more efficient – rather than focusing 
on accountability and addressing impunity. When comparing the message of this 
statement to the language of the EU concept documents it becomes clear that the actors 
who have drafted the policy and the ones implementing it disagree on a rather 
fundamental level.  
A senior CSDP official, similarly confirming speaking anonymously, actually goes even 
further. First, the official acknowledges of not knowing much about the concept of 
human security, before continuing on criticising the EU policy level actors who demand 
on a human security approach, calling such demands surrealistic: 
[W]ith regards to the Members States, I must say that there are two things that 
are a little contradictory, which is perhaps not surprising, of course, as there 
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are 27 countries, and they want us to work on issues of human rights, impunity, 
gender, sexual violence and things like that. And, we agree, of course, we do 
whatever they want, but in fact, sometimes when we are at the PSC, for 
example, it is a little surrealistic, because some countries, especially from the 
north, insist on priority to fight sexual violence. Okay, we can do something of 
course, but if we focus on that and if we use a lot of our energy on that, in fact 
we are just treating the symptons but not the sickness. The sickness is the fact 
that this is not an army, it is just a group of people who arrives and abuses them 
and does whatever they want without any order, and that is it. --If you do not 
have a working hierachy, if you do not have discipline, it will not work. --But the 
way, sometimes, some Member States, ask us to work, and it is nonsense, but 
they want it, and we will do something about it of course…  
(Official from CSDP mission) 
From the above comment it becomes rather clear that the interviewee agrees with 
his/her colleague from the EU Delegation in that the priority should be on strengthening 
the capacity and administrative structures of the armed forces, instead of focusing on 
the “nonsense” of human security and addressing impunity, which are seen as mere 
“symptoms” of the inefficient, weak and poorly trained army. After this, it hardly is 
surprising that another CSDP official is even blunter by stating, among else, that “human 
rights, it just does not work” (Official from CSDP mission). Later on, this official also 
proposes that “perhaps the EU should give up its human rights objectives”, and instead 
focus only on very technical projects and capacity building.  
One of the interviewed CSDP officials also explaied that the missions generally, and 
particularly one of the former Heads of Mission, did not take very seriously the reports 
that the Congolese armed forces were heavily involved in raping women. The official 
also explaied that the “social project” that aimed to support the spouses and families of 
the soldiers was regarded as “a hobby horse of the General” – a project which main 
purpose was to gain positive publicity for the mission. 
The above comments show that the actors implementing the EU’s SSR support activities 
in the Congo do not genuinely value the concept of human security. Despite all the 
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normative language regarding the promotion of human rights and addressing impunity, 
the implementing actors themselves do not consider these aspects crucial for a 
successful SSR, or at least these are not prioritised high among the key tasks.  
Furthermore, if it is true that “human rights projects” are generally regarded as the 
generals’ hobby horses that only seek to polish the missions’ image, it is indeed 
questionable how much these projects in practice have impact on the ground. If the 
implementing officials do not even themselves believe in the officially stated expected 
outcomes of such projects, how likely it is that those outcomes will be met in practice? 
It also seems that some of the interviewed key actors were not even aware of the 
provisions of the EU SSR policy objectives regarding the promotion of human security. 
If this is the case, how could one even expect them to implement something they 
perhaps do not even properly comprehend? 
While lack of understanding and/or disagreement with the guiding principles of the EU 
SSR concept might in some extent explain why the EU actors are not implementing a 
comprehensive, system-focused approach that prioritises human security, there are 
also other factors that can partially explain the chosen approach. This became apparent 
during the interviews as the EU officials reasoned why the DRC’s comprehensive SSR has 
been a rather challenging task, and why certain sensitive political level questions have 
not been addressed and advocated. The next section will briefly discuss some of these 
factors – which will be followed by an effort to answer the original research questions. 
5.4 Other Factors Explaining Incoherence between Policy and Action  
5.4.1 Difficult Context and Lack of Resources: Need to Prioritise 
One of the factors that the interviewed EU officials often cite as a reason why the EU 
action has not supported a comprehensive security sector reform in the Congo and why 
resources have not been directed in advancing human security, is simply the 
combination of an extraordinarily difficult context and the scarcity of resources that 
forces the EU actors to prioritise.  
As discussed in the chapter focusing on the historical context of the Congo and the 
production and reproduction of its insecurity, the Congo is an enormous country with a 
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bleak colonial legacy, possessed by large-scale problems related to lack of development 
and security. Among such problems are also the legacy of Mobutu’s patrimonialism, the 
predatory nature of the state, an ill-functioning security sector, and unbearable poverty. 
In other words, Congo is per se an extremely challenging context, an artificial country, 
where any statebuilding effort would be an incredibly challenging task. This is exactly 
the argument made by many of the interviewed EU officials, as they explained the 
successes and challenges, and the chosen approaches and priorities, of the EU action in 
the Congo.  
For example, one CSDP official argued that statebuilding in the context of the Congo is 
extremely difficult. Among else, the official explained how the “fundamental problem” 
might well be the effort to try to “build a European state in the Congo”.  
Another CSDP official went further as he/she explained his/her version of the history of 
the Congolese state, emphasising how the country is actually initially an artificial 
construction, “created by foreigners”, “invented outside”, and how “nobody ever before 
1885 in this area thought about something like [the conteporary] Congo”. The official 
went on explaining how the independence of the Congo happened very suddenly 
without proper preparation, which meant that completely incompetent people started 
running the country, including its security organisations. For the official, this is still the 
fundamental problem of the Congo: The country is not unified or organised, and nobody 
really knows “how to deal with such a big country”. The official tells an anecdote of the 
neighbouring, organised Rwanda, explaining how the Congolese call this small country 
a meaningless “confetti” that can nevertheless invade its huge neighbour due to its high 
level of organisation: “Do you know what a confetti is? It is a very-very small piece of 
paper that you throw around in carnivals, a very small piece of paper...and they [the 
Congolese] think of Rwanda often saying that ‘this confetti – how could they invade a 
big country like this?’ ‘Okay, because they are organised and you are not!’ Well you 
cannot say that publicly of course, but that's the problem. Finally, the official explains 
how difficult task it is to reform the security sector in a context of a weak and failing 
state that “accepts everything” – even the militias that were integrated into the army 
after the war. He/she finishes his/her lengthy contribution by concluding that “…in 
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Congo, it's terrible. They have no idea, they have no idea, really. I have a lot of sympathy 
and lots of Congolese friends but they are lost.”  
A key point for these officials is that due to the troubled history and the massive 
challenges facing the country today, it will take a long time and considerable resources 
to complete the statebuilding exercise in the Congo, and to implement a sustainable 
and comprehensive SSR as part of this endeavour. Furthermore, in addition to this 
difficult context, the Congo is but one of the countries in Africa for which the EU 
provides support, and the resources allocated to any reform activity remain limited. For 
many of the interviewed officials this combination, an extremely difficult context and 
scarce resources, makes a comprehensive security sector reform a rather challenging 
task, despite all the emphasis it has gained on the policy level. For example, a CSDP 
official explains that the budget of the Congo’s state for conducting a security sector 
reform is insignificant, which means that a lot of prioritisation is required: “We 
understand that there are many things they have to do and they have to prioritise, and 
that it is sometimes difficult for them too. I don't want to give excuses for them, but I 
understand that they also may have a lot of difficulties” (Official from CSDP mission). 
Similarly, many of the interviewed officials explain how the missions constantly need to 
choose and prioritise as their resources are limited: 
So the lack of resources…is a big problem for us. And of course in some extent 
we do understand why it is like that – because there are many priorities also 
for Europe, but a mission (EUSEC) which budget last year was 13.6 million euro, 
and we had 51 European officials, when you consider the size of the country 
and all that, to some extent I would even say it cannot be achieved, it cannot 
really be achieved what we have to do here, but I think we can do it anyway. 
But it is very, very difficult to achieve what we have to do. So these are real 
difficulties.  
(Official from CSDP mission) 
This argument is also shared by some other analysts who have studied the EU’s support 
to the Congolese SSR. For example, Weiler (2009, 6) has focused on the effectiveness 
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and the internal coordination of the EU’s support to the Congo’s SSR, and notes in his 
paper that the scarcity of resources remains one of the key challenges for the EU, as it 
tries to engage in such a massive task as supporting a comprehensive SSR in the Congo. 
Hoebeke et al. (2007, 11), present a similar conclusion: The EU’s resources have simply 
not been sufficient to support a comprehensive reform in the Congo.  
While it can and should be questioned whether 51 European officials and a EUR 13.6 
million annual budget equals as a “lack of resources”, this certainly seems to be a 
fundamental problem for the interviewed officials. The argument here is that in order 
to reform the whole security system, or even substantially transform the functioning of 
any of the formal security providers, significant resources are needed. The Congolese 
army remains disintegrated and corrupted, and perceived as posing a threat to some 
segments of the population, instead of providing them security from such threats. A vast 
amount of resources would be needed to generate a comprehensive change. At the 
same time, the army does not even have the control of the whole territory of the 
Congolese State, and a part of its forces are actually constantly in operations in the 
Eastern Congo, making it very difficult to carry out a comprehensive military reform. 
Therefore, constant prioritisation is required. 
Furthermore, as became clear from the comments presented earlier, despite the 
importance given to the concept on a policy level, not many EU officials seem to regard 
advancing human security as a key priority for the EU action. On the contrary, as 
discussed earlier, many of them see a creation of a strong and functioning army as a 
higher priority. It is then not surprising that as the officials need to prioritise, they will 
prefer to use their scarce resources to finance projects that are seen most important, 
such as provision of training to the soldiers or tackling corruption, and ignore the less 
important “social projects” and the “surrealistic” concepts that “are not easy to be used” 
in the context of the Congo, such as human security. 
To conclude, the difficult context in the Congo, the scarce resources available for the 
reform, and the EU officials’ need to prioritise – combined with their general suspicion 
towards the concept of human security – are among the factors explaining the chosen 
approach.  
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5.4.2 “Some Get Caught, Others Don’t”  
Another common factor appearing in the EU officials’ answers as they explain why a 
system-focused and human security-promoting approach has not been followed in the 
EU support to the Congolese SSR is the lack of political will among the Congolese 
authorities. For example, an official from the EU delegation explains that the Congolese 
do not want to follow the EU approach: “What I could say is, for example, that it has 
been really difficult for the Congolese authorities to own a concept of security sector 
reform, which is a pretty sophisticated concept, [and] which is based on the concept of 
nation state in European countries, as you know”. 
The reasoning here is that the EU has not been successful in advancing human security 
in the Congo’s SSR partly due to the fact that the Congolese authorities have not been 
interested in such an approach. Furthermore, the EU officials argue that an adoption of 
a system-focused approach does not seem appealing to the local authorities. For 
example, according to one official, the EU has been advocating for drafting of a 
comprehensive “security strategy” that would at least in some extent follow a security 
system thinking – but that this has de facto been blocked by the Congolese authorities 
who do not wish to work in a comprehensive way: 
In fact, one could say that they [the Congolese] have not been really interested 
in developing a broader institutional framework. So there is no security 
strategy or security sector reform approach. There is a separate strategy for 
the police sector, for the justice sector, for the military sector…  
-- The Congolese preferred to work separately in each sector and maybe later 
they will be thinking a wider strategy.  
(Official from EU delegation) 
Furthermore, EUSEC officials explain how the EU has tried to support the establishment 
of a Steering Committee that would guide a more comprehensive military reform and 
improve coordination between the various actors involved in the military reform. 
However, according to the officials, the Congolese have not been interested in creating 
such a mechanism either. 
104 
 
This suggested unwillingness of the Congolese to follow an approach that the EU has 
chosen actually raises an important question related to the principle of national 
ownership: If it really is the case that the Congolese authorities do not wish to adopt 
certain approaches or ideas, such as the concept of human security, and if they, for 
whatever reason, want to work in a less comprehensive way, should they not be allowed 
to do so? This is a point that one of the interviewed EU officials raises:  
There are two ways [to handle the lack of political will by the Congolese]. Either 
you try to confront or you try to bypass. So what I think is that first we were 
trying to deal with a limited political will. But again, I dont think we should judge 
them for not doing what we are writing in our policy papers. It is also that we 
have to understand the context and the history of this country in a way that 
you cannot achieve everything you want. But we are working, and there has 
been a lot of progress in the recent years. 
(Official from EU delegation). 
Arguing that the concept of a comprehensive and human security-focused security 
sector reform is not what the Congolese authorities want, is actually supported by some 
other observers who have assessed the EU support to the Congolese security sector 
reform. For example, Vines (2010, 1097) argues that the Congolese government has not 
been fully committed to a comprehensive security sector reform and has therefore not 
prioritised reform activities in its policies. For Vines, the EU has failed in obtaining the 
Congolese ownership in its SSR support, which also partially explains why the reform 
has not been particularly successful.  
Local ownership, the first principle of the OECD Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
policy document, is of course one of the key principles of any EU development support 
initiative. If the Congolese do not actually want to follow a comprehensive or human 
security approach, why should the EU even try to push for it? While answering this 
question is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is interesting to see how the EU officials 
then defend the actual activities that they have been supporting, some of which have 
certainly not been openly welcomed by the Congolese stakeholders either.  
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For example, key projects for the CSDP missions have included the separation of the 
payments from the chain of command, as well as elimination of thousands of “ghost 
soldiers” from receiving salary payments through conduction of a military census. In 
other words, eradication of corruption has been a priority for the EU, and many of the 
interviewed officials presented these projects as some of the success stories of the EU 
SSR support. However, the EU officials also explained how there has been significant 
“resistance” among the Congolese authorities to implement the reforms that seek to 
tackle corruption. In fact, “political problems” related to unwillingness of the Congolese 
authorities and “resistance to the operation” were presented as points to emphasise the 
EU’s successful action. Despite this resistance, the EU had managed to push this reform 
activity through, and to create a system that prevents corruption. Interestingly, actions 
resisted by the Congolese that try to address corruption are justified, and actually 
identified as success stories by the interviewed officials. At the same time an approach 
that aims to promote human security can be neglected due to the same resistance. 
Nevertheless, corruption and lack of political will of the Congolese authorities are 
indeed regarded as key obstacles for a successful EU SSR support in the Congo. Some 
interviewed EU officials actually take this argument even further, in explaining how the 
Congolese officials, and particularly the army officers, are a key reason for the 
unsuccessful implementation of the EU approach. For example, an official who has 
previously worked with EUSEC, explains how the Congolese army is “completely 
criminal”, and suggests that the EU should not actually be working with the army at all. 
The official describes the army officers as “bastards” and “bandits”, and concludes by 
saying how “some of them get caught [from their misbehavior], while some do not”. 
(Official from CSDP mission) 
This reflects the line of reasoning promoted by many scholars who have focused on the 
role of the predatory state in the Congo’s history: King Leopold’s brutal colonial state 
and its feared ‘Force Publique’, as well as the post-colonial state guided by Mobutu’s 
patrimonialism and divide and rule policies, have certainly influenced how the role of 
the state, and the role of its security forces in particular, are described in the literature 
focusing on the contemporary Congo. For example, Froitzheim, Söderbaum & Taylor 
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(2011), who have discussed the challenges of the Congolese SSR, use the concept of 
neopatrimonialism to explain how the elites are now using the state to their own 
advantage, including in the efforts to reform the security system. According to them, 
the rulers of today’s Congo, similarly to the rulers of the Congo since the colonial days, 
are not committed in achieving a comprehensive security sector reform or establishing 
effective coordination among the donors but rather aim to divide the donors and work 
separately in each sector to fill their own pockets (Froitzheim et al. 2011, 62). Gambino, 
who has also focused on the challenges in the Congolese SSR and particularly on the 
EU’s role in it, agrees with Froitzheim et al., concluding that the EU SSR support to the 
Congo has “foundered fundamentally due to the Congolese’ bad faith” (Gambino 2008, 
19). 
Similarly to Froitzheim et al. and Gambino, a common line of thought among the 
interviewed EU officials seems to be that the local authorities, including the officials in 
the ministries, the commanders in the army and the police, and the local elites in 
general, are either not interested in implementing “our” (human security) approach, or 
perceived as rather corrupted or even criminal. This, in turn, according to the 
interviewed officials, makes it difficult to implement a system-focused, comprehensive 
human security approach: Either the Congolese do not want it (which might actually be 
well justified due to the principle of local ownership, as argued by the above official), or 
they are simply so corrupted and criminal that they make following such an approach 
extremely difficult. In either case, it is the Congolese authorities who are seen as 
hampering the implementation of the EU’s comprehensive SSR approach, thus making 
it practically impossible to follow a “security system” thinking or to promote human 
security through the EU support.  
5.4.3 EU’s Internal Problems 
As discussed earlier, a lot has been done in the policy level to adopt a comprehensive 
EU SSR approach, and the Congo is the country where this has been taken the furthest. 
Adoption of the joint-Council-Commission SSR Framework; creation of various short- 
and long-term instruments and tools to address conflict prevention and fragility; the 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the EEAS; and a specific joint-
EU-comprehensive approach paper for the EU’s SSR in the Congo, are all significant 
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developments that have taken place since the turn of the millennium. As a result of the 
increasing merger between the EU’s security and development policies, the EU has 
today a wide range of security and development tools and instruments available to 
support third countries’ security sector reforms in a broad, and human security-focused 
manner.  
However, this has by no means been an easy endeavor and there have been significant 
challenges on the way. As discussed earlier, within the EU’s previous pillar system, 
development policy traditionally belonged to the Commission’s competence, whereas 
primarily security-related actions have belonged to the Council, and conducted through 
the CFSP/CSDP. Despite the increasing merger in the recent years and the ratification of 
the Lisbon Treaty, this still practically continues to be the case, and the two institutions 
have not been willing to give up their competencies easily, as the previously mentioned 
SALW case, and the arguments over the scope of the IfS’ short-term component, 
showed (Gourlay 2008, 96).  
In fact, some experts argue that such tensions between the EU institutions continue to 
affect the internal operation and effectiveness of the EU action in the Congolese SSR. 
For example, according to Froitzheim et al. (2011, 48), the institutional incapacity and 
the continuing rivalry between the EU institutions have indeed limited the EU’s 
effectiveness to support a comprehensive SSR in the Congo. Weiler (2009, 22) very much 
agrees, arguing that the inter- and intra-pillar coordination continues to remain one of 
the most important problems for the EU’s SSR action on the ground.  
According to the interviewed EU officials, such observations are not completely 
unjustified. While insisting on anonymity, many of them speak surprisingly openly about 
the internal problems the EU action has been facing in the Congo. For a Master’s student 
writing a thesis on the EU’s support to the Congolese SSR this is highly interesting, 
particularly as this type of finger-pointing may in itself be an indication that the mutual 
loyalty and trust among the various EU actors in the Congo is not particularly strong.  
Perhaps the clearest challenge for the interviewed CSDP officials in this respect relates 
to the nature of the CSDP missions’ mandate: As discussed earlier, the missions have 
very much a restricted, technical mandate, and cannot therefore have anything to do 
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either with development support or the political aspects of the reform. The EU 
Delegation, and in particular the EEAS, (and previously also the EUSR), are in charge of 
the political support, and within the Delegation, the Commission deals with 
development support (More & Price 2011, 18–19). The CSDP missions in the Congo, 
however, are not even located in the Delegation, and are strictly providing technical 
assistance to the police and the military. 
However, as the OECD DAC Guidelines point out, conducting a comprehensive and a 
human security-focused army or police reform requires a significant engagement in the 
political level (OECD 2005, 28). As security sector reform very much affects the existing 
power relations it is therefore by nature a political process, which cannot be achieved 
without addressing the political sphere. Acknowledging this, the Council SSR Concept 
(2005, 9) stresses the importance for SSR reforms to address the “issues of how security 
system is structured, regulated, managed, resourced and controlled” – all inherently 
political questions by nature. Furthermore, political dialogue, together with principles 
such as good governance, the rule of law, respect of human rights, civilian oversight of 
the security sector, and accountability, is similarly identified as among the key principles 
in the EU joint-SSR concept (Council 2006a, 2–3).  
In the context of Congo, addressing the political level seems to be particularly relevant: 
As was discussed earlier, the EU officials identified the lack of political will among the 
Congolese authorities as a key obstacle for a successful SSR in the Congo. They saw the 
Congolese authorities as unprofessional or corrupted, and often blocking the initiatives 
that sought to ensure a comprehensive human security-focused and system-oriented 
reform process. Furthermore, all the interviewed officials spoke about the importance 
of addressing the political level in order to achieve the objectives of the reforms. For 
example, an official from the EU Delegation stated how they have “realised that to do a 
security sector reform you need to have political will because it is a political issue” 
(Official from EU delegation).  
For the CSDP missions’ officials, the incapacity to address the political level seemed to 
be particularly problematic. As the missions themselves are technical by nature, they do 
not possess tools to address the political level directly. This was among the biggest 
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practical challenges that the CSDP officials identified as hampering the effective 
implementation: 
We are a technical mission and our mission is to advice and to support the army 
in the reform process, in training of military and logistical issues, so we are 
technicals and technicians, we are not politicians, and actually we don't have 
the mandate to make pressure on the political level here in Congo, so we try to 
coordinate with the EU delegation whose role is to be a leader in the political 
aspects here in the Congo. But this is one of the main lacks of EUSEC. We are a 
technical mission but the problems that we need to deal with are political 
problems, and we don't have the tools to solve the problems actually. (Official 
from CSDP mission) 
Of course the biggest challenge [in the defense reform] I would say is the lack 
of political will from the Congolese side, but also the European side. For 
example, the Member States have been informed since September last year 
[2011] that we have had this problem concerning the non-promulgation of the 
law on the status of the military but there has been no political demands at any 
level concerning that towards the Congolese authorities. And of course our 
mission is a technical mission, so we can go to make demands at the level of 
generals, but we cannot go to the Congolese ministries and raise those issues, 
that is something that should be done by the Member States. So for that we 
need a position taken by the EU at a higher level, it should be done by Mrs. 
Ashton for example, or by some foreign affairs ministers of the Member States. 
We cannot do it, we can just inform and advise. So when I speak about the lack 
of the political will, it is also on the European side.  
(Official from CSDP mission) 
For these interviewed CSDP officials, a key problem seems to be the technical nature of 
the missions: They simply cannot raise political level questions with the Congolese 
authorities at an adequate level as their mandate is not sufficient for this. Referring to 
the historical division of competencies between the EU institutions, the interviewed 
officials also make it clear that they do not expect this to change in the near future. For 
110 
 
example, one of the interviewed officials (Official from CSDP mission) would welcome a 
more political role for the missions but argues that the “Brussels is not listening”, and 
that it would be never accepted “in Brussels”. Another CSDP official shares this view, 
explaining how the “view of the Commission and some of the Member States is certainly 
not to give more political power to CSDP missions” (Official from CSDP mission). 
As discussed earlier, improved EU coordination and coherence has been a specific 
objective for the EU’s SSR approach, including for the adoption of the EU SSR joint-
concept in 2006 and the DRC-specific EU comprehensive approach joint-document. How 
this cooperation between the EU institutions is then implemented in the Congo? As the 
missions completely rely on the EU Delegation to address the crucial political level 
questions, and as is emphasised in all the EU policy documents, it could be expected 
that this cooperation takes place smoothly. In practice, however, at least in mid-2012 
when the interviews took place, this did not seem to be the case.  
While the officials acknowledged that there have been some improvements in the 
mutual coordination 35 , particularly the CSDP missions’ officials felt that the EU 
Delegation and the Member States are not keen on pushing forward some of the issues 
that the missions regard important. For example, several CSDP officials complained that 
the EU Delegation has not always been interested in raising the missions’ issues with 
the Congolese authorities. According to the officials, neither the EU Delegation nor the 
Member States have been active in supporting the missions politically regarding the 
promulgation of the earlier-mentioned law on the status of the military: “The first thing 
to do, and they (the EU Delegation and the Member States) are not doing it right now, 
is to raise the issue with them. They are not speaking about it with them, and they should 
do it” (Official from CSDP mission). 
Sometimes the problems related to coordination are actually related to personal 
relations. This has apparently been the case in the past, according to one of the officials, 
when the Head of Delegation and the EUSR did not get along very well: 
                                                     
35 For example, the officials explained that nowadays there are regular comprehensive approach meetings 
between the EU actors in which information is shared, as well as other informal information-sharing 
between the CSDP missions and the EU Delegation. 
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I have been working in the Congo for nine years now and I have a lot of 
experience, and it [the lack of coordination] was also [due to] personal relations 
in some extent. With the head of the EU during the transition period until 2007 
there were no problems at all. He worked hand in hand with the EUSR, they 
appreciated each other and there were no problems. When a new Head of 
Delegation arrived in late-2007, he started to think that ‘I am the representative 
in the Congo, why do I have to meet this EUSR every two months coming here 
and going to see the President - I am the representative of the EU’. So it was a 
little personal. And he did not like that and that didn't help… 
According to the officials, similar problems surface occasionally also with certain 
Member States, as sometimes their priorities and interests conflict with the ones of the 
EU. Furthermore, on a very practical level, there have been problems related to 
communication. For example, as explained by the interviewed EU officials, the CSDP 
missions and the Commission have been using separate communications systems for 
classified documents, which has practically prevented the effective sharing of classified 
documents by email. 
The above examples, shared by the EU officials, show that the internal EU cooperation 
and coherence, despite all the progress made in the recent years, has still been affecting 
the EU action, and possibly hampered the implementation of a comprehensive, human 
security-focused SSR in the Congo.  
If the problems in the Congolese SSR, as argued by the EU officials, are in large part 
related to the political level, the EU should then raise the political questions in order to 
contribute to a sustainable reform. However, if the actors mandated to work on the 
political level do not raise the problems faced by the purely technical CSDP missions, as 
argued by some of the CSDP officials, such problems are hard to overcome. 
5.5 Answering Research Questions: EU support and Human Security  
The aim of this thesis has been to find out in what ways and to what extent the EU has 
managed to implement its normative SSR approach in the DRC. In particular, the study 
has been trying to shed light on how the EU action has succeeded in understanding and 
adopting an approach that focuses on security system thinking and the concept of broad 
112 
 
security. Related to this, the thesis has been asking how well the EU security sector 
reform support action has managed to understand and implement its objectives 
regarding the concept of human security.  
By now it is clear that the implementation of the ambitious EU SSR policy has not entirely 
succeeded. Despite clear progress regarding the development of the policy concepts, 
tools and instruments, which could enable the EU to address security sector reform 
comprehensively, the EU action in the Congo can hardly be seen as having managed to 
adopt a broad, system-focused, human security approach. 
In practice, the EU support to the DRC’s SSR has been mostly technical assistance and 
capacity building. The SSR has been regarded as an essential part of the Congo’s 
statebuilding endeavour, and therefore it has focused particularly on supporting the 
formal security providers, the police, the military and the formal justice-system. At the 
same time, the action has by and large ignored the non-state security actors and the 
various informal security provision mechanisms. However, by rejecting a possibility for 
nearly any collaboration with non-state actors, the EU action has basically abandoned 
system-thinking to security sector reform. Finally, the EU action has focused particularly 
on supporting the training of the formal security actors, and improving their 
administration and human resources management, with an implicit objective of 
strengthening the technical proficiency of state security forces to carry out core 
operational functions. At the same time the normative, or political aspects of the 
reform, have not been adequately addressed.  
Therefore, the EU SSR support in the Congo can hardly be regarded as following a 
context-specific system approach that tries to address the security system holistically, 
and to focus on how security and insecurity are produced in a particular context. Any 
initiative that seeks to include the local and informal level actors is practically seen as 
either illegitimate or even potentially harmful. By following Kalyvas and Autesserre’s 
system-focused model of analysis regarding the rootcauses of insecurity in the Congo, 
the EU action can hardly be seen as supporting a system-focused SSR. On the contrary, 
there seems to be a certain disconnect between the EU SSR policy and its actual 
implementation in the Congo: by ignoring the informal actors and by refusing to 
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collaborate with them, the EU is practically denouncing its own approach of a system-
focused reform that would take into account both the state and the non-state actors.  
A similar disconnect seems to exist regarding to promotion of human security: As the 
EU’s SSR approach is examined on a policy level, advancing human security is regarded 
as a key priority for the EU’s SSR support. Practically all the relevant EU policy papers, 
including the DRC-specific comprehensive approach joint-document, have a normative, 
human security-focused approach. In practice, however, the EU support is not 
particularly human security-focused. The EU actors implementing the EU support do 
seem to understand some of the inter-connections between development and security 
– the so-called development-security nexus – a core assumption behind the concept of 
human security. However, this understanding does not seem to significantly influence 
the type of support the EU is providing to the Congolese SSR. As discussed, the support 
provided is mostly of a technical nature, and it focuses largely on improving the 
efficiency of the formal security providers to carry put their operational functions. This 
is far from the normative, human security-focused support the OECD DAC SSR 
Guidebook and the EU SSR concept documents are advocating.  
According to the EU concept documents, in addition to focusing on the technical aspects 
of the reform, the EU action should also target at addressing questions that are political 
by nature, including issues of how the security system is structured, regulated, managed, 
resourced and controlled. Currently only few of these aspects, such as the resource-
management of the security forces, have gained particular attention, while others have 
been rather neglected. In fact, the type of support the EU has been giving to the 
Congolese security actors, has practically not been that far from a “traditional” security 
sector support that focuses only on strengthening the formal security providers, and 
seeks to ensure that they possess a monopoly over the use of force. 
However, particularly in such a context where the formal security actors are among the 
worst human rights perpetrators, producing insecurity rather than security to some of 
the ordinary citizens, the reform activities should place a significant emphasis on 
adopting of what Davis calls a justice-sensitive approach. Among else, the support 
should aim at preventing the security providers’ abuse, addressing their impunity, and 
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supporting human rights and gender-sensitive training. While there have been certain 
activities that have, at least on paper, sought to promote human rights and address 
sexual and gender-based violence, such projects have been rather small in scale and 
scope. Furthermore, as discussed above, such “social projects” seem to be seen as a 
mere visibility tools for the missions, according to some of the interviewed officials. 
Perhaps somehow surprisingly, many of the interviewed EU officials actually expressed 
clear doubts towards the concept of human security, therefore undermining one of the 
basic foundations of the EU SSR approach. In most cases, the interviewed officials were 
either not aware of the human security provisions of the EU SSR concepts, or did not 
regard such provisions as important in their work. As discussed, among the officials, the 
concept of human security and an EU approach based on this concept, were seen as 
“surrealistic”, “impossible to work”, or “not as a main priority” in the context of the 
Congo. One official even accused “some of the Member States from the North” for 
bringing such an idealist concept in the EU policy. These responses clearly show that the 
EU officials implementing the SSR support in the Congo do not in practice consider 
human security as a priority in their work. Therefore it is no longer surprising that the 
EU approach is not particularly human security-focused either. 
The tendency to prioritise statebuilding together with the low understanding and low 
interest regarding the concept of human security can certainly explain why the EU 
approach has not been particularly system-focused or human security-promoting. 
However, as was discussed earlier, there are also certain other factors that partially 
explain why the EU officials have not regarded human security as a key priority for the 
EU SSR action, and why they have not followed a truly system-focused approach in their 
support.  
For example, many of the officials explained how the extremely challenging context in 
the Congo combined with low resources they possessed, forced them to prioritise. As 
the Congolese state is an artificial structure with a particularly violent history and a 
completely ill-functioning security-system, and as resources are finite, the officials have 
to select the activities they regard as the most important. Promoting human security 
through accountability of security providers is not regarded as important priority as, for 
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example, creating a unified army with a functioning human resources system. As a result, 
and as the concept of human security is regarded suspicious, activities focusing on the 
concept are not prioritised.  
Furthermore, the interviewed EU officials regarded the Congolese authorities as a major 
obstacle to the implementation of a system-focused human security-promoting 
support. Either the Congolese officials were not interested in such an approach or they 
were seen as deliberately seeking to prevent its implementation, possibly in order to 
promote their private gains. In fact, particularly the army officials were regarded as 
criminal by some of the CSDP missions’ officials, and it was even questioned whether 
the EU should be collaborating with them in the first place. In such an environment, and 
due to the requirement “to respect the local ownership” it becomes challenging for the 
EU officials to advance concepts that are seen as Western and not supported by the 
local authorities.  
Finally, the EU’s ineffective internal coordination was identified as among the factors 
affecting the implementation of a comprehensive approach. This relates to the long 
inter-institutional rivalry between the EU institutions and to the historical division of 
competencies between the actors responsible for security and development policies. 
While it seems that there has been significant improvement in this regard due to the 
recent merger of the security and development policies and the establishment of tools, 
policies and institutional frameworks to allow a comprehensive and coordinated 
approach, the interviews with the EU officials proved that the implementation in the 
field has not completely succeeded. For example, the EU officials told about the 
problems related to the practical coordination between the EU actors. In particular, as 
the CSDP missions – the main implementing EU actors on army and police reforms – are 
technical missions, they have been relying completely on the EUSR and the EU 
Delegation regarding to the political aspects of the reform. In a difficult context such as 
the Congo, in which the local authorities are regarded as particularly uninterested in 
reforming the security sector, a successful reform is seen as impossible without 
addressing the political level. However, the CSDP officials often complained that the EU 
actors responsible for the political side have not been particularly interested in raising 
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the missions’ issues with the Congolese authorities, which in turn has affected the 
implementation of the EU support to these sectors.  
To conclude, despite the significant important efforts in the recent years regarding the 
development of EU SSR policies, frameworks and instruments, the EU’s comprehensive 
approach in the Congo has not been particularly system-focused or human security-
promoting. Therefore its comprehensiveness can be questioned. There are various 
factors that partially explain the chosen approaches in the field, including the difficult 
context; the insufficient resources; the need to prioritise; the lack of political will among 
the Congolese authorities; as well as the challenges related to the EU’s inter-
institutional set-up and division of competencies. While not all of these are factors that 
the EU actors can easily change, at least some of them could be addressed.   
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6 CONCLUSION: Many Questions, Few Answers 
This study has focused on the implementation of the normative aspects of the EU SSR 
policy through a case study on the DRC. The most important conclusion that can be 
drawn from the findings of this study is that the practical implementation of the EU SSR 
approach does not correspond to the normative aspirations spelled out in the policy. 
This is hopefully also the greatest value of this particular study: to reveal some of the 
shortcomings and gaps in the EU SSR policy implementation in order to help the 
practitioners to improve their action.  
As was discussed in the previous chapter, there are several factors that partially explain 
these shortcomings. Moreover, based on these factors, some recommendations can be 
presented how the EU could possibly improve its engagement in the Congolese DRC. 
This could be done, among else, through integrating and mainstreaming human security 
into reform activities; through training and sensitisation of the EU officials; through 
improving its internal cooperation and coordination; through ensuring that there are 
adequate resources to address questions related to oversight, impunity and 
accountability of the security actors; and simply through higher priorisation of the 
normative aspects of SSR in the policy planning and implementation. 
At the same time, it needs to be acknowledged that not all the failures regarding the 
Congo’s SSR can easily be put on the EU’s shoulders. On the contrary, as discussed in 
length in the chapter focusing on the context of the Congo, and as identified by many 
of the EU officials, the Congo is an incredibly difficult and complex context to implement 
a comprehensive reform. Moreover, as a comprehensive SSR requires addressing the 
political questions that deal with the division of resources and power, it will necessarily 
be a very long process. This is true particularly in the context of the Congo, where the 
security system has been so ill-functioning for so long time. 
In addition to possibly identifying shortcomings for the use of practitioners, the author 
of this thesis has hoped to contribute to the more general discussion around 
statebuilding, security sector seform and human security. To start with, by focusing on 
the system approach and the context-specific production and reproduction of security 
in the Congo, the author has hoped to raise thoughts regarding approaches to 
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statebuilding. Following Autesserre and Kalyvas, in the system approach the production 
of security is approached by analysing the various factors that contribute to the 
scrutinised phenomenon, and the different levels in which actions and events take place. 
For example, it is crucial to understand how the various global-level structural processes 
might affect the developing countries’ statebuilding capabilities, as well as the nature 
of their security systems. As discussed in this study, in the context of the Congo, such 
structural processes could include, for example, globalisation, the imposition of new 
public management, or the ending of the Cold War. Similarly, by focusing solely on the 
national level dynamics and ignoring how the different local-level mechanisms and 
events might contribute to the production of security in a given context, such important 
factors might not be taken into account in the reform process. In the context of the 
Congo this kind of one-eyed focus on the state level can be particularly tragic. 
Furthemore, applying a system-focused analysis in the production of security allows us 
to understand that statebuilding and SSR in the Congo are particularly difficult for the 
fact that the Congo is not really a state. As was noted in the Introduction, the Weberian 
concept of nation state is based on the model of European nation states. The capabilities 
of such state include a monopoly of legitimate violence within its boundaries. The Congo, 
in turn, is practically an artificial state, a huge area with various ethnic groups who did 
not have much in common before the creation of the colonial state. Moreover, in the 
context of the Congo, the security system has always been used by the ruling elites to 
advance their own gain, instead of providing actual security to the Congolese citizens. 
In fact, the formal security providers have never been regarded as legitimate providers 
of security to some parts of the population, and various informal security-provision 
mechanisms have always been emerging particularly in the East.  
Therefore, a critical question is whether it is even possible to transfer a liberal 
democratic state into the context of the Congo, where the history of state is rather 
contradictory and sad, and if so what is the best way to achieve this? In particular, is the 
simple focus on the state level, and building the operational capacity of the formal 
security actors really the best way to achieve a comprehensive security system reform 
in a context where the formal actors do not enjoy a particularly high level of trust among 
the population? Furthermore, how justified it is to focus one-eyedly on the national 
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level statebuilding, and ignore the possible local-level rootcauses of violence, as well as 
the local-level security-provision mechanisms and other security-related actors? How 
well-advised it is not to incorporate the local perspectives to the security sector reform, 
for instance through wide public consultations, as doing so could help to find flexible 
and practical strategies for the reform process? 
While these questions are partly beyond the scope of this thesis, it should, at a minimum, 
be understood that any statebuilding or SSR activity cannot succeed if the state or the 
security actor in question does not become seen as legitimate by the population. In the 
context of the Congo, a reform of the currently predatory security system cannot be 
achieved without trying to transform the system into a one that actually produces 
security to the Congolese people. Even if it was taken for granted that building a state 
is the most important long-term strategic objective in the DRC, as advocated by some 
of the EU officials, it should at least be asked what kind of a state the EU is helping to 
build, and what type of support the EU should give to the Congo. If the EU is obliged to 
regard the Congolese state as the only legitimate provider of security to the Congolese 
people, how should the EU then support the Congolese formal security providers in 
order to ensure that the formal actors actually become a source of security and 
protection to the Congolese people?   
The point of view of the author is that without addressing the the normative aspects of 
the SSR, the reform cannot succeed. Here the concepts of human security and broad 
security are particularly useful. As mentioned earlier, the very concept of human 
security is of course closely linked to the discussion on the inter-connection between 
security and development, the security-development nexus. The problem here is, as 
mentioned briefly earlier, that the concepts of development and security are very broad 
and elusive, and the mechanisms that affect the production of the two complex. More 
work is therefore needed to understand the actual linkages between the two. 
At a practical level, there is still use for an approach that understands development and 
security as the two sides of the same coin, however. In particular, through a system 
approach, at least some of the interlinkages between the production and reproduction 
of security and development can possibly be revealed. Indeed, as discussed earlier, the 
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system approach sees the whole social reality as a holistic system, in which everything 
affects everything. Therefore, for example, through figuring out how the grievances at 
a certain level have affected the nature of conflict in various levels over the time, can 
reveal some inter-connections between the two. Furthermore, when looking at our case 
study of the Congolese SSR, the usefulness of a human security approach at a practical 
level becomes evident: while the traditional approach to security is only focusing on the 
external security of a particular state, the human security approach sees that it is not 
enough to focus solely on the state survival, particularly in a context where the state is 
of a predatory nature. The focus in the SSR is therefore in its normative aspects, and the 
security of the people.  
While beyond the scope of this thesis, a few words should be written regarding to 
another hurdle concerning the implementation of the normative aspects of the EU SSR 
approach. In particular, there is a contradiction between the EU development policy 
principle of local ownership, and the promotion of the normative aspects of reform, 
including demands to reduce corruption or promote human rights. The argument 
presented by one of the interviewed EU officials was that the EU should perhaps not to 
try implement an approach that seeks to promote human security. Instead, the EU 
should respect the Congolese ownership, and the Congolese authorities are simply not 
interested in this type of approach.  
It was already discussed earlier that at the same time the EU officials were often seeing 
the Congolese as corrupted and even criminal, and it was also presented that the 
projects that were addressing corruption were seen as justified and as success stories. 
This was despite the fact that they were regarded as challenging to implement due to 
the Congolese resistance. This might to some extent propose that a respect of the 
national ownership is not necessarily an overarching guiding principle for the EU action. 
A good question here is that should national ownership even be an overarching principle 
in a context such as the Congo?  
In the Paris Declaration for Aid Effectiveness, the donor countries commit to “respect 
partner country leadership and help strengthen their capacity to exercise it” (OECD 2008, 
3). But an important question here, and particularly relevant for the discussion on 
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human security, is whether the country leadership actually represents the interests of 
the citizens. The concept of ownership is interpreted as the ownership of the country 
leadership, the ownership of the state, but if the state is controlled by corrupted officials 
of which “some get caught, while some do not”, should their capacity really be “helped 
to be strengthened”? In particular, can it be expected that the country leadership could 
ensure the interest of the people in a country that has for most of its history been 
misruled and abused by its ruling classes and elites, and where the state security 
machinery has been used to prey on its citizens instead of protecting them? On the 
other side of the scale there is, of course, the burden of a colonial legacy that the EU 
will always continue to carry in its engagement in Africa. This makes any political or 
normative demands and conditions particularly difficult. 
Finally, there is one more difficult but practical question that has emerged during the 
writing of this thesis. This concerns the line between pragmatism and idealism regarding 
the integration of militias and addressing impunity. In particular, the question here is at 
what expense can peace be bought? Currently, as discussed earlier, strengthening of 
the government and the eradication of the militias are seen as the main strategic actions 
by the EU officials. However, if the government is not capable to defeat the militias, and 
if granting an amnesty and integrating them into the national army were the only way 
to stop the fighting and violence, should demands for justice be given up to achieve the 
ending of hostilities? In particular, should persons who have committed human rights 
violations, whether they were part of the state or the non-state forces, be integrated to 
the army if this was a way to end fighting? This, and many of the above questions raised 
here are however left unanswered, to be hopefully responded by more intelligent 
people in future.  
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ANNEXES 
Annex 1: Information Sheet for Participants 
 
The European Union Involvement in the Security Sector Reform 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Advancing 
Human Security by Building a Robust State? 
 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR   
PARTICIPANTS  
 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project.  
 
 
What is the Aim of the Project? 
The aim of this project is to examine the EU’s increasing engagement in the third 
countries’ Security Sector Reform (SSR) through a case study on the EU’s involvement 
in the SSR of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). More specifically, the focus 
is on the implementation of the coordinated, comprehensive and context-specific ‘human 
security’ approach that the different EU SSR concept papers in general, and the EU action 
in the DRC’s SSR in particular, have adopted.  
 
Through interviews with the key EU stakeholders, both with the Commission as well as 
Council/CSDP officials, the project will seek to find out in what ways the EU’s normative 
and holistic SSR approach has been implemented in practice, and in which extent it has 
contributed to the human security of the Congolese. Furthermore, through an analysis of 
the possible implementation gaps, the project seeks to identify possible grounds for a 
more efficient SSR engagement in future.  
 
You are being asked to participate because you belong to the identified key stakeholders: 
The EC officials or the CSDP civilian missions’ officials. We expect to interview 
between 10-20 EU officials who work in the planning or implementation of the EU DRC 
SSR action, either in Kinshasa or in Brussels. 
 
The project is being undertaken as part of the requirement for a Master’s degree in 
Development Studies at the University of Helsinki, Finland. 
      
What will you be asked to do? 
 
The interviewees are asked to participate in an interview that will last between 30–45 
minutes, via telephone or skype, and which will be recorded.  During the interview you 
will be asked questions regarding your views on the root causes of the Congo’s insecurity, 
the success of the EU’s SSR action to improve the Congolese human security, and the 
challenges for the implementation of the EU comprehensive SSR approach in the DRC, 
as well as some related questions that might arise over the course of the interview. The 
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precise nature of the questions have not been strictly predetermined in advance, but will 
depend on each interviewee’s personal responsibilities and the mandate of his/her 
organisation, as well as the way the interview develops. However, the following areas 
are covered over the course of the interview: 
 
The efficiency of the EU action and the challenges for implementation of SSR 
projects: 
 In which ways the interviewee regards the EU action, and the particular reform 
projects she/he is involved, as having contributed improving the security situation 
in the DRC? 
 What has possibly not succeeded as effectively as intended? 
 What are considered as the biggest challenges with regards to the implementation 
of a comprehensive EU SSR approach, and/or the particular projects that the 
interviewee is involved? 
 
Rootcauses of the Congo’s ‘human insecurity’ & the EU’s holistic approach to 
tackle it: 
 What do you regard as the biggest security challenges in the Congo today?  
 What kinds of factors are regarded as having caused/causing the contemporary 
insecurity? 
 How is the EU action tackling these security threats/root causes, and what factors 
are considered possibly as preventing the EU from tackling such threats? 
 Why the chosen actions have been prioritised over others? 
 
EU’s Coherent and Coordinated Approach: 
 In which extent are the other EU institutions/Member States’ SSR efforts 
complementing the interviewee’s organisation’s SSR action, and the vice versa? 
 How well is coordination with regards to the EU SSR-action taking place between 
the CSDP-missions and the EC-action (EDF, IfS, EIDHR-instruments) in the field? 
 How is communication and coordination taking place between the EU action and 
the other donors, and with the Congolese authorities? 
 
In the event that the line of questioning does develop in such a way that you feel hesitant 
or uncomfortable you are reminded of your right to decline to answer any particular 
question(s) and also that you may withdraw from the project at any stage without any 
disadvantage to yourself of any kind. 
 
What personal information will be collected and how will it be used? 
You will be asked to share your age, gender, name of the Organisation in which you 
areserving/served, length of service, and nationality, as well as list your core 
responsibilities/duties in your organisation. As mentioned above the interviews will be 
recorded and portions of them will be transcribed. Each recording will be given an alias 
associated with the personal data on the form. After that point your name will not be 
associated with your interview.  
 
The information you share will be used to write a thesis and potentially other papers and 
reports.  Fragments of your interview may appear in the final report, but will only be 
identified by alias and the name of the mission or project. Your name will not be used in 
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any publication, paper or report. For example, in the final report you could be referred as 
an ‘EUPOL official’, or ‘Commission Official in Kinshasa’. 
 
The interviews will be partially transcribed. The researcher is a post-graduate student and 
his supervisors may also be able to listen to the interviews and read transcripts and 
summaries.  
 
The results of the project will be available in the University of Helsinki Library. You are 
also welcome to request a copy of the thesis.  
 
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free 
to contact: 
Matti Karvanen, masa.karvanen@gmail.com, tel: +358 (0)41 533 0366. 
